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ABSTRACT 
The other-race effect refers to the impoverished individuation and recognition of other-race 
faces relative to own-race faces. The aim of this thesis was to investigate non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation, inter-/intra-racial context, and encoding conditions as 
signalling cues that affect own- and other-race face processing. Across eight experiments 
using both behavioural and neuroimaging methods, I demonstrated (1) that the context in 
which own- and other-race faces are encountered can determine the salience of racial category 
membership, with implications for how (and how much) non-racial ingroup/outgroup status 
influences own- and other-race face perception, (2) that task demands can lead perceivers 
toward more or less configural processing regardless of target ingroup/outgroup status, with 
implications for the influence of non-racial ingroup/outgroup status, and (3) that both racial 
and non-racial ingroup/outgroup status have the potential to influence the early stages of face 
perception. These findings both support and extend the Categorisation–Individuation Model, 
yielding a more comprehensive insight into the other-race effect. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“THEY ALL LOOK ALIKE TO ME”: THE OTHER-RACE EFFECT  
 
This chapter introduces the other-race effect, or the common observation that people find it 
especially difficult to discriminate between, and display impoverished recognition for faces of 
a different race from their own, relative to faces of their own-race. The literature review 
details potential mechanisms underlying the effect, and highlights several influential 
theoretical models of the other-race effect, culminating with the recently proposed 
Categorisation–Individuation Model. The review details the model’s assumptions, reviews 
supportive evidence, and highlights limitations and areas for theoretical advancement. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the aims and hypotheses of the thesis and an overview of the 
general methodological approach.  
 
1 Introduction 
“…It is well known that, other things being equal, individuals of a given race are 
distinguishable from each other in proportion to our familiarity, to our contact with the 
race as a whole. Thus to the uninitiated American, all Asiatics look alike, while to the 
Asiatic all White men look alike…” (Gustave A. Feingold, 1914) 
 
 “They all look alike to me”. This uncomfortable, but not uncommon, impression is 
often what people experience when confronted with members of ethnic groups other than 
their own (Meissner & Brigham, 2001a; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005; Sporer, 2001). 
Indeed, the reduced individuation of other-race relative to same-race faces has been of 
concern for psychologists for nearly a century (e.g., Feingold, 1914), as it can have important 
negative consequences both for the perceiver and the target. For the perceiver, mere feelings 
of social embarrassment at not being able to recognise other individuals; for the target, the 
2 
potentially life changing, as in cases of eyewitness misidentification that lead to criminal 
conviction and prison sentencing (Brigham, Bennett, Meissner, & Mitchell, 2007). Such 
reduced individuation can also maintain heightened levels of intergroup conflict and mistrust, 
and cognitive processing biases begin to inform stereotypes during the perception of other 
individuals (Brigham & Malpass, 1985). For example, other groups are perceived as more 
homogenous than the individual’s own group (Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Linville & 
Jones, 1980; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Intergroup interactions therefore become less 
rewarding and more difficult due to the likelihood of making recognition errors (Brigham, 
2008). Avoiding such inter-racial interactions, however, only maintains perceptions of other-
race homogeneity. The clear importance of this own-race advantage in individuation has 
therefore motivated a profusion of attempts to identify its causes, cumulating in several 
theoretical models of the “other-race effect” (e.g., Meissner & Brigham, 1985). These 
accounts can be more broadly divided into perceptual expertise based explanations, or 
feature-based accounts of the other-race effect.  
These accounts differ in the proposed locus of the other-race effect, but say little about 
possible interactions between perceptual experience and social categorisation or the specific 
aspects of face processing that may be affected by these factors. Broadly, this thesis examines 
the relative weightings between social-motivation and perceptual experience (i.e., race-
specific processing experience) in determining memory and processing outcomes in the other-
race effect at the behavioural and electrophysiological level. I examine how racial context and 
encoding goals influence the relative weightings of these factors. I begin by introducing the 
other-race effect in more detail and outline the memory and processing, correlates of racial 
biases in face memory and processing.  
 
3 
2 The Other-Race Effect  
The other-race effect, interchangeably referred to as the own-race bias, cross-race 
effect, and the cross-race recognition deficit, refers to the finding that discrimination and 
recognition accuracy tend to be impoverished for other-race, relative to own-race, faces 
(Ayuk, 1990; Brigham, & Barkowitz, 1978; Barkowitz & Brigham, 1982; Cross, Cross, & 
Daly, 1971; Chance & Goldstein, 1981; Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 1975; Ellis & 
Deregowski, 1981; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; Lindsay, Jack, & Christian, 1991; Malpass & 
Kravitz, 1969). The effect remains one of the most replicated findings within the face 
perception literature. (For reviews, see Brigham, 2008; Brigham et al., 2007; Brigham, 1986; 
Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance, & Goldstein, 1996; Sporer, 2001).  
Several meta-analyses have examined the other-race effect (Anthony, Copper, & 
Mullen, 1992; Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989). Meissner et al. (2001a) analysed data 
from 39 research articles, involving 91 independent samples and nearly 5,000 participants and 
focused on recognition sensitivity, as calculated within a signal detection framework. In brief, 
signal detection postulates that during face recognition experiments, participant’s responses 
are generated either by the signal (i.e., familiarity/memory for a target face) or are generated 
by noise (i.e., occur due to chance or misattributed familiarity for a new/foil face; e.g., Green 
& Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Correct identification of target faces produces 
a “hit”, and inappropriately identifying a foil face as a target produces a “false alarm”. By 
calculating the sum of hits and false alarms, signal detection produces an estimate of the 
signal strength relative to noise (d’), and can be utilised to calculate response strategy/bias 
(C). Measures of response bias reflect the overall strategy employed by participants when 
making old/new judgements. Participants can either exhibit a liberal response bias (i.e., 
responding incorrectly that a target face is present when it is actually absent), a conservative 
4 
response bias (i.e., incorrectly responding that a target is absent, or committing a “miss”), or 
no bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). In terms of the other-race effect, Meissner et al.’s 
meta-analysis demonstrated several findings of interest. Firstly, the other-race effect was 
robust, accounting for 15% of the variability across all studies. Secondly, a significant 
“mirror” effect was observed, characterised by a pattern whereby other-race faces received a 
lower proportion of “hits” (i.e., other-race targets were less likely to be correctly identified as 
a target, relative to own-race targets), and a higher proportion of false alarms (i.e., other-race 
foils were incorrectly identified as targets more, relative to own-race foils). Consistent with 
this mirror effect, Meissner et al. also found evidence for differential response biases to own-
race and other-race faces. Own-race faces were associated with a more conservative response 
bias (i.e., incorrectly responding that a target is absent more often, or committing more 
“misses”). In contrast, other-race faces were associated with a more liberal response bias (i.e., 
responding incorrectly that a target face is present more often when it is actually absent); 
however, this accounted for less than 1% of the overall variance across studies (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001a). These differences in response strategy may reflect attention differences 
modulating recollection and familiarity processes in participants’ judgements (Macron, Susa, 
& Meissner, 2009). For example, it may be that we actually recollect own-race faces (i.e., 
remember them) more, where as for other-race faces we rely mere feelings of familiarity (i.e., 
he seems familiar; Meissner et al., 2005). Overall, the data presented thus far suggests that 
own-race faces are processed either more efficiently or in a qualitatively different way to 
other-race faces, a point to which I will return in subsequent sections.  
Other-race effects are not exclusive to White individuals; indeed, other-race effects 
have been observed using various ethnic groups as participants, such as Hispanic (e.g., Gross, 
2009, Platz & Hosch, 1988; MacLin, MacLin, & Malpass, 2001), East Asian (e.g., Chance, 
5 
Goldstein, & McBride, 1975; Chance, Turner, & Goldstein, 1982; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; 
Gross, 2009, Luce, 1974; Ng & Lindsay, 1994, Michel, Caldara, & Rossion., 2006; 
Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, de Schonen, 2005), Black (e.g., Ellis & Deregowski, 
1981; Gross, 2009), and Middle Eastern participants (e.g., Megreya, Burton, & White, 2011). 
Therefore, the other-race effect therefore transcends racial group membership.  
 The aforementioned paragraph may lead the astute reader to believe the other-race 
effect is explained entirely by majority or minority group status within a given country. This 
assumption, however, would be inaccurate. Other-race effects have been observed in both 
majority and minority groups (Gross, 2009; Platz, & Hosch, 1988; Wright Boyd, & Tredoux, 
2001, 2003). For example, in a classical field study of the other race-effect, Platz and Hosch 
(1988) examined the performance of Mexican, Black, and White convenience store workers 
in the United States in identifying customers (in reality, confederates) of these same three 
ethnicities. Customers had interacted with the workers earlier in the day (for example, by 
asking for directions) or made memorable transactions (for example, by paying in pennies). 
Two hours later, two more confederates, posing as law interns, asked the convenience store 
workers for help in identifying customers who may have entered the store that day. Platz and 
Hosch observed a significant other-race effect, with each group recognising faces of their 
own-race better than faces from any other ethnic group. More recently, Gross (2009) had 
participants representative of the four major ethnic groups within the USA (White, Black, 
East Asian, and Hispanic) perform a recognition task with faces of each ethnic group and 
objects. Data were analysed with object recognition scores as a covariant, essentially 
controlling idiocentric differences in visual recognition. Critically, all participants exhibited 
an own-race bias at recognition; this was irrespective of majority or minority group status. 
However, all ethnic groups did exhibit greater recognition for White (i.e., the majority group 
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within the USA), after their own race, with the exception of Black participants who exhibited 
equal recognition of Black and White faces. Therefore, the other-race effect transcends 
minority/majority group status.  
Finally, although Meissner et al. (2001a) included in their meta-analysis a vast 
majority of studies conducted within the USA and Canada (around 85; Meissner et al., 2001a; 
Brigham, 2008; Brigham et al., 2007), it would be a misapprehension to assume that the effect 
is restricted to North America. Indeed, the other-race effect has been replicated across many 
different countries. For example, other-race biases have been evident both in South Africa and 
the United Kingdom (e.g., Chiroro & Valentine, 1995, Walker, & Hewstone, 2006a; Wright, 
Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001, 2003), as well as other European nations such as Germany (e.g., 
Sporer, 2001; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004), Middle Eastern nations such as Egypt (e.g., 
Megreya, Burton & White, 2011), and Eastern cultures (e.g., Ng & Lindsay, 1994). The other-
race effect, therefore, transcends differences in culture.  
In conclusion, the other-race effect is a robust phenomenon that transcends race, 
culture, and minority/majority group status. Consequently, the other-race effect cannot be 
explained by simple differences between these variables, but instead reflects a more general 
bias in the way we encode, perceive or remember people that are from different ethnic groups 
than our own.  
3 Theoretical Approaches: Why the Other-Race Effect Occurs 
Given the overwhelming importance and pervasiveness of the other-race effect, 
several theoretical accounts have been proposed in the literature, with varying degrees of 
explanatory success. Early approaches alleged that the effect is explained by physiognomic 
differences between disparate race faces, or by racial prejudice. Expertise accounts, in 
contrast, generally propose that the effect is a consequence of limited perceptual experience 
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with other-race faces. Finally, attentional accounts assert the other-race effect derives from a 
tendency to pay less attention to, or disregard other-race individuals, rather than derived from 
perceptual experience per se.  
3.1 Early Approaches: Homogeneity and Racial Prejudice  
One of the earliest explanations of the other-race effect was that other-race (i.e., non-
White/Caucasian) faces are more or perceived to be more physiognomically homogenous 
(e.g., Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). Accordingly, discrimination between and recognition of 
other-race faces are impaired relative to White face recognition. Researchers investigating 
physiognomic homogeneity have found very little evidence to support their hypotheses. 
Indeed, this line of enquiry is substantially undermined by the overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating that the impoverished recognition for other-race faces, but unimpaired 
recognition for own-race faces, occurs across various ethnic groups (see previous sections). 
For example, other-race individuals (i.e., non-White individuals) display superior recognition 
of their own racial group relative to other-racial groups (e.g., Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; 
Byatt & Rhodes, 2004; MacLin & Malpass, 2001; Chance et al., 1982; Chance, Goldstein, & 
McBride, 1975; Goldstein, & Chance, 1980; Gross, 2009; Luce, 1974; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; 
O’Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentine, & Abdi, 1994; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Sangrigoli et al., 
2005; Valentine & Endo, 1992). Observations that non-White participants find it difficult to 
recognise White faces generally undermines an explanation of the other-race effect based 
exclusively on White faces having more physiognomic variability than non-White faces.  
Experiments directly investigating physiognomic homogeneity have failed to provide 
any plausible evidence in support of the accounts assumptions. Anthropological measures 
show no support of racial homogeneity. For example, Goldstein and Chance (1979a, 1979b) 
examined anthropological measurements in White, Japanese, and Black faces (taken from 
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previous research). The authors concluded there was no plausible evidence for racial 
differences in facial heterogeneity (i.e., all of the different racial faces tested exhibited similar 
amounts of facial variability).  
Psychological experiments have also been unsuccessful in establishing any credible 
evidence for within-racial group homogeneity (e.g., Goldstein & Chance, 1976, 1978; but see 
Goldstein & Chance, 1979c, for contrasting evidence). For example, Goldstein and Chance 
(1976) used a perceptual same/different paradigm with pairs of own- or other-race faces; their 
reasoning was that if other-race faces really are more homogenous, then White participants 
should show longer reaction times and produce more errors when making same/different 
judgements to other-race faces. Results demonstrated that both reaction times and accuracy 
rates did not differ as a function of stimulus race. In a follow-up study, Goldstein and Chance 
(1978) had White and East Asian participants perform a task where they judged whether pairs 
of White or pairs of East Asian faces were more or less similar to each other. Again, the 
results failed to establish any difference in participants’ average judgements as a function of 
race. 
In conclusion, there is no compelling evidence that the other-race effect is accounted 
for by racial differences in physiognomic homogeneity. However, as Meissner and Brigham 
(2001a) note, different physiognomic features may be more appropriate for discriminating 
between and recognising own-race—but not other-race faces (Bar-Haim, Saidel, & Yovel, 
2009; Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975; Shepherd, 1981; Shepherd & Deregowski, 
1981). 
A second early explanation of the other-race effect was that the bias reflected an 
individual’s racial prejudice. Otherwise stated, people with more prejudiced attitudes would 
be less motivated to differentiate between other-race faces. Nevertheless, explicit measures of 
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prejudice have consistently failed to corroborate any relationship between the magnitude of 
the other-race effect in memory and participants’ racial prejudice (Brigham & Barkowitz, 
1978; Lavrakas, Buri, & Mayznerm 1976; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 
2000). Nor does evidence emerge when implicit measures are used. In a recent study, 
Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, and Sriram (2001) used a priming procedure (after Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995) whereby they presented participants with a list of adjectives, each 
of which was preceded by either an own- or other-race face. Participants had to decide as 
quickly as possible whether each word had a positive or negative connotation. In this 
procedure, the degree to which faces facilitate the judgements of positive or negative words 
indicates a participants’ attitude towards a target race (Fazio et al., 1995). Specifically, faster 
responding to negative adjectives when preceded by an other-race face than an own-race face, 
and slower responding to positive words when preceded by an other-race face than an own-
race race, indicates a negative attitude towards the other racial group. Following this priming 
procedure, participants completed an old/new recognition test, where the old/target faces were 
the same faces employed in the priming task. Ferguson et al. observed no evidence that 
implicit prejudice (as indexed by priming effects) influenced the magnitude of the other-race 
effect. In conclusion then, there is no credible evidence suggestive of prejudice underpinning 
the other-race effect. This is substantiated by Meissner and Brigham’s (2001a) meta-analysis, 
which found no direct link between level of prejudice and other-race recognition.  
3.2 Expertise/Perceptual Familiarity Accounts 
Expertise accounts, in general, propose that perceivers are more familiar/experienced 
with own-race than other-race faces and consequently process own-race faces more accurately 
and efficiently than other-race faces (e.g., Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Goldstein & Chance, 
1985, Kelly et al., 2007a), the result of which is substantially improved recognition for own-
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race relative to other-race faces. According to this account, the greater contact that perceivers 
have with members of their own racial group leads them to become substantially more 
sensitive to the facial features and cues of their own race, allowing them to successfully 
differentiate between countless numbers of disparate own-race faces (Byatt & Rhodes, 2004; 
Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Corenblum & Meissner, 2006; Furl, Phillips, & O’Toole, 2002; 
Hills & Lewis, 2006; Valentine, 2001; Walker & Hewstone, 2006a).  
In essence, the expertise hypothesis implies that the magnitude of the other-race effect 
reflects the amount of inter-racial experience one has had with a given race. Consequently, the 
other-race effect should be most evident in individuals who either have had no, or very 
limited, experience with other-race faces; in contrast, the other-race effect should be absent or 
weak for those with high levels of inter-racial experience. Three lines of enquiry are generally 
cited as supporting this reasoning: adoption studies (e.g., Sangrigoli et al., 2005; De Heering, 
Liedekerke, Deboni, & Rossion, 2010), developmental studies (e.g., Chance et al., 1982; 
Ferguson, Kulkofsky, Cashon, & Casasola, 2009; Kelly et al., 2005; 2007a; b; 2009; 
Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Walker & Hewstone, 2006a), and studies of intergroup 
contact (e.g., Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Carroo, 1986, 1987; Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; Cross et al., 1971; Larvrakas et al., 1976; Luce, 1974; Malpass & Kravitz, 
1969, Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001, 2003).  
3.2.1 Adoption studies. If experience underlies the other-race effect, then individuals 
who have had substantial experience with members of other racial groups should display no, 
or at least a negligible other-race effect. Indeed, individuals who have had more experience 
with another racial group than with their own might even manifest reversed other-race effects. 
One such scenario where own-race experience may be limited is after inter-racial adoption. 
There are at least two notable studies. Sangrigoli et al. (2005) performed a delayed match-to-
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sample face recognition test with adult Korean participants who had been adopted into White 
European Families when they were 3–9 years old. The results demonstrated that irrespective 
of the age of adoption, the adoptees exhibited a strong—but reversed—other-race effect. That 
is, Korean adoptees recognised White (other-race) faces better than Korean (own-race) faces. 
These results support the assumption that the other-race effect derives from experience with 
racial groups—to the point that it is even reversible in childhood, as the face processing 
system is maturing. It also adds weight to the assertion that experience is pivotal in 
determining the extent to which we learn the cues that aid own- and other-race discrimination 
(e.g., Chiroro & Valentine, 1995).  
Other evidence suggests that while experience may play a crucial role in learning cues 
for own- and other-race individuation, it is imperative that that such experience takes place 
while the face processing system is still evolving (e.g., Carey, Diamond, & Woods, 1980; de 
Heering et al., 2010). For example, de Heering et al. (2010) investigated recognition accuracy 
among 6–14-year-old Asian children adopted between two and 26 months of age into White 
European families. Unlike the results reported by Sangrigoli et al. (2005), de Heering et al. 
found no reversal of the other-race effect. Nonetheless, recognition was comparable for own-
race and other-race faces, suggestive that experience with White faces overrode the 
emergence of the other-race effect; this effect was not modulated by participant age at 
adoption. Overall, the results indicate that exposure to own-and other-race faces can modulate 
own- and other-race face representations while the face system is maturing; even when 
exposure occurs relatively early (i.e., 2–26 months); however, this may still be insufficient in 
order to overcome the face representations acquired during very early infancy (e.g., Kelly et 
al., 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Quinn et al., 2008; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004).  
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3.2.2 Developmental studies. If experience underpins the other-race effect, then it is 
possible that the effect follows a developmental trajectory whereby face representations 
become increasingly more tuned to faces of the perceiver’s own race. Chance, Turner, and 
Goldstein (1982) reported a developmental trend, suggesting that the other-race effect 
becomes more robust with increasing age. In a recent study, Walker and Hewstone (2006a) 
tested White primary school (aged 7–11 years), secondary school (aged 12–15 years) and 
university students to investigate the developmental time course of the other-race effect, using 
a same/different perceptual matching task (after Walker & Hewstone, 2006b, Walker & 
Tanaka, 2003). In this procedure, participants viewed either a White or Asian parent face, 
followed by the same face or a morphed face (created by morphing together a White and 
Asian parent face over varying degrees along a linear continuum). Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether the faces were the same or different. Analysis of hits (or when a 
participant correctly identified the trial type, i.e., same or different) revealed that that while 
the other-race effect was observed in primary school children (aged 7-11 years), secondary 
students (aged 12-15) and university students, the magnitude of the other-race effect increased 
with age. Collectively, this demonstrates that encoding biases in face recognition occur 
relatively early, and that experience drives a developmental time course whereby face 
representations become gradually more finely tuned for differentiating between faces of one’s 
own race (Chance & Goldstein, 1982; Ferguson et al., 2009; Furl et al., 2002; Goodman et al., 
2007; Walker & Hewstone, 2006a; but see Corenblum & Meissner, 2006; Pezdek, Blandon-
Gitlin, & Moore, 2003).  
Elsewhere, debate has focused on how early the other-race effect occurs in infancy 
(e.g., Anzures, Quinn, Pascalis, Slater, & Lee, 2010; Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006; 
Ferguson et al., 2009; Hayden, Bhatt, Joseph, & Tanaka, 2007; Kelly et al., 2005, 2007a, 
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2007b, 2009; Quinn et al., 2008). For example, there is evidence that newborn infants show 
no preference for own- over other-race faces, but by three months old, show a preference for 
own-race faces, as evidenced by preferential orientating to faces of one’s own-race (Kelly et 
al., 2005). In a more recent study, Kelly et al. (2007a) investigated whether infants also 
demonstrated an own-race bias in recognition. Kelly et al. utilised a visual-paired comparison 
task. In this procedure, infants are habituated to a single face, and then exposed to a pair of 
faces (the habituated face and a new face). If infants orientate towards or look longer at the 
new face, then this indicates that the infant can discriminate between the old habituated face 
and the newly presented face. Kelly et al. employed this procedure with 3-, 6- and 9-month-
old White infants while they were viewing African, Middle Eastern and Chinese faces. At 3 
months, infants discriminated between all faces, irrespective of race; by 6 months of age, 
infants were only able to discriminate between White and Chinese faces; and by 9 months, 
discrimination was restricted to own-race faces. These results demonstrate that the other-race 
effect begins to emerge as early as 6 months of age. Kelly et al. interpreted their results in 
terms of perceptual narrowing (Nelson, 2001), which suggests that the visual system 
gradually becomes more finely tuned via early experience. Kelly et al. (2007a) suggest that 
whereas newborn infants are able to distinguish between all faces, their greater experience 
with own-race faces “tunes” them toward the features that are necessary to differentiate 
within this category of faces. Taken together, the evidence presented in this section illustrates 
that early experience in infancy shapes the perceptual face-processing system.  
3.2.3 Inter-racial contact. According to the contact hypothesis, individuals with less 
inter-racial experience should exhibit larger own-race recognition biases, whereas those with 
more experience should show no such effect, or at least a bias towards the category of faces 
with which one has had the most experience. Such cross-over interactions in racial 
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recognition should therefore be correlated with the respective amount of experience one has 
with the other-race. Self-report studies, however, are demonstrative of only a weak link 
between inter-racial contact and the magnitude of the other-race effect (e.g., Brigham, Maass, 
Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Carroo, 1986, 1987; Cross et al., 1971; Larvrakas et al., 1976). 
For example, Cross et al. (1971) found an own-race bias in White individuals that was 
significantly correlated with the inter-racial experience. Note, however, that no such effect 
was observed in Black participants.  
Other studies have failed to find any conclusive evidence supportive of the contact 
hypothesis (e.g., Luce, 1974; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969, Ng & Lindsay, 1994). For example, 
Ng and Lindsay (1994) had East Asian and White participants perform a face recognition task 
with own-and other-race faces, and correlated participants’ contact scores with recognition 
sensitivity and bias measures. Ng and Lindsay found that both White and East Asian 
participants recognised own-race faces better than other-race faces. However, there was no 
relationship between inter-racial contact and increased recognition sensitivity. In a second 
study, they tested White and Asian participants who had recently emigrated to a majority 
other-race country. Ng and Lindsay reasoned that such individuals would have had greater 
opportunity for inter-racial contact; therefore, if contact supports other-race individuation, 
then participants should display increased other-race recognition. Again, there was still no 
compelling evidence to support a link between contact and increased other-race recognition.  
In order to prevent potential socially desirable responding contaminating their results, 
other researchers have utilised cross-national samples, or samples that have had very limited 
exposure to other-race individuals (e.g., Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 1982; Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; MacLin, Van Sickler, MacLin, & Li, 2004; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001, 
2003). If contact supports other-race recognition, then when there is little opportunity for 
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interaction with a target racial group, recognition of that group should be reduced relative to 
own-race faces. For example Wright et al. (2003) measured the other-race effect in White 
students from the University of Bristol (a university in a predominantly White population, i.e., 
the United Kingdom) and White and Black students from the University of Cape Town a 
university in a predominantly Black population, i.e., South Africa). White students from 
either university exhibited better recognition of own-race faces, but Black students in Cape 
Town (who had very limited contact with White people) showed a strong own-race bias for 
Black faces. In this case, they observed a significant correlation between inter-racial contact 
and recognition for Black students.  
In another African study, Chiroro and Valentine (1995) examined the other-race effect 
in high- and low-contact Black and White students in Zimbabwe. High contact was attributed 
on the basis that the participants attended a multi-racial college with greater opportunities for 
contact with the other race students. In contrast, low-contact students attended an institution 
where inter-racial contact was minimal or limited. Their results demonstrated that while the 
low-contact students exhibited clear racial biases in face recognition, the high-contact Black 
students recognised own-race and other-race faces equally well. High-contact White 
individuals, however, exhibited no reduction in their own-race bias. This appears to 
undermine the role of contact as a purely quantitative moderator of the other-race effect. 
However, the socio-political climate of Zimbabwe at the time meant that many communities 
were racially segregated, and so it remains possible that high-contact White and Black 
students differed in their degree of contact with the other racial group. Regardless, this would 
still suggest that mere contact in itself remains insufficient to overcome the other-race effect, 
a point I will return to in subsequent sections. 
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3.2.4 The Multidimensional Face Space Model. Although experienced-based 
explanations suggest a conceptual link between perceptual learning and improved ability to 
recognise other-race faces, no specific theoretical mechanism is proposed to account for the 
aforementioned improvement in recognition ability. Consistent with own-race experience 
corresponding to superior recognition of own-race faces, and relative inexperience 
corresponding with impoverished recognition of other-race faces, Valentine (1991, 2001; see 
also Valentine & Endo, 1992) proposed a multidimensional face space approach to face 
processing and the other-race effect. The multidimensional face space (MDFS) model 
assumes that faces are encoded as dimensions within “multidimensional face space”, and that 
each individual’s face-space is derived from their unique perceptual experience (Valentine, 
1991, 2001).  
Valentine (1991, 2001) proposed two differing versions of the MDFS model: (1) a 
norm-based, or prototype-based model, and (2) an exemplar-based model. In the norm-based 
model, faces are encoded as vectors within face-space, and in relation to their deviation from 
a single “norm” or prototype, which lies at the centre of face-space (Valentine & Bruce, 
1986). In contrast, the exemplar-based model assumes there is no prototype face at all; 
instead, all faces are encoded as single points in multidimensional space. Both the norm-based 
and exemplar-based models assume that faces are unevenly distributed within face-space, but 
for different reasons. In the norm-based model, faces are heavily populated around the 
prototype, because these faces are more typical, and deviate less from the prototype face. In 
contrast, the outer regions of face space are less densely populated, as these faces tend to be 
highly distinctive from the prototype. The exemplar-based model predicts a similar 
arrangement, in that single points (i.e., encoded faces) form densely clustered areas, termed 
the central tendency, again because the faces are perceptually similar (Valentine, 
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1991).Unlike the prototype model, however, this central tendency has no active role in 
encoding faces, but merely indicates the point of maximum exemplar density (Valentine, 
1991). Therefore, face recognition errors tend to occur when encoded faces are in close 
proximity to one another in face-space, as in the case of the exemplar-based model, or when 
encoded vectors are highly similar, as in the norm-based model. Valentine (1991, 2001) and 
Valentine and Endo (1992) advocate that any useful feature that aids discrimination between 
faces can be considered a “dimension”; however, Valentine is agnostic with regards to the 
precise dimensions that may support individuation in MDFS, although dimensions such as 
age and gender have been suggested by empirical data (e.g., Johnston, Kanazawa, Kato & 
Oda, 1997).  
With regards to the other-race effect, although the norm and exemplar-based models 
vary conceptually, they still predict the same pattern of effect
1
. Valentine (1991, 2001) and 
Valentine and Endo (1992) argue that because we tend to encounter own-race faces more than 
other-race faces, and because face-space is a representation of all the faces we have 
encountered in our lifetime, the dimensions by which faces will be encoded will be the 
dimensions that are appropriate for discriminating between own-race but not other-race faces. 
The result is that other-race faces will densely cluster in a separate part of face space, because 
they are drawn from a different racial population. As other-race points are geographically 
closer together in face-space, other-race faces are more difficult to discriminate between and 
therefore recognise accurately (Valentine & Endo, 1992).  
                                                             
1
 There is a great deal of debate within the literature regarding weather a norm-based or an exemplar-based 
model more accurately conceptualises face processing. Valentine and Endo (1992) argued that an exemplar-
based model provided the most parsimonious explanation of the other-race effect. However, evidence from the 
face adaptation effect suggests a norm-based explanation may be more appropriate (e.g., Leopold et al., 2001), 
and more recent data even suggests that there may be race-specific norms within face-space (e.g., Jaquet, 
Rhodes, & Hayward, 2008). Resolving these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, but remains an important 
empirical question for future research.  
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The MDFS models framework is broadly supported by literature suggesting that we 
may use different features for discriminating between own-race and other-race faces (e.g., 
Bar-Haim, Saidel, & Yovel, 2009; Davies, Ellis, & Shepherd, 1977; Ellis, Deregowski, & 
Shepherd, 1975; Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002; Sergent, 1984). For example, there is 
evidence that White participants encode own-race faces using representations of the eyes in 
relation to the nose and mouth (e.g., Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002; Sergent, 1984), but 
other evidence suggests that information about the mouth and jaw line might be the most 
useful for discrimination of Black faces (e.g., Davies, Ellis, & Shepherd, 1977; Ellis, 
Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975). Thus, the extraction of the kinds of information typically 
derived from own-race faces might not be the “right” kind of information to support the 
recognition of other-race faces and might actually be detrimental to recognition. Further, the 
MDFS model’s assertions have been substantiated with various experimental paradigms 
including: studies employing multidimensional scaling (e.g., Byatt & Rhodes, 2004; Johnston 
et al., 1997b; Lee, Byatt, & Rhodes, 2000; Papesh, & Goldinger, 2010); neural networks 
(Caldara & Abdi, 2006); behavioural-based classification studies (e.g., Johnston et al., 
1997a); and studies which employ caricatures as stimuli (e.g., Byatt & Rhodes, 1998; Rhodes, 
Carey, Byatt, & Proffitt, 1998).  
Despite the wealth of empirical evidence substantiating the MDFS approach, the 
model(s) are unable to provide an exhaustive account for all of the findings regarding the 
other-race effect. In particular, findings from studies employing ambiguous race faces have 
been problematic (e.g., Levin, & Banaji, 2006; MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 2003; Michel, 
Corneille, & Rossion, 2007; 2010; Pauker et al., 2009), indicating that although the poor 
recognition of other-race faces may reflect reduced perceptual experience, it also may also 
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reflect (at least in some cases) the reduced motivation to individuate, or perhaps pay attention 
to them.  
3.3 Attentional Accounts  
Another prominent explanation of the other-race effect is that perceivers fail to pay 
attention to other-race individuals, termed “cognitive disregard” (Rodin, 1987). The cognitive 
disregard approach suggests that humans act like cognitive misers seeking cues for 
categorisation of individuals as outgroup members, enabling them to preserve cognitive 
resources for more elaborate or individuated processing of ingroup members. When this cue 
to outgroup status is activated, any further information is irrelevant and disregarded. In the 
other-race effect, racial cues would prompt disregard mechanisms (i.e., seeing them as 
“outgroup” or “Black” only), which means that potential individuating information would be 
disregarded, leading to poor other-race recognition (Malpass, 1990). Without an outgroup-
specifying cue, attention is devoted to individuating information. This attentional account has 
two forms: the feature selection account (Levin, 1996, 2000); and the Ingroup/Outgroup 
Model (Sporer, 2001).  
3.3.1 Cognitive accounts: Feature selection. The feature selection or race 
categorisation account of the other-race effect (Levin, 1996, 2000) argues that race-
specifying information (for example, skin tone) is automatically encoded at the expense of 
visual information, therefore reducing the amount of individuating information encoded by 
perceiver and impairing recognition accuracy. Levin suggests that the other-race effect is not a 
failure to generalise perceptual familiarity; rather, it is a consequence of coding information 
that is optimal for categorisation (i.e., by group/race) rather than for individuation (see also 
Ge et al., 2009). More specifically, own-race faces are coded for individual identity, while 
other-race faces are coded for category-diagnostic information. This approach suggests that 
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the other-race effect occurs due to inappropriate attention being directed to race at encoding (a 
mechanism similar to that of cognitive disregard; Rodin, 1987). When other-race faces are 
automatically coded by race, no further information processing takes place.  
Support for feature selection hypothesis mainly comes from visual search tasks that 
require classification of faces by race, rather than recognition. For example, Levin (1996, 
2000) used a visual search task where participants searched for a White or Black target, 
surrounded by varying numbers of other-race face distracters. Levin’s logic was simple: If 
other-race faces are coded by race, search for Black faces (surrounded by White distracters) 
should be quicker than search for a White target (surrounded by Black distracters). Indeed, 
this was what Levin observed. Further, when participants were quick to locate other-race 
faces, they subsequently demonstrated poor other-race recognition. These results suggest that 
own- and other-race faces are coded in a feature-present/feature-absent manner. As other-race 
faces contain a feature diagnostic of racial difference (from oneself, or own- group), they are 
not subsequently processed further (Levin, 2000). Consistent with this, when own- and other-
race faces are manipulated to appear more different from each other (i.e., producing 
caricatures that enhance race-specifying features), search asymmetries are facilitated. In 
contrast, when faces were manipulated to look more alike (i.e., producing prototypical faces, 
in which race is less salient between categories), search asymmetries are reduced (Levin & 
Angelone, 2001).  
3.3.2 Social accounts: The Ingroup/Outgroup Model. Sporer’s (2001) 
Ingroup/Outgroup Model of the other-race effect varies from Levin’s feature selection 
account in that it sees face processing as essentially social. As such, motivation is assumed to 
play a pivotal role in forming ingroup (i.e., own-race) and outgroup (i.e., other-race) 
differences in face perception and recognition.  
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The model suggests that when a face is viewed, the race is initially processed. When 
the face is ingroup (i.e., own-race), “default” configural processing occurs, which is normally 
characteristic of own-race face processing. In brief, Sporer (2001) assumed that configural 
processing was holistic (i.e., that own-race faces are processed as a gestalt or “perceptual 
whole”, e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 
1987), and relied on second-order relational, or configural coding (i.e., processing the discrete 
relations between facial features, e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & 
Tan, 1989)
2
. In contrast, when presented with outgroup (other-race) faces, cues to outgroup 
status initiate categorisation processes before typical face-processing strategies can begin. 
Ingroup categorisation therefore bypasses the categorisation phase when the presented target 
conforms to ingroup membership. Note that the dimensions along which ingroup and 
outgroup members vary are not salient and are therefore left unprocessed (consistent with 
Levin, 1996). Sporer (2001) proposed differing mechanisms may account for the poor 
recognition of other-race faces: (1) cues diagnostic to racial outgroup membership may serve 
as cues for cognitive disregard (Rodin, 1987), (2) outgroup categorisation may result in 
greater feature-based processing and undermining recognition of other-race faces (i.e., 
processing faces on a piecemeal feature by feature basis; e.g., Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; 
Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989; Rhodes, Ewing, & Evangelista, 2009; Sangrigoli & 
de Schonen, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004), and (3) any further encoding that occurs may focus 
on information that differentiates outgroup membership from members of one’s own group.  
3.3.3 Mixed evidence for attention-based accounts. An indirect assumption of the 
feature-selection account and ingroup/outgroup model is that own-race face processing can 
somehow be “switched” to “look” like other-race processing and vice versa when given 
                                                             
2
  More information on configural, and holistic processing, their conceptual differences and how they relate to 
each other is detailed in Section 4, How the other-race effect operates, page 40.  
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appropriate instructions that negate the categorisation of other-race faces by race. Evidence in 
this area is mixed. Supportive evidence is provided by studies investigating recognition 
memory for ambiguous-race faces when categorised as own-race or other-race (Levin, & 
Banaji, 2006; MacLin & Malpass, 2001, 2003; Michel, Corneille, & Rossion, 2007; 2010; 
Pauker et al., 2009; but see Rhodes, Lie, Ewing, Evangelista, & Tanaka, 2010, for contrasting 
evidence). For example, MacLin and Malpass (2001, 2003) produced a set of racially 
ambiguous faces, and gave them different racial markers (either Black- or Hispanic-
stereotypical hair). Interestingly, even when the faces were identical, differential racial 
makers changed how the face were categorised, as indicated by participants responding 
whether they believed the face to be White, Black Hispanic, Indian, or another race. These 
beliefs this affected memory, such that when a face was categorised as other-race, it was 
subsequently recognised poorly in comparison to when it was categorised as own-race.  
More recently, Rhodes, Locke, Ewing, and Evangelista (2009) reasoned that if the 
other-race effect resulted from the categorisation of other-race faces, then inducing 
participants to categorise both own-race and other-race faces should eliminate the other-race 
effect. In one experiment, participants rated own-race and other-race study faces for race 
typicality or categorised faces by race. In another experiment, participants were instructed to 
individuate other-race faces (by warning participants about the other-race effect and 
instructing them to pay close attention to what differentiates one face from another). Rhodes 
et al. observed that rating racial typicality and categorising faces by race failed to reduce the 
other-race effect. Only individuation instructions helped reduce the appearance of other-race 
effect at recognition. The authors conclude that the other-race effect reflects the reduced 
perceptual experience people have with other-race individuals and the reduced motivation to 
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process them, rather than resulting from the automatic categorisation of other-race faces by 
race-diagnostic cues (see also Rhodes, Lie, Ewing, Evangelista, & Tanaka, 2010).  
3.4 Emerging Consensus: The Interaction of Experience and Motivation 
As the foregoing review suggests, there is evidence both for and against perceptual 
experience and attentional accounts of the other-race effect. Attempting to determine which of 
the accounts best characterises the other-race effect thus seems impossible. More importantly, 
however, the debate overlooks the possibility that the accounts are not incompatible. Not 
knowing which other-race features are diagnostic and not processing other-race faces as fully 
as own-race faces, for example, might be mutually reinforcing. 
3.4.1 The Categorisation–Individuation Model. Recently, Hugenberg, Young, 
Bernstein, and Sacco (2010) proposed the Categorisation–Individuation Model. This model 
integrates perceptual familiarity, feature selection, and ingroup/outgroup accounts of the 
other-race effect. Consistent with evidence that own-race faces tend to be processed more 
configurally than other-race faces (i.e., more in terms of spatial relationships between facial 
features; e.g., Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, et al., 2006; Michel, Corneille, & Rossion, 
2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & Tan, 1989; 
Sangrigioli & de Schonen, 2004; Tanaka, Keifer, & Bukach, 2004), the core tenet of 
Categorisation–Individuation Model is that the other-race effect derives from the tendency to 
selectively attend to identity-diagnostic information (i.e., configural information) in own-race 
faces but to category-diagnostic information (e.g., skin tone) in other-race faces (See 
Hugenberg et al., 2010, p. 1170). Thus, the other-race effect has its roots in both perceptual 
experience and motivated processing.  
The model proposes that selective attention to identity- versus category-diagnostic 
information in faces is determined by a number of factors. The first factor is the strength of 
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category activation (i.e., with the presentation of a face, a social category is activated, such as 
race). Category activation is therefore privileged over individuation in face processing 
(Cloutier & Macrae, 2007; Cloutier, Mason, & Macrae, 2005; Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 
2010) and tends to be stronger for other-race than own-race faces (Levin, 1996, 2000; 
Stroessner, 1996). Situations that elicit strong own-race category activation should elicit 
stronger attention to category-diagnostic information in own-races faces. Indeed, Young, 
Hugenberg, Bernstein, and Sacco (2009) demonstrated that when own-race faces were seen in 
the context of other-race faces (specifically, when a block of own-race faces was preceded by 
a block of other-race faces), own-race recognition was significantly disrupted, presumably 
because the inter-racial context led own-race faces to be categorised rather than individuated.  
The second factor in the Categorisation–Individual Model derives from the signalling 
function of categorisation. Social categories are assumed to signal to the perceiver the 
importance (or lack thereof) of target identity. All else being equal, ingroup membership 
informs the perceiver that the target’s identity is important, whereas outgroup membership 
informs the perceiver that the target’s identity is irrelevant (unless that outgroup membership 
is associated with some form of threat; Ackerman et al., 2006; Becker et al., 2010; Shriver & 
Hugenberg, 2010). In the context of the other-race effect, this means that participants should 
be more motivated to direct attention to identity-diagnostic information in own-race than 
other-race faces. 
Race, however, is only one cue to shared or non-shared category membership and thus 
to the importance of individuation. According to the Categorisation–Individuation Model, any 
ingroup- or outgroup-specifying information (e.g., category label, context) can signal identity 
importance and determine the motivation to individuate. For own-race faces, outgroup-
specifying information can undermine motivation, whereas for other-race faces, ingroup-
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specifying information can enhance motivation. Evidence for the motivation-undermining 
effects of outgroup-specifying information on own-race processing comes from investigations 
in which racial ingroup/outgroup status is crossed with non-racial ingroup status (typically in 
the form of university affiliation). Hugenberg and Corneille (2009), for example, 
demonstrated that outgroup (versus ingroup) categorisation reduces configural processing of 
own-race faces, and Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg (2007) demonstrated that outgroup 
(versus ingroup) categorisation undermines recognition of own-race faces.  
Shriver, Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, and Lanter (2008) replicated Bernstein et al.’s 
recognition effects with both university affiliation and social class as indicators of 
ingroup/outgroup status. Importantly, Shriver et al. investigated recognition of both own-race 
and other-race faces, and failed to find evidence that ingroup-specifying information 
enhanced other-race recognition. This finding highlights the importance of the final factor 
included in the Categorisation–Individuation Model: perceivers’ prior individuation 
experience in discriminating faces within a racial category, which interacts with the 
motivation to process faces in terms of identity- versus category-specifying information. 
Because of de facto segregation, most perceivers have significantly more individuation 
experience with own-race than other-race faces, and have developed processing strategies that 
lead to the efficient extraction of identity-specifying information from own-race faces. 
Because own-race and other-race faces often differ in terms of the dimensions that are useful 
from discriminating identity (e.g., Hills & Lewis, 2006; Shepherd & Deregowski, 1981), the 
expertise that perceivers develop with own-race faces transfers imperfectly to the processing 
of other-race faces.  
In terms of the Shriver et al. results, the Categorisation–Individuation Model assumes 
that the effectiveness of individuation motives is constrained by individuation experience. The 
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motivation to individuate is assumed by the model to elicit a processing shift even for other-
race faces, but without experience in discriminating faces according to the appropriate 
dimensions, successful individuation is likely to be limited. Thus, in the Shriver et al. studies, 
participants may have attempted to shift their attention to identity-diagnostic information for 
ingroup-categorised other-race faces but, due to a lack of perceptual experience, were 
unsuccessful. 
In addition to the effectiveness of individuation being constrained by individuation 
experience, individuation experience is constrained by individuation motives. That is, the 
benefits of individuation experience are only fully exploited when perceivers are motivated to 
individuate faces. When motivation decreases, as when own-race faces are assigned to an 
outgroup category, individuation decreases despite experience (Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver 
et al., 2008). Hugenberg et al. argue that the lack of individuation of outgroup-categorised 
own-race faces stems from the fact that expertise with individuation does not preclude 
expertise with categorisation. That is, when the motivation to individuate own-race faces is 
undermined by outgroup-specifying information, perceivers are readily able to shift their 
attention to category-specifying information, leading own-race recognition to drop to the 
recognition levels for other-race faces (but see Hayward, Rhodes, & Schwaninger, 2008, for 
evidence that recognition for own-race faces is not always disrupted by the use of non-
identity-diagnostic (i.e., non-configural) processing). 
3.4.1.1 Both own- and other-race face processing are susceptible to 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects. Although the Categorisation–Individuation Model 
usefully integrates several different factors affecting face processing, allowing it to account 
for a broad set of data, it is unable to account easily for several other findings in the other-race 
effect literature. First, despite Shriver et al.’s (2008) null findings regarding the impact of 
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categorisation on the processing of other-race faces, other research suggests that other-race 
processing is malleable. McKone, Brewer, McPherson, Rhodes, and Hayward (2007), for 
example, familiarised White participants with a small number of unambiguous other-race 
faces and found that participants subsequently exhibited greater configural processing for 
familiar than for unfamiliar other-race faces, with inversion costs for familiar other-race faces 
equal to those found for own-race faces (note that the face inversion effect is an indirect way 
of measuring configural processing, e.g., Michel et al., 2006; Tanaka & Gordon, 2011). As 
the training provided to participants was minimal, these results suggest that perceivers can 
switch relatively easily between configural and featural processing for other-race faces.  
Moreover, Hehman, Mania, and Gaertner (2010) used a modified face-recognition 
paradigm in which they were able to control the relative salience of racial and non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup status. They found that when target faces were grouped by race, participants 
recognised more own-race than other-race faces, regardless of university affiliation; when 
target faces were grouped by university affiliation, however, participants recognised more 
own-university than other-university faces, regardless of race. Thus, other-race recognition 
can be influenced by non-racial ingroup/outgroup status. Moreover, Hehman et al.’s 
findings— two non-interacting main effects: one for target university, and one for target race 
—raise important questions as to whether perceptual experience and motivation really interact 
to determine processing (see also Hehman, Stanley, Gaertner, & Simons, 2011).  
These deviations from Hugenberg and colleagues’ (Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et 
al., 2008) findings can be explained within the Categorisation–Individuation Model through 
its assumption that individuation motives and experience are mutually constraining. 
Nonetheless, they raise important questions of when and how ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
influences face processing. For example, are there factors at encoding that influence the 
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signalling function of categorisation? I agree that the fundamental tenets of the 
Categorisation-Individuation model are valid: Perceivers have greater individuation 
experience for own-race than other-race faces and greater individuation motivation for 
ingroup than outgroup faces and these two factors constrain one another. What is missing in 
the current instantiation of the Categorisation–Individuation Model, however, is a clear 
account of when and how individuation experience constrains individuation motivation and 
vice versa. It is not straightforwardly the case that the motivation to individuate trumps 
extensive individuation experience for own-race faces, or that a lack of individuation 
experience can trump the motivation to individuate other-race faces. 
This broad limitation is evident in three respects. First, the Categorisation–
Individuation Model is relatively vague with respect to the factors that might heighten or 
diminish the signalling function of ingroup-/outgroup-specifying information. This is not a 
limitation per se, but it does leave room for theoretical refinement. Second, the model links 
ingroup categorisation with the motivation to individuate, and individuation with configural 
processing, but presents little direct evidence for a link between ingroup categorisation and 
configural processing—or indeed, that poor outgroup recognition is linked to feature-based or 
category-based representation. For example, recognition memory studies supporting the 
Categorisation–Individuation Model have failed to employ any manipulation of processing 
(e.g., Bernstein, et al., 2007, Hugenberg et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008; Shriver & 
Hugenberg, 2010; Young et al., 2009; Young, Bernstein, & Hugenberg, 2010; Young & 
Hugenberg, 2011). One exception is the recent evidence from Hugenberg and Corneille 
(2009) that for own-race faces, ingroup categorisation prompts more holistic processing than 
does outgroup categorisation. Nonetheless, this is only one demonstration, and to date there is 
no evidence of whether the same link would emerge with other-race faces, which tend to be 
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processed less configurally (e.g., Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & Tan, 1989; 
Hancock & Rhodes, 2008). Finally, the model also assumes that only ingroup-/outgroup-
specifying information is relevant in determining perceivers’ motivation to individuate 
faces—or, at least, ingroup-/outgroup-specifying information is the only factor that is 
discussed in the model’s presentation. It is possible, however, that other factors (e.g., active 
goals, task requirements) can prompt more or less configural processing, and thus more or 
less of the “types” of processing that support individuation. 
4 Theoretical Approaches: How the Other-Race Effect Operates 
4.1 Configural, Holistic and Feature-Based Processing 
There is a great deal of agreement within the literature that faces are processed 
configurally, more so than any other type of visual object (e.g., Carey, 1992; Farah, Wilson, 
Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001; 
McKone, Martini, & Nakayama, 2001; Rossion & Gauthier, 2002; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997), 
an assertion that has been corroborated by a recent meta-analytic review (Bruyer, 2011). 
However, there is far less consensus about what “configural” processing actually means 
(Farah et al., 1998; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; Rossion, 2008, 2009; Leder & Bruce, 2000; 
for reviews, see Bruyer, 2011; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; McKone & Robbins, 
2011; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Tanaka & Gordon, 2011), partly because the term has been 
used interchangeably to refer to conceptually different types of processing. For example, 
Maurer et al. (2002) suggest there are three different types of configural processing: (1) 
sensitivity to first-order relations (or perceiving the common configuration of all faces; i.e., 
two eyes above a mouth; e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986); (2) sensitivity to second-order 
relations (i.e., the processing of discrete spatial dimensions between independent features in 
the face; e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, 1988); and (3) holistic processing (i.e., 
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processing the face as a perceptual “whole” or gestalt without decomposing the target into 
specific features; e.g., Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999; Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Tanaka & 
Farah, 1993; 2003; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). I am agnostic concerning the “type” of 
configural processing that is implicated within this thesis, or indeed, whether it is “configural” 
or “holistic”. However, I adopt the same convention as Hugenberg et al. (2010) in their 
formulation of the Categorisation–Individuation Model, and discuss holistic processing as a 
subset of configural processing (see Hugenberg et al., 2010; Maurer et al., 2002).  
Feature-based processing (sometimes termed “piecemeal” or “component” 
processing) is a qualitatively different process from configural processing, whereby faces are 
processed in terms of their independent component parts (e.g., nose, eyes, chin; e.g., Diamond 
& Carey, 1986; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Rhodes et al., 1989; Sergent, 1984; Tanaka & Farah, 
1993). There has been some debate about what constitutes a “component” in feature-based 
processing. Bartlett, Searcy, and Abdi (2003) suggest that it is implicit within the literature 
that features are those components of the face that can be independently described from each 
other (i.e., their description is not interdependent on other components), are localised in their 
spatial extent, and mark discontinuities within the surface of the face.  
4.2 Configural, Feature-Based Processing and the Other-Race Effect 
A perennial theme within the other-race effect literature is that perceivers are more 
aware of and sensitive to the facial features and configurations that differentiate own-race 
faces than other-race faces (Byatt & Rhodes, 2004; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Corenblum & 
Meissner, 2006; Furl et al., 2002; Hills & Lewis, 2004; Valentine, 2001; Walker & Hewstone, 
2006a). Many researchers also advocate a “special” form of processing for own-race faces 
that is qualitatively different from how we process other-race faces (Brigham & Malpass, 
1985; Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Murray, Rhodes, & Shuchinsky, 2003).  
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In fact, there is evidence that own-race and other-race faces tend to be processed in 
qualitatively different ways. Specifically, there is evidence that own-race faces tend to be 
processed more configurally (i.e., in terms of the spatial relationships between facial features), 
whereas other-race faces tend to be processed in a more feature-based manner (e.g., 
Greenberg & MacGregor, 2010; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 
2006; Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989; Rhodes, Ewing, Hayward, Maurer, Mondloch, 
& Tanaka, 2009; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Stahl, Weise, Holger, & Schweinberger, 
2008; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). For example, Tanaka, Kiefer, and Bukach (2004) 
had participants perform a delayed perceptual matching task, where participants saw a target 
face followed by test stimuli that consisted of isolated face parts (eyes, noses or mouths) or 
face parts embedded within a whole face. The results demonstrated that White participants 
demonstrated a whole-face recognition advantage (i.e., better recognition when parts were 
presented within the context of a face, rather than in isolation), but only for own-race faces. 
Asian participants, however, demonstrated a whole-face advantage irrespective of race. 
Tanaka et al. interpreted this pattern as reflecting participants’ overall inter-racial experience, 
in that their Asian participants had more experience with Whites than vice versa. This 
suggests that the other-race effect arises from holistic processing of own-race faces (i.e., 
processing the face as a whole gestalt, or the features of the face as interdependent parts) and 
featural processing of other-race faces (i.e., processing the features of the face in isolation)
 
.  
Michel et al. (2006) used the face-composite illusion to examine the holistic 
processing of own-race and other-race faces. In the face-composite paradigm, participants 
judge whether the top halves of two faces are identical or different; these faces are connected 
with bottom halves that are also either identical or different. A reliable outcome is that 
participants perceive identical top halves of faces as different (or are slower to recognise them 
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as identical) when they are joined with the bottom halves of two different faces (Young et al., 
1987). The reasoning is that participants form a “gestalt” or holistic representation of the 
entire face, such that the top and bottom halves are “fused” into a coherent whole rather than 
being represented as independent features—interfering with participants’ ability to detect that 
the top halves of the face depict the same identity. In Michel et al.’s study, White and Asian 
participants were asked to make same/different judgements to own-race and other-race faces. 
Two faces (denoted as “study” and “test” faces) were presented sequentially. The target faces 
were aligned or misaligned composites in which the top halves depicted the same individual 
or two different individuals. Both Asian and White participants processed own-race faces 
more holistically, as evidenced by responses to a half-face target being more disrupted when 
the faces were aligned relative to when they were misaligned. Michel et al. interpreted their 
results as demonstrating that holistic/configural processing increased with perceptual 
familiarity.  
Other researchers have also found evidence for the configural processing of own- but 
not other-race faces using the face inversion effect. Face inversion (i.e., rotating faces by 
180°) has been assumed to be more detrimental to configural than feature-based processing 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 1980; Yin, 1969; but see McKone & Yovel, 2009; 
Rhodes et al., 2006; Tanaka & Farah, 1991), as presumably inverting faces makes it harder to 
extract the discrete spatial differences between features within the face that aid differentiation. 
For example, Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, and Tan (1989) examined recognition of own- and 
other-race faces using face inversion as a marker of configural processing. Their logic was 
that if poorer extraction of configural information underlies the other-race effect, then 
inversion effects should be smaller for other-race relative to own-race faces. Indeed, this is the 
general pattern of effect that was observed. This suggests that configural processing is 
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necessary for subsequent recognition and differentiation (see also Buckhout & Regan, 1988; 
Gajewski, Schlegel, Stoerig, 2008; Hancock, & Rhodes, 2008, McKone et al., 2007; Murray 
et al., 2003; Rhodes et al., 1989; Vizioli, Foreman, Rousselet, & Caldara, 2010).  
More recently, Hancock and Rhodes (2008) investigated the extent to which the 
quantity and quality of inter-racial contact modulated the face inversion in effect in 
recognition memory in Chinese and White participants. The results demonstrated that White 
and Chinese participants recognised faces of their own race more than the other-race faces, 
and inversion affected own-race recognition more than other-race recognition. Interestingly, 
however, both of these factors (face-inversion effects and recognition) were modulated by 
inter-racial contact. Increased contact reduced the other-race effect, and increased inversion 
decrements for other-race faces. In summary, this suggests that configural processing is used 
to a greater extent for own-race faces, but that its use is also modulated by experience with 
other-race individuals.  
4.3 Factors that Inhibit or Facilitate the Configural Processing of Faces 
Thus far, and generally in line with the Categorisation–Individuation Model, I have 
presented two factors rooted in perceptual familiarity that tend to recruit greater levels of 
configural-based processing: own-race faces (e.g., Greenberg & MacGregor, 2010; Hancock 
& Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 2006; Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989; 
Rhodes et al., 2009; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Stahl, Weise et al., 2008; Tanaka, 
Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004), and upright faces (as compared to inverted faces; e..g., Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Thompson, 1980; Yin, 1969; but see McKone & Yovel, 2009; Rhodes et al., 
2006). There are several other factors at encoding that can facilitate configural processing, 
irrespective of one’s perceptual experience. I start by discussing the processes of 
individuation versus categorisation and their relation to processing, which is generally 
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accounted for by the Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010). I then 
outline other encoding factors that serve to either enhance or restrict configural processing, 
which are yet to be accounted for by the Categorisation–Individuation Model.  
4.3.1 Individuation versus categorisation. According to the social cognition 
literature, there are two opposing ways of processing faces at encoding: categorisation and 
individuation (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Brewer, 1988). Categorisation can be defined as 
the classification of exemplars (i.e., target faces) into groups based upon shared dimensions, 
for example, classifying faces at the level of race (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). In 
contrast, individuation is the discrimination between exemplars from within a given category 
(Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Brewer, 1988; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000), or recognising the identity of a target. 
The face tends to provide many competing cues that can either aid the process of 
categorisation, or individuation. Individuation (or being able to distinguish between 
exemplars of a particular group), according to the face perception literature at least, requires 
analysis of relational or configural-based processing (e.g., Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Sergent, 
1984; Rhodes et al., 1989). In contrast to individuation, categorisation of an exemplar is less 
dependent upon processing configural information. Instead, categorisation can be achieved 
simply by analysing single facial features (i.e., feature-based processing; Brown & Perrett, 
1993; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, 1988; Levin, 1996, 2000). For example, 
categorisation on the basis of race can be accomplished with relative ease by analysis of facial 
features that may conform to racial group membership, such as afrocentric features (e.g., 
Blair, Chapleau & Judd, 2005; Blaire, Judd & Chapleau, 2004; Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004; 
Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002) or racially stereotypic hairstyles (e.g., MacLin & 
Malpass, 2001, 2003; Macrae & Martin, 2006; Martin & Macrae, 2007). Indeed, evidence has 
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supported a conceptual link between configural processing and individuation, and 
categorisation and feature-based processing. For example, Mason and Macrae (2004) used a 
divided visual field paradigm, where participants had to perform categorical judgements (i.e., 
“Are these faces the same sex?”) and individuated judgements (i.e., “Are these faces the same 
person?”) with pairs of faces that were either presented to the left or right hemisphere 
(Experiment 1). Given that there is evidence suggestive of a right hemisphere advantage in 
face recognition and sensitivity to configural information (e.g., Leehey, Carey, Diamond, & 
Cahn, 1978; Rhodes, 1985, 1993; Yin, 1969), and a left hemisphere advantage in processing 
the local aspects of visual stimuli (Fink, Halligan, Marshall, Frith, Frackowiak, & Dolan, 
1996; Robertson & Lamb, 1991; Kosslyn, 1987), Mason and Macrae reasoned that if 
individuation is served by configural processing, then participants should be more accurate at 
making individuation judgements when the faces were presented to the right hemisphere than 
when presented to the left hemisphere. Indeed, this is exactly what Mason and Macrae 
observed. Furthermore, in another follow-up experiment, individuation judgements were 
observed to modulate activity in the right fusiform gyrus, and right inferior gyrus, whereas 
categorisation judgements modulated activity in the left inferior frontal and left superior 
temporal gyri (Mason & Macrae, 2004, Experiment 3).  
In a more recent set of studies, Michel, Corneille, and Rossion (2007, 2009) asked 
White participants to make same/different judgements to sequentially presented pairs of 
White, Asian, and racially ambiguous (i.e., White–Asian morphed) faces, making use again of 
the composite-face illusion. When racially ambiguous faces were cued as own-race rather 
than other-race, participants processed the faces more holistically, as evidenced by responses 
to a half-face target being more disrupted when the faces were aligned relative to when they 
were misaligned. These results suggest that the motivation to individuate own-race faces, 
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results in stronger configural processing than when faces are categorised as racial outgroup 
members—at least when the targets are racially ambiguous.  
There is also evidence that categorisation can affect the structural encoding of own-
race faces. Hugenberg and Corneille (2009), again using the face-composite manipulation, 
asked White participants to make same/different judgements to sequentially presented pairs of 
own-race faces categorised as ingroup or outgroup members on the basis of university 
affiliation. Participants showed greater configural processing when faces were categorised as 
ingroup members than when they were categorised as outgroup members. These results 
suggest that outgroup categorisation is sufficient to debilitate the strong “default” configural 
processing normally observed for own-race faces.  
In summary, there is clear evidence for a link between individuation relying largely on 
configural processing (Mason & Macrae, 2004; Michel et al., 2007, 2010) and categorisation 
relying either less on configural processing or more on feature-based processing (Mason & 
Macrae, 2004; Michel et al., 2007, 2010; Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009). This is broadly in 
line with the assertions of the Categorisation–Individuation Model (i.e., the respective roles of 
configural vs. featural processing in individuated and category directed processing). It is 
therefore surprising that no direct tests of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the processing 
of both own-race and other-race face processing have been put forward in support of the 
Categorisation–Individuation Model at the time of writing this thesis, apart from that of 
Hugenberg and Corneille (2009). Even so, Hugenberg and Corneille (2009) only examined 
the processing White faces, by White participants. Therefore, the only information for 
categorisation or individuation was the university ingroup/outgroup priming procedure they 
employed. A true understanding of the effects of categorisation and individuation in the other-
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race effect can only be achieved when there is a second racial group of stimuli and therefore 
alternatives for the categorisation or individuation of targets.    
4.3.2 Encoding operations bias face processing. There is evidence that the way 
stimuli are encoded can depend on the goals of the task. According to Levels of Processing 
Theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975), recognition memory is dependent 
upon encoding mode: “Deep” elaborated processing, relative to “shallow” perceptual 
processing, results in better subsequent memory. Classically, Levels of Processing theory 
suggests that deep encoding requires the extraction of semantic information and is based on 
abstract processing, whereas shallow encoding is more superficial and based on perceptual 
processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). In support with this account, several studies have 
demonstrated that judging faces for likeability or making other trait judgements on faces 
results in better recognition than categorising faces by gender or making superficial 
judgements about, for example, the size of a particular facial feature (e.g., Berman, & Cutler, 
1998; Bower & Karlin, 1974; Biber, Butters, Rosen, Gerstman, & Mattis, 1981; Courtois & 
Mueller, 1979; Clifford & Prior, 1980; McKelvie, 1985, 1991, 1996; Petterson & Baddeley, 
1977; Sporer, 1991; Wells & Turtile, 1988, Winograd, 1981; for reviews, see Coin & 
Tiberghien, 1997; Winograd, 1978). There are also several studies suggesting that configural 
processing is more likely to be engaged under deep than shallow encoding conditions (Marzi 
& Viggiano, 2010; McKelvie, 1985, 1995, 1996).  
Given that face encoding may change as a function of the depth of processing, then it 
is plausible to expect that effects of social categorisation and perceptual experience may vary 
with the encoding context, too. The Categorisation–Individuation Model does support the idea 
that the other-race effect is broadly accounted for by encoding phenomena (see Young, 
Bernstein, & Hugenberg, 2010). It is therefore surprising that in its current form it has not 
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considered the role of depth of processing at encoding in modulating differences in the 
processing of, and memory for, ingroup-/outgroup-categorised own-race and other-race 
targets.  
5 Thesis Overview 
5.1 Aims and General Hypotheses 
In light of the reviewed literature, this thesis begins with the assumption, central to the 
Categorisation–Individuation Model, that the other-race effect derives from both limited 
perceptual experience with and weaker motivation to individuate other-race relative to own-
race faces. Nonetheless, I take the position that the Categorisation–Individuation Model is 
limited in that it assumes (at least implicitly) that only ingroup-/outgroup-specifying 
information is relevant in determining perceivers’ motivation to individuate faces. The 
overarching aim is thus to investigate additional cues that possess signalling function during 
own- and other-race face processing, thereby clarify the motivational mechanisms underlying 
the other-race effect and extending the Categorisation–Individuation Model. This overarching 
aim includes three more specific aims. 
5.1.1 Understanding the role of context. In Chapter 2, I report two experiments that 
aim to test whether and how context modulates the impact of ingroup-/outgroup-specifying 
cues. In line with the Categorisation–Individuation Model, I hypothesise that the context in 
which own- and other-race faces are encountered can determine the salience of racial category 
membership, with implications for how (and how much) non-racial ingroup/outgroup status 
influences the configural processing of own- and other-race face perception. As of yet, there 
have been no direct tests of configural processing under such conditions, at least using both 
own- and other-race faces as stimuli.  
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5.1.2 Exploring the role of encoding goals and ongoing processing demands. In 
Chapter 3, I report four experiments that aim to test whether the relative reliance on 
configural versus featural information that is assumed to characterise identity-directed versus 
category-directed processing can be modulated by cues other than those that specify 
ingroup/outgroup status. I hypothesise that encoding goals can lead perceivers toward more or 
less configural processing regardless of target ingroup/outgroup status, but with implications 
for the influence of ingroup/outgroup status. 
5.1.3 Investigating the time course of racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup 
status effects. In Chapter 4, I report one experiment with the aim of examining the neural 
correlates of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on own- and other-race face processing. The 
Categorisation-Individuation does not give any formal definition of what facial characteristics 
aid individuation versus categorisation. Investigating the electrophysiological correlates of 
feature-based and configural processing in ingroup/outgroup categorisation will provide 
insights into what actually underpins the observed behavioural effects. I hypothesise that both 
racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup status have the potential to influence different early 
stages of face perception. 
5.2 General Methodological Approach 
In this thesis, unfamiliar own- and other-race faces were labelled as ingroup or 
outgroup members. Specifically, the effects of social categorisation were investigated by 
labelling own- and other-race faces as being either from participants’ home institution, the 
University of Birmingham, or a rival institution, the University of Nottingham. Faces were 
presented in either upright or inverted orientation (Chapters 2–4), or manipulated to form face 
composites (Chapter 5) to allow for the measurement of configural and holistic processing, 
respectively. In Chapter 2, I investigated the effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the 
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perceptual discrimination of own- and other-race faces; inversion was used to assess 
configural encoding. I also considered the signalling function of the context, by using either 
randomised presentation of own- and other-race faces (creating an inter-racial context; 
Experiment 1) or by blocking the presentation of the faces by race (creating an intra-racial 
context; Experiment 2). In Chapter 3, I investigated the effects of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation on the recognition of own- and other-race faces. Here, I also considered the 
signalling function of the encoding task by investigating own- and other-race face recognition 
when participants encoded faces for later recognition (Experiments 3, 5) or had a more 
globally orientated encoding goal (i.e., rating trait likeability; Experiments 4, 6); the effects 
on processing were also explored with the addition of face inversion (Experiments 5–6). In 
Chapter 4 (Experiment 7), I tested the contribution of ingroup/outgroup categorisation to 
own- and other-race face processing using event-related potentials, specifically focusing on 
structural encoding (i.e., the N170 component). Finally, Chapter 5 acknowledges the potential 
limitations of using face-inversion effects as markers of configural processing; Experiment 8 
investigated the effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on perceptual discrimination in the 
face-composite paradigm, an alternatives means of isolating configural processing. In Chapter 
6, I discuss the implications of these studies for the face processing and social cognitive 
literature, and re-evaluate the Categorisation–Individuation Model.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PERCEPTUAL DISCRIMINATION OF OWN- AND OTHER-RACE 
FACES AS A FUNCTION OF INGROUP/OUTGROUP 
CATEGORISATION AND INTER-GROUP/INTRA-GROUP CONTEXT
3
 
 
The current chapter examined the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the encoding 
of own-race and other-race faces presented in inter-racial and intra-racial contexts 
(Experiments 1 and 2, respectively); face inversion provided an index of configural 
processing. White participants performed a same/different matching task on pairs of upright 
and inverted faces that were either own-race or other-race, and labelled as being from their 
own university or another university. In Experiment 1, the own- and other-race faces were 
intermixed, creating an inter-group context. The results revealed that for other-race faces, 
participants demonstrated greater configural processing following own- than other-university 
labelling. Own-race faces showed strong configural coding irrespective of the university 
labelling. In Experiment 2, faces were blocked by race, creating an intra-group context for 
each block. Participants demonstrated greater configural processing of own- than other-
university faces, but now for both own- and other-race faces. These experiments demonstrate 
that other-race face processing is sensitive to non-racial ingroup/outgroup status regardless 
of racial context, but that the sensitivity of own-race face processing to the same cues depends 
on the racial context in which targets are encountered.  
                                                             
3
 Experiments 1 and 2 are reported in Cassidy, K. D., Quinn, K. A., & Humphreys (2011). The influence of 
ingroup/outgroup categorization on same- and other-race face processing: The moderating role of inter- versus 
intra-racial context. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 811–817. 
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1 Introduction 
The Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010) provides a broad 
theoretical framework within which we can understand the effects of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation on own- and other-race face processing. The model proposes that the other-race 
effect derives from a tendency to attend selectively to individuating information in own-race 
faces and category-diagnostic information in other-race faces. According to the model, this 
difference in attentional allocation arises because ingroup status signals that identity is 
important, whereas outgroup status signals that it is not—leading to the further proposition 
that non-racial ingroup/outgroup status can also prompt differential attention to identity- 
versus category-diagnostic cues. The aim of the research reported in the current chapter was 
to examine the impact of racial versus non-racial category salience in shaping own-race and 
other-race face processing. 
1.1 Ingroup/Outgroup Categorisation and Own- versus Other-Race Face Processing 
The Categorisation–Individuation Model suggests that any cues to ingroup/outgroup 
status can signal identity importance and the motivation to individuate. These cues need not 
be racial: For own-race faces, outgroup categorisation can undermine the motivation to 
process beyond a category level, whereas for other-race faces, ingroup categorisation can 
enhance the motivation to process other-race faces.  
Indeed, as reviewed in Chapter 1 (Section 3.4.1), several studies have provided 
support for the hypothesis that ingroup/outgroup categorisation influences own-race face 
processing. Hugenberg and Corneille (2009), for example, demonstrated that outgroup (versus 
ingroup) categorisation reduces configural processing of own-race faces; Bernstein et al. 
(2007) demonstrated that outgroup (versus ingroup) categorisation undermines recognition of 
own-race faces; and Young et al. (2009) demonstrated that when own-race faces were seen in 
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the context of other-race faces (specifically, when a block of own-race faces was preceded by 
a block of other-race faces), own-race recognition was significantly disrupted, presumably 
because the inter-racial context led own-race faces to be categorised rather than individuated 
It is important to note that these demonstrations come from experiments examining 
White participants’ processing and recognition for ingroup- versus outgroup-categorised 
White (i.e., own-race) faces. Evidence for ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects for other-
race face processing, however, is less clear. Shriver et al. (2008), for example, replicated 
Bernstein et al.’s (2007) effects for own-race targets, but failed to find an effect for other-race 
targets. More recently, however, Young and Hugenberg (2011) demonstrated that warning 
participants about the other-race effect and asking them to try to avoid it (Experiment 1) or 
including angry faces among the stimuli (Experiment 2)—two procedures designed to 
heighten the motivation to individuate—led participants to respond to the ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation manipulation similarly for own- and other-race targets, that is, by showing 
improved recognition for ingroup-categorised faces (regardless of race). Importantly, 
however, the effect of motivation in the first experiment was modulated by inter-racial 
experience, such that only those participants with relatively extensive experience showed 
improved recognition for ingroup-categorised other-race faces. 
1.2 Racial Salience and Ingroup/Outgroup Categorisation 
The above evidence indicates that categorisation of own-race faces as outgroup 
members impairs configural processing and recognition of own-race faces, and that the 
categorisation of other-race faces as ingroup members sometimes improves recognition of 
other-race faces. Thus, it appears that own-race face processing responds in a more stable 
manner to ingroup/outgroup categorisation than does other-race face processing. Aspects of 
their respective designs, however, may explain some of the differences. In particular, the 
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investigations of other-race face processing have included both own- and other-race faces in 
their designs, whereas the investigations of own-race face processing have included only 
own-races faces. 
According to the Categorisation–Individuation model, any ingroup- or outgroup-
specifying information (e.g., category label, context) can signal identity importance and 
determine the motivation to individuate, and this should be equally true for own- and other-
race targets (notwithstanding the role of experience). One possibility is that in the foregoing 
research, the design differences inadvertently made race more or less salient. In some 
circumstances, racial ingroup/outgroup membership may provide the primary dimension for 
categorisation, with implications for processing and memory. In other circumstances, 
however, racial ingroup/outgroup membership may represent only one among multiple 
possible dimensions for categorisation, and may not be perceived as the primary or most 
useful dimension; when other dimensions are used, differences in configural processing and 
recognition might emerge.  
1.3 Overview 
In the current research, I sought to investigate the role of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation on the perceptual encoding of own-race and other-race faces, with an eye to 
testing and clarifying the Categorisation–Individuation Model. I examined how different 
categorisation contexts (inter- and intra-racial) affected face processing for both own-race and 
other-race faces. I report two experiments. In Experiment 1, I aimed to investigate the effects 
of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the perceptual encoding of own- and other-race faces in 
an inter-racial context. In Experiment 2, I investigated whether the same pattern of effects 
would emerge when faces were presented in an intra-racial context (i.e., when presentation of 
faces was blocked by race). In both experiments, I used a perceptual matching task, and 
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presented the faces either upright or inverted by 180°, using inversion costs (i.e., impaired 
processing for inverted relative to upright faces) as a marker of configural processing.  
2 Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, I examined the effects of ingroup/outgroup university affiliation on 
face processing when own-race faces were presented along with other-race faces—that is, in 
an inter-racial context that provided both race and university affiliation as dimensions for 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation. Following past research (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009), I 
expected that perceivers would engage in greater configural processing (i.e., demonstrate 
larger inversion costs) for own-university than other-university faces. However, I also 
expected that the inter-racial context would serve to keep race salient as a categorisation 
alternative, with potential implications for the strength of university-based categorisation 
effects. In particular, given perceivers’ likely fluency in the configural processing of own-race 
races and the possibility that the salience of the own-/other-race distinction would lead 
participants to view White as “ingroup” regardless of university affiliation, I expected that 
race salience would mitigate the influence of the newly-assigned group membership (i.e., 
university affiliation) for the processing of own-race faces. As a consequence, I expected that 
evidence for greater configural processing of own-university than other-university faces 
would emerge more strongly—or perhaps even only—for other-race faces (following Michel 
et al., 2007, 2009).  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants and design. Thirty-three students from the University of 
Birmingham completed the study for course credit; all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The data for one participant were removed from the analysis because of an error rate 
in excess of 20%, leaving 32 participants (31 female; Mage = 20.3 years). The experiment was 
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based on a 2 (trial type: same, different) × 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target 
university: own-university, other-university) × 2 (target orientation: upright, inverted) within-
participants design.  
2.1.2 Materials. The materials included face stimuli and university primes. The face 
stimuli were graphic files depicting 80 Black and 80 White faces, taken from previous 
research (Shriver, Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Lanter, 2008) as well as from the 
CAL/PAL face database (Minear & Park, 2004) and the Stanford face database (Eberhardt, 
Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). All faces were adult men in a forward pose with 
neutral expressions. The images were standardised in Adobe Photoshop CS2 to be greyscale 
and sized 236 pixels vertically. An inverted version of each face was also created by rotating 
each image 180°. This resulted in a total of 320 experimental stimuli. The university primes 
were graphic files depicting the University of Birmingham (own-university prime) and 
University of Nottingham (other-university prime) names (in their respective corporate fonts) 
and official crests.  
The face stimuli were grouped into same-race, same-orientation pairs, with an effort to 
match paired stimuli along a variety of dimensions (e.g., luminance, contrast, head/hair 
shape)
4. The pairs were divided into sets such that each face appeared as an ingroup member 
for some participants but an outgroup member for others, and on a “same” trial for some but a 
“different” trial for others. Each face appeared four times per set (twice upright and twice 
inverted). Each stimulus set included 384 experimental trials, presented in random order. 
2.1.3 Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed a short 
task designed to enhance their ingroup identification/self-categorisation as students at the 
                                                             
4
 This procedure meant that for “different” trials, any given face was always paired with the same other face. 
Although random pairing would have been optimal, this procedure was necessary to minimise participants’ 
ability to use non-identity specifying cues such as hair shape, or skin tone to make “different” judgements 
(because such cues obviously could not be used to make “same” judgements).  
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University of Birmingham (adapted from Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). 
Specifically, participants received a survey, allegedly from Student Services, with the 
following instructions: 
As a member of the University of Birmingham, you’ve joined one of the most exciting 
academic communities in the country. For over a hundred years, the university has 
contributed to the advancement of knowledge and its application. The University of 
Birmingham has around 26,000 students from the UK and all over the world, and it’s a 
great place to study. As part of our continuing effort to understand what motivates our 
students and makes our community unique, we would be grateful if you could take a 
few minutes and think about the University of Birmingham’s identity, and the ways in 
which you are like your fellow University of Birmingham students. When you have 
done this, please write down your thoughts. 
These instructions were followed by five blank lines, numbered 1 to 5. (Participants were not 
instructed to fill all five lines.)  
Participants then completed the target face perception task; all instructions and stimuli 
were presented via a personal computer running MediaLab and DirectRT research software 
(Empirisoft Corporation, 2006). Participants learned that during the task, they would see faces 
of students from either the University of Birmingham or the University of Nottingham
5
. They 
learned further than on each trial of the task, they would see two faces and that their task was 
to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible, by means of a key press, whether the faces 
depicted the same individual or two different individuals. Trials were initiated with the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the university prime that appeared 
                                                             
5
 I chose the University of Nottingham as the outgroup university because of its similarity to the University of 
Birmingham (e.g., geographic region, status, student demographics) and familiarity to the University of 
Birmingham students. It is thus a relevant comparison for the University of Birmingham students, without 
invoking status issues.  
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centred at the top of the screen for 1500 ms. Two faces then appeared below the prime, 
flanking the central fixation cross, and were displayed until participants produced a response. 
The intertrial interval was 1000 ms. Responses and their latencies were recorded by the 
computer program. Figure 1 depicts examples of stimuli used during the task. 
On task completion, participants completed an inter-racial contact questionnaire (Voci 
& Hewstone, 2003; see Appendix A). Participants responded to four randomly ordered 
questions about the quantity of contact with Black individuals (e.g., “How frequently do you 
have contact with Black people?”) along 5-point scales anchored by never and very frequently 
and to three randomly ordered questions about quality of contact with Black individuals (e.g., 
“When you meet Black students, in general do you find the contact pleasant?”) along 5-point 
scales anchored by not at all and very.  
  
Figure 1. Example stimuli used in Experiments 1–2. Left panel: upright other-race, own-
university “same” trial; right panel: inverted own-race, other-university “different” 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Perceptual discrimination. Mean discrimination latencies served as the dependent 
measure of interest
6
. Due to the presence of outlying responses in the data set, response times 
over 2.5 standard deviations from the participant’s mean were excluded (6.09% of the data) 
along with trials where errors were committed (2.69% of the data). The data were submitted 
to a 2 (trial type: same, different) × 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target university: 
own-university, other-university) × 2 (target orientation: upright, inverted) repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are 
presented in Appendix B. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target orientation, F(1, 31) = 48.23, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .60, demonstrating that participants were slower to discriminate inverted than 
upright targets (Ms = 992 and 913 ms, respectively). There was also a number of significant 
interactions: Trial Type × Target University, F(1, 31) = 35.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .54; Trial Type 
× Target Race × Target University, F(1, 31) = 7.65, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .19; and the predicted 
Target Race × Target University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 31) = 7.57, p = .01, ηp
2
 
= .20. The Trial Type × Target University and Trial Type × Target Race × Target University 
interactions failed to moderate or interact with the predicted pattern, and so were not analysed 
further. However, the Trial Type × Target Race × Target University means are presented in 
Table 1 for the reader’s interest7. 
The predicted Target Race × Target University × Target Orientation interaction was 
analysed further by conducting separate Target University × Target Orientation ANOVAs for 
                                                             
6
 Error rates were also analysed. Error rates were generally low (2.69%), and mirrored the reaction time data (i.e. 
there was no evidence for a speed-accuracy trade off) . Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are 
presented in Appendix C for the reader’s interest. . 
7
 In general, the pattern suggested that participants were faster to respond “same” to own-university than other-
university targets and faster to respond “different” to other-university than own-university targets. This pattern 
was more pronounced for own-race than other-race targets.  
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each target race (see Figure 2). For own-race faces, there was only a significant main effect of 
target orientation, F(1, 31) = 24.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .45. Participants responded more quickly 
to upright targets than to inverted targets (Ms = 909 and 989 ms, respectively); university 
categorisation did not affect performance, F(1, 31) = 0.52, p = .48, ηp
2
 = .016.  
For other-race targets, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of target orientation, 
F(1,31) = 55.29, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .64, which was subsumed within a significant Target 
University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 31) = 11.84, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .28. Participants 
responded more quickly to upright versus inverted other-race targets for both own-university 
targets, t(31) = 7.18, p < .001, and other-university targets, t(31) = 4.39, p < .001; however, 
inversion was significantly more disruptive for own-university than other-university targets, 
t(31) = 3.04, p = .005. 
 
2.2.2 Inter-racial contact. Separate scores for quantity and quality of inter-racial 
contact were calculated by averaging across the items separately for each subscale of the 
contact questionnaire (Cronbach’s α = .91 and .67, respectively). 
If experience increases the likelihood of processing other-race faces configurally (e.g., 
Rossion & Michel, 2011), then participants reporting higher (versus lower) levels of inter-
racial contact should show stronger inversion costs in their processing of other-race faces. 
Table 1 
Mean discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of trial type, target race, and target 
university, Experiment 1 
    Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
“Same” trials   
 Own race (White) 925 (35.29) 962 (43.48) 
 Other race (Black) 924 (34.57) 950 (36.28) 
“Different” trials   
 Own race (White) 999 (46.20) 934 (52.68) 
  Other race (Black) 971 (37.57) 955 (41.11) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
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Figure 2. Mean discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of target race, university, and 
orientation, Experiment 1. Note. Error bars denote standard error.  
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Inversion costs for other-race faces, as a function of university affiliation, were 
submitted to a correlational analysis (Spearman’s rho) with participants’ self-reported quality 
and quantity of contact. The analysis revealed no significant correlations between either the 
quantity (all ps > .71) or quality of contact (all ps > .07) and inversion costs for either own- or 
other-university other-race faces (see Appendix D). The results of Experiment 1 are therefore 
not explained by simple differences in inter-racial experience.  
2.3 Discussion 
The current study examined how non-race-based ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
influenced the perceptual encoding of own-race and other-race faces presented in an inter-
racial context. In addition to the typically observed face-inversion effect (i.e., faster RTs for 
upright than inverted faces), the results demonstrated that, for other-race faces, inversion was 
more disruptive to the discrimination of own-university than other-university faces. For own-
race faces, however, there were no effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation based on 
university affiliation, and inversion was equally disruptive to the discrimination of own-
university and other-university faces. 
I argue that this pattern emerged because the inter-racial context kept race salient as a 
dimension for categorisation. For own-race faces, race salience would serve to encourage the 
typically observed differences in the processing of own- and other-race faces, that is, more 
configural processing of own-race faces. For own-race faces, the equivalence in processing 
own-university and other-university faces suggests that this “default” processing, once 
activated, is sufficiently fluent to mitigate against sensitivity to other bases for 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation. For other-race faces, however, lack of expertise means that 
configural processing is not the default but can be employed when ingroup membership is 
stressed, as here by university affiliation. 
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3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 examined the effects of ingroup/outgroup status on face processing in an 
intra-racial context—that is, when own-race and other-race faces were presented in separate 
blocks, making university affiliation the most salient ingroup/outgroup categorisation within 
each block. In past research (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009), university categorisation yielded 
stronger configural processing for own-university than other-university faces. That research, 
however, examined the processing of own-race faces only. I extended this research to other-
race face processing. In this context, I expected that participants would engage in greater 
configural processing of ingroup (own-university) than outgroup (other-university) faces 
irrespective of target race. Hugenberg and Corneille’s work suggests that when race salience 
is minimised, the configural processes normally associated with own-race faces can be 
disrupted by outgroup categorisation along another dimension. If outgroup categorisation can 
disrupt the configural processing of own-race faces, then it should be equally able to disrupt 
the processing of other-race faces, with which perceivers often lack experience. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants and design. Forty-four students from the University of 
Birmingham completed the study for course credit; all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The data for one participant were removed from the analysis because of an error rate 
in excess of 20%, leaving 43 participants (41 female; Mage = 20.7 years). The experiment was 
based on a 2 (trial type: same, different) × 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target 
university: own-university, other-university) × 2 (target orientation: upright, inverted) × 2 
(block order: own-race-first, other-race-first) mixed design with block order as a between-
participants factor.  
3.1.2 Materials. The materials were as in Experiment 1. 
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3.1.3 Procedure. The procedure was as in Experiment 1, with one exception. Rather 
than completing the same/different task in one fully randomised block, participants completed 
the task in two blocks, one comprised only of Black faces and the other comprised only of 
White faces. Block order was randomised across participants. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Discrimination latency. Mean discrimination latencies served as the dependent 
measure of interest. Due to the presence of outlying responses in the data set, response times 
over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were excluded (1.99% of the data) along with 
trials where errors were committed (5.48% of the data). The data were submitted to a 2 (trial 
type: same, different) × 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target university: own-
university, other-university) × 2 (target orientation: upright, inverted) × 2 (block order: own-
race-first, other-race-first) mixed-model ANOVA with block order as a between-participants 
factor
8
. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented in Appendix E. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target orientation, F(1, 42) = 52.20, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .55, demonstrating that participants were faster to discriminate upright than 
inverted targets (Ms = 795 and 842 ms, respectively). There was also a main effect of trial 
type, F(1, 42) = 6.87, p = .012, ηp
2
 = .14, such that participants were faster to respond “same” 
than “different” (Ms = 805 and 831 ms, respectively). 
The analysis also yielded a number of significant interactions: Trial Type × Target 
Race, F(1, 42) = 4.29, p = .045, ηp
2
 = .093; Trial Type × Target University, F(1, 42) = 11.08, 
p = .002, ηp
2
 = .209; Trial Type × Target Orientation, F(1, 42) = 5.85, p = .020, ηp
2
 = .12; 
Target Race × Block Order, F(1, 42) = 7.87, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .16; and Trial Type × Target Race 
                                                             
8
 I also analysed error rates. Again, error rates were generally low (5.48%), and generally mirrored the pattern of 
reaction times (i.e., there was no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade off). Condition means and the ANOVA 
summary tables are presented in Appendix F for the reader’s interest. 
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× Target University × Block Order, F(1, 42) = 5.49, p = .024, ηp
2
 = .12. These interactions 
failed to moderate or interact with the predicted pattern, and so were not analysed further. 
Means for the highest-order interactions (Trial Type × Target Orientation; Trial Type × 
Target Race × Target University × Block Order) are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, 
for the reader’s interest9. 
 
Table 2 
Mean discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of trial type and target orientation, 
Experiment 2 
  Upright faces Inverted faces 
“Same” trials 788 (19.78) 823 (24.21) 
“Different” trials 802 (17.45) 860 (20.61) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
 
Importantly, the analysis also yielded the predicted Target University × Target 
Orientation interaction, F(1, 42) = 12.17, p =.001, ηp
2
 = .23 (see Figure 3). This interaction 
was analyzed further by conducting paired t-tests, which demonstrated that, regardless of 
target race, participants were faster to respond to upright than inverted faces for both own-
university targets, t(43) = 7.57, p = .001, and other-university targets, t(43) = 5.82, p = .001. 
Moreover, as with other-race targets in Experiment 1, the inversion cost was greater for own-
university than other-university targets, t(43) = 3.51, p = .003. Unlike in Experiment 1, 
however, this pattern was not moderated by target race (Target Race × Target University × 
Target Orientation, F(1, 42) = 0.053, p = .82, ηp
2
 = .001). 
3.2.2 Inter-racial contact. Separate scores for quantity and quality of inter-racial 
contact were calculated by averaging across the items separately for each subscale of the 
contact questionnaire (Cronbach’s alphas = .87 and .67, respectively). Correlational analysis 
                                                             
9
 In general, the Trial Type × Target Orientation effect suggested that inversion costs were greater for “different” 
trials. The Trial Type × Target Race × Target Orientation × Block Order interaction was less clear-cut than the 
Trial Type × Target Orientation interaction found in Experiment 1. Again, the interaction provided general 
support for a pattern whereby participants were faster to respond “same” to own-university, than other-university 
targets, and “different” to other-university than same-university targets. 
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(Spearman’s rho) revealed no significant correlations between either the quantity (all ps >.90), 
or quality of contact (all ps > .42) and inversion costs for either own- or other-university 
other-race faces (see Appendix G). The aforementioned latency results are therefore not 
explained by simple differences in racial experience. 
 
 
3.3 Discussion  
The current study examined how non-racial bases for ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
influence the perceptual encoding of own-race and other-race faces presented in an intra-
racial context. I once again found typical face-inversion effects, and replicated the pattern of 
Experiment 1 in which inversion was more disruptive for the discrimination of other-race 
faces when those faces were categorised as own-university versus other-university. However, 
in contrast to Experiment 1, ingroup/outgroup categorisation also influenced own-race face 
processing; inversion was more disruptive to the discrimination of own-race faces when 
categorised as own-university versus other-university. The aforementioned pattern of results 
for own-race faces is broadly in line with Hugenberg et al. (2009). When race salience was 
minimised, participants’ processing was guided by cues to university status, which would be 
most salient given the intra-racial context. For own-race faces, this meant that cues to 
Table 3 
Mean discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of trial type, target race, target university, 
and block order, Experiment 2 
  Own-race block first   Other-race block first 
    
Own university 
(Birmingham) 
Other university 
(Nottingham)   
Own university 
(Birmingham) 
Other university 
(Nottingham) 
“Same” trials      
 Own race (White) 817 (30.62) 840 (32.46)  761 (30.62) 778 (32.46) 
 Other race (Black) 806 (33.13) 816 (36.59)  795 (33.13) 828 (36.59) 
“Different” trials      
 Own race (White) 895 (28.24) 863 (29.15)  796 (28.24) 795 (29.16) 
  Other race (Black) 818 (27.53) 823 (29.69)   829 (27.53) 832 (29.69) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
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outgroup membership reduced the motivation to process these faces in a configural manner 
Hugenberg et al. (2010).  
 
Figure 3. Mean discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of target university and 
orientation, Experiment 2. Note. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
4 General Discussion 
The results of these two experiments demonstrate that other-race face processing is 
sensitive to non-racial ingroup/outgroup status regardless of racial context, but that the 
sensitivity of own-race face processing to the same cues depends on the racial context in 
which targets are encountered. For other-race faces, non-racial ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation influenced the way in which the faces were encoded, a novel result within the 
social categorisation literature. Inversion was more disruptive to the processing of other-race 
faces when those faces were categorised as ingroup rather than outgroup members on the 
basis of university affiliation, suggesting that non-racial ingroup categorisation induced 
stronger configural encoding. Moreover, this pattern held true regardless of whether the faces 
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were presented in inter-racial (i.e., intermixed presentation) or intra-racial (i.e., blocked 
presentation) contexts. 
For own-race faces, non-racial ingroup/outgroup categorisation influenced the way in 
which the faces were encoded, but only in the intra-racial context. In this context, inversion 
was more disruptive to the processing of own-university than other-university faces. In the 
inter-racial context, however, inversion was equally disruptive to own-university and other-
university faces. I suggest that when Black and White faces were intermixed, race became 
salient as a dimension for categorisation and the familiarity and visibility of racial 
ingroup/outgroup status trumped university-based ingroup/outgroup status, such that all faces 
were perceived in terms of race. As a result, all own-race faces were perceived as ingroup 
members, and configural processing was adopted as the default. Only when racial groupings 
were weighted less strongly—when the faces were blocked by race—did participants perceive 
own-race other-university faces as outgroup members and override the configural processing 
default. 
Stated differently, context can determine whether own-race faces are perceived as 
ingroup versus outgroup members, and inter-racial contexts promote ingroup categorisation. 
This interpretation is supported by follow-up contrasts that explored the effect of context, in 
which I combined the own-race data from Experiments 1 and 2. As I would expect, own-
university faces were perceived as ingroup members regardless of the context in which they 
were presented; that is, inversion costs (and presumably configural processing) were 
equivalent for own-university faces presented in intra-racial and inter-racial contexts (Ms = 53 
vs. 69 ms, respectively; t(74) = 1.001, p = .32). Other-university faces, however, were 
perceived as outgroup members to a greater extent when race was less salient; that is, 
inversion costs were smaller (indicating less configural processing) for other-university faces 
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presented in an intra-racial rather than inter-racial context (Ms = 38 vs. 84 ms, respectively; 
t(74) = 2.29, p = .025). 
The findings for the intra-racial context are consistent with previous research, which 
has focused on the effects of social categorisation when own-race faces are encoded. 
Hugenberg and Corneille (2009), for example, presented own-race faces and provided 
evidence for greater configural processing of ingroup- than outgroup-categorised targets. 
These data indicate that social categorisation can influence the extent to which own-race faces 
are processed configurally when the faces are presented in a mono-racial context. My 
evidence, however, also demonstrates that this pattern does not hold for own-race faces when 
they appear in an inter-racial context, where non-racial ingroup-outgroup categorisation exerts 
negligible influence. I suggest this reflects the increased salience of race when own-race and 
other-race faces are presented together. In this context, there might be automatic 
categorisation of own-race faces as ingroup members (on the basis of race) that triggers 
configural encoding and is insensitive to non-visible ingroup/outgroup status. For other-race 
faces, however, the motivation afforded by another form of ingroup categorisation may 
sufficient to offset categorisation by visual cues such as race, leading to greater configural 
processing for ingroup than for outgroup members.  
The findings also extend recent work by Hehman et al. (2010), who examined the 
effects of race and university categorisation on recognition memory. Hehman et al. used a 
modified face-recognition paradigm where Black and White faces were spatially grouped at 
encoding by race or university affiliation to equate the salience of the two dimensions. Their 
results demonstrated that when target faces were grouped by race, participants recognised 
more own-race than other-race faces, irrespective of university affiliation. When target faces 
were grouped by university, however, participants recognised more ingroup than outgroup 
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faces, irrespective of race. The authors explained their results in terms of the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), whereby a shared category dimension 
can offset the influence of a non-shared dimension—at least as long as the dimensions are 
equally salient. My research adds to that of Hehman et al. by providing evidence of what 
happens when the processing context sets two potential categorisation dimensions in 
competition (and where one is more visibly salient): When own- and other-race faces are 
encountered in a mixed context, racial and non-racial forms of categorisation interact to guide 
encoding. 
4.1 Conclusion 
The current research demonstrated that the relative impact of non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the encoding of own-race and other-race faces depends 
critically on context. Other-race face processing is sensitive to non-racial ingroup/outgroup 
status regardless of racial context, but the sensitivity of own-race face processing to the same 
cues depends on the racial context in which targets are encountered; for own-race faces, non-
racial ingroup/outgroup status exerts influence primarily in intra-racial contexts. I suggest that 
pre-existing (race) and newly generated group (university affiliation) categorisations can 
interact to modulate face encoding, and that processing of other-race faces is more sensitive to 
the availability of alternative ingroup/outgroup dimensions than is the processing of own-race 
faces.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
RECOGNITION OF OWN- AND OTHER-RACE FACES AS A 
FUNCTION OF INGROUP/OUTGROUP CATEGORISATION: THE 
MODERATING ROLE OF ENCODING GOALS 
10
 
The current chapter examined the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorisation and encoding 
goals on memory for own-race and other-race faces. White participants studied faces for later 
recognition (memory-directed encoding; Experiments 3, 5) or evaluated faces for likeability 
(trait-directed encoding; Experiments 4, 6) and then completed a recognition test; face 
inversion provided an index of configural processing (Experiment 5–6). The results revealed 
that when participants explicitly encoded faces for later recognition, outgroup categorisation 
impaired own-race recognition, but ingroup/outgroup categorisation had no effect for other-
race faces (Experiments 3, 5.).Under trait-directed encoding, however, ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation had no effect for own-race faces, but outgroup categorisation impaired other-
race recognition (Experiment 4). The face-inversion manipulation revealed important 
processing differences as a function of encoding goal: When participants encoded faces for 
later recognition, inversion effects even for own-race faces were negligible, suggesting that 
memory-directed encoding goals may limit configural processing (Experiment 5); without this 
goal, only outgroup-categorised other-race faces failed to elicit inversion effects (Experiment 
6). These experiments demonstrate that encoding goals interact with racial and non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup status to determine processes and outcomes in face recognition. 
                                                             
10 Experiments 3-6 are reported in Cassidy, K. D.,  Humphreys, G. W., and Quinn, K.A.. (in preparation). The 
influence of ingroup/outgroup categorization on own-and other-race face processing: The moderating role of 
encoding goals.  
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1 Introduction 
The Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010) proposes that the 
other-race effect derives from the tendency to attend to identity-diagnostic information in 
own-race faces but to category-diagnostic information in other-race faces, and that the effect 
has its roots in both perceptual experience and motivated processing, which constrain one 
another. The model assumes that the effectiveness of individuation motives is constrained by 
individuation experience, and that the effectiveness of individuation experience is constrained 
by individuation motives. In essence, the model assumes that ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
can determine the quantity or depth of processing, with ingroup categorisation providing 
greater motivation to individuate than outgroup categorisation; the extent to which greater 
motivation translates into better recognition, however, is constrained by experience, with 
own-race faces being easier to individuate than other-races faces. The current chapter aimed 
to extend the Categorisation–Individuation Model to include not only the quantity or depth of 
processing, but also the quality or nature of processing, as determined by the encoding goal of 
the participant. . 
1.1 Motivation and Recognition of Own- and Other-Race Faces 
According to the Categorisation–Individuation Model, any ingroup- or outgroup-
specifying information (e.g., category label, context) can signal identity importance and 
determine the motivation to individuate. For own-race faces, outgroup-specifying information 
can undermine motivation and subsequent recognition, whereas for other-race faces, ingroup-
specifying information can enhance motivation and subsequent recognition. In support of this 
reasoning, Bernstein et al. (2007) demonstrated that outgroup categorisation undermined 
recognition of own-race faces. Contradicting this reasoning, however, Shriver et al. (2008) 
found no evidence, that ingroup categorisation improved recognition of other-race faces. They 
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suggested that the increased motivation to attend to identity-diagnostic information in ingroup 
other-race faces was constrained by a lack of individuation experience with this category of 
faces. Thus, although participants may have attempted to shift their attention to identity-
diagnostic information in ingroup other-race faces, their lack of experience with these faces 
made them unsuccessful.  
Despite Shriver et al.’s failure to find evidence that motivation influences other-race 
recognition, other evidence does suggest that memory for other-race faces is relatively 
malleable. McKone et al. (2007), for example, familiarised White participants with a small 
number of unambiguous other-race faces and found that participants subsequently exhibited 
greater configural processing for familiar than for unfamiliar other-race faces, with inversion 
costs for familiar other-race faces equal to those found for own-race faces. More recently, 
Hehman et al. (2010) used a modified face-recognition paradigm in which they were able to 
control the relative salience of racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup status. They found that 
when target faces were grouped by race, participants recognized more own-race than other-
race faces, regardless of university affiliation. When target faces were grouped by university 
affiliation, however, participants recognized more own-university than other-university faces, 
regardless of race (see also Hehman, Stanley, Gaertner, & Simons, 2011). Finally, my own 
research has also demonstrated ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects on the processing of 
other-race faces, dependent on contextual cues (Cassidy et al., 2011; see Chapter 2). Thus, 
other-race face processing can be influenced by non-racial ingroup/outgroup status and cues 
that highlight individuating versus category-specifying information. 
Although these data broadly support the assumption of the Categorisation–
Individuation Model that motivation and experience interact to guide processing, two other 
aspects of Chapter 2’s findings are noteworthy. First, I did not find evidence that 
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ingroup/outgroup categorisation influenced the configural processing of own-race faces, 
suggesting that extensive experience can sometimes override motivation. Second, I did find 
evidence that ingroup/outgroup categorisation influenced the configural processing of other-
race faces, at least in intra-racial contexts, suggesting that motivation can sometimes make up 
for a lack of experience. These findings raise important questions of when and how 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation influences face processing. For example, are effects of social 
context and processing experience modulated by the goal of encoding – whether faces are 
coded intentionally for later memory or whether memory coding is incidental to the main 
task? This was investigated here in this chapter. 
1.2 Effects of Encoding Goals 
The mixed evidence for the influence of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the 
processing of own-race and other-race faces raises important questions of when and how 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation influences face recognition. I suggest that one important 
factor is the nature of the conditions at encoding. Specifically, encoding goals that prompt 
configural processing may be more compatible with individuated face representation, where 
as goals that prompt feature-based processing may be more compatible with category-level 
representation (Levin, 1996, 2000).  
There is evidence that the way stimuli are encoded can depend on the goals of the 
task. According to Levels of Processing Theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 
1975), recognition memory is dependent upon encoding mode: “Deep” elaborated processing, 
relative to “shallow” perceptual processing, results in better subsequent memory. Classically, 
Levels of Processing theory suggests that deep encoding requires the extraction of semantic 
information and is based on abstract processing, whereas shallow encoding is more superficial 
and based on perceptual processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). In support with this account, 
65 
several studies have demonstrated that judging faces for likeability or making other trait 
judgements on faces results in better recognition than categorising faces by gender or making 
superficial judgements about, for example, the size of a particular facial feature (e.g., Berman, 
& Cutler, 1998; Bower & Karlin, 1974; Biber et al., 1981; Courtois & Mueller, 1979; Clifford 
& Prior, 1980; McKelvie, 1985, 1991, 1996; Petterson & Baddeley, 1977; Sporer, 1991; 
Wells & Turtile, 1988, Winograd, 1981; for reviews, see Coin & Tiberghien, 1997; 
Winograd, 1978). Of particular relevance to the current research there are also several studies 
suggesting that configural processing is more likely to be engaged under deep than shallow 
encoding conditions (Marzi & Viggiano, 2010; McKelvie, 1985, 1995, 1996). For example, 
McKelvie (1985) found that the recognition advantage of judging faces on the basis of 
likeability  (deep encoding) versus gender (shallow encoding) was eliminated when faces 
were inverted. As inversion is assumed to be a way of disrupting configural processing (cf. 
Yin, 1969), poor recognition performance on inverted-face trials was taken as evidence that 
deeper encoding recruited more configural processing. Similarly, McKelvie (1991) 
demonstrated that inversion disrupted recognition accuracy following trait judgements, but 
not following judgements of distinctive facial features (see also McKelvie, 1995; although see 
Valentine & Bruce, 1986, for alternative evidence).  
1.3 Overview  
Given that face encoding may change as a function of the depth of processing, I expect 
that effects of social context and perceptual expertise may vary with the encoding context, 
too. Here I examined this idea in the context of varying whether faces were encoded 
intentionally for later memory or incidentally, when another task was required and then a 
surprise memory test was given. Young et al. (2009) and Shriver et al. (2008) examined 
intentional memory encoding and found that outgroup categorisation disrupted own-race face 
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recognition but ingroup categorisation conveyed no advantage for other-race faces. These data 
suggest that intentional memory coding is sensitive to category-level processes, disruptive for 
own-race faces but the default for other-race faces. I replicated these data in Experiments 3 
and 5. Incidental memory was tested in Experiments 4 and 6. I argue that default own-race 
(i.e., configural) processing is engaged in when participants are given a “deep” incidental task 
(judging the likeability of the face). In addition, to provide converging evidence on the 
recruitment of different face processing strategies under intentional versus incidental 
encoding, as race and university group assignments varied, I manipulated whether faces were 
upright or inverted at encoding and test (see Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; 
Experiments 4 and 6). If there is strong configural coding and relatively poor coding of other 
features (e.g., under deep but incidental encoding conditions), then strong inversion effects 
should emerge on stimuli coded configurally. If there is strong coding not only of facial 
configurations but also of facial features, as might arise under intentional memory conditions, 
then inversion effects may be weaker.    
Although most investigations of the own-race effect do not report analyses of 
criterion/bias, I conducted these analyses for exploratory purposes. Although in laboratory 
settings there are no real consequences of misses and false alarms, it seemed reasonable that 
the psychological consequences of ingroup/outgroup membership would still influence 
participants’ behaviour. In particular, I drew on the “ingroup over-exclusion effect” (Leyens 
& Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995), which hypothesises that the motivation 
to protect one’s own identity leads to a tendency to exclude from the ingroup any individuals 
whose group membership is at all in doubt—in other words, to adopt a more stringent 
criterion for accepting individuals as ingroup members. I therefore predicted that participants 
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would adopt more conservative criterion for own-race than other-race faces and for own-
university than other-university faces. Whether these factors would interact was unclear. 
2 Experiment 3  
In Experiment 3, I examined White participants’ memory for own-university and 
other-university, own-race and other-race faces after memory-directed (i.e., 
intentional)encoding. Shriver et al. (2008) presented participants with ingroup- and outgroup-
categorised own-race and other-race faces in an intentional memory task, and found that 
participants exhibited greater recognition accuracy for ingroup- than outgroup-categorised 
own-race, but not other-race, targets. Following Shriver et al., I therefore predicted that for 
own-race faces, recognition memory would favour ingroup over outgroup targets, but that for 
other-race faces, ingroup/outgroup categorisation would have no effect.  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants and design. Thirty White students from the University of 
Birmingham (27 female; Mage = 19.2 years) completed the study for course credit; all had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was based on a 2 (target race: own-
race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) within-participants 
design.  
2.1.2 Materials. The materials were as in Chapter 2. The stimuli were divided into 
sets such that across participants, each face appeared as an ingroup member for some 
participants but an outgroup member for others, and as a recognition target for some 
participants but a foil for others. In each set, there were 160 faces (80 Black, 80 White; 80 
targets, 80 foils). 
2.1.3 Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed a short 
task designed to enhance their identification to their ingroup (University of Birmingham), as 
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in Experiments 1–2. Specifically, participants completed a brief questionnaire, ostensibly 
from university student services, in which they reported five ways in which they were similar 
to their fellow University of Birmingham students.  
Participants then completed the main task; all instructions and stimuli were presented 
via a personal computer running MediaLab and DirectRT research software (Empirisoft 
Corporation, 2008). Participants learned that they would take part in a face recognition task 
with separate learning and recognition phases. They learned further that during the task, they 
would see faces of students from either the University of Birmingham or the University of 
Nottingham. They learned on each trial of the task, they would see one face and that their task 
was to attend closely to all of the faces to recognise them later. Trials were initiated with the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the ingroup/outgroup prime that 
appeared centred at the top of the screen for 1500 ms. A face then appeared, centred on the 
screen below the prime for 2000 ms (see Figure 4). The intertrial interval was 1000 ms. 
Eighty faces in total were presented (20 for each same-/other-race × same-/other-university 
category).  
  
Figure 4. Example stimuli, Experiments 3–6. Left panel: own race, own university; right 
panel: other race, other university.  
 
Following a brief filler task, participants completed the old/new recognition test. 
Participants indicated, by means of a key press, whether each face had been presented in the 
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target learning phase. The stimuli included the 80 previously presented faces plus 80 foil 
images (40 Black, 40 White). Faces were presented centrally on the computer screen below 
the own-university or other-university prime. “Old” faces were presented with their original 
primes; and “new” faces were paired quasi-randomly with the own-university or other-
university prime (with the only condition that 40 faces were presented with the own-
university prime and 40 with the other-university prime). After responses to each face, 
participants rated their confidence in their memory response along a 7-point scale anchored 
by 1 (not at all confident) and to 7 (extremely confident). All stimuli were presented in a 
randomised order.  
Finally, participants completed an adapted inter-racial contact questionnaire (Hancock 
& Rhodes, 2008; see Appendix H). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with 
each of 15 items concerning their experience with Black targets (e.g., “I know lots of Black 
people”; 8 items; Cronbach’s α = .77) and White targets (e.g., “I interact with White people 
on a daily basis”; 7 items; Cronbach’s α = .30). Ratings were made along a 6-point scale 
anchored by very strongly disagree to very strongly agree.  
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Recognition memory. The primary dependent variable of interest was 
recognition accuracy, analysed using a signal detection framework (Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991). Hit and false alarm rates were calculated separately for each of the Target Race × 
Target University conditions, and these rates were then used to calculate discrimination 
sensitivity (d’) and criterion/bias (C) parameters.11 Participants’ d’ and C scores were 
                                                             
11 After converting frequencies to probabilities, probability values of 1 were replaced with .95 (or (N-1)/N, 
where N denotes the number of targets) and probabilities of 0 were replaced with .05 (or 1/N, where N denotes 
the number of foils); this correction is necessary for the accurate calculation of d’ (cf. Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991) and was used throughout the recognition studies within this thesis 
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submitted to 2 (target race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-
university) repeated-measures ANOVAs.  
2.2.1.1 Recognition sensitivity. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are 
presented in Appendix I. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target race, F(1, 
29) = 6.20, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .18, such that participants demonstrated greater recognition 
sensitivity for own-race than other-race faces (Ms = 1.55 and 1.07, respectively). There was 
also a main effect of target university, F(1, 29) = 8.50, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .23, such that 
participants demonstrated greater recognition sensitivity for own-university than other-
university targets (Ms = 1.52 and 1.10, respectively).  
As predicted, these two effects were subsumed within a significant Target Race × 
Target University interaction, F(1, 29) = 6.97, p = .013, ηp
2 
= .19 (see Figure 5). For own-race 
targets, recognition sensitivity favoured own-university over other-university targets, t(29) = 
4.47, p < .001. In contrast, for other-race faces, recognition sensitivity was equivalent for 
own-university and other-university targets, t(29) = 0.07, p = .94.  
2.2.1.2 Criterion/bias. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented 
in Appendix J. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of target race only, F(1, 29) = 24.36, 
p < .001, ηp
2 
= .46, demonstrating that participants adopted a liberal criterion when responding 
to other-race faces but a more conservative criterion to own-race faces (Ms = -.26, and .25, 
respectively). No other results were significant (all ps > .79).  
2.2.2 Confidence ratings. Participants’ confidence ratings were analysed in a Target 
Race × Target University ANOVA. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are 
presented in Appendix K The analysis demonstrated only a significant main effect of target 
race, F (1, 29) = 10.29, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .26, demonstrating that participants were more 
confident in their memory for own-race than other-race faces (Ms = 4.5 and 4.8, respectively).  
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2.2.3 Inter-racial contact. Inter-racial contact was calculated by averaging across the 
items pertaining to participants’ experience with other-race targets (Cronbach’s alpha = .77). 
A correlational analysis (Spearman’s rho) with recognition sensitivity, criterion/bias, and 
confidence ratings for each condition of the experiment revealed no significant correlations 
(all ps > .11), suggesting that patterns of recognition sensitivity and criterion/bias cannot be 
explained by differences in inter-racial experience (see Appendix L). 
 
 
Figure 5. Recognition sensitivity (d’) as a function of target race and university, 
Experiment 3 (intentional memory). Note. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
2.3 Discussion 
The current experiment replicated the typical other-race effect. It also replicated the 
results of Shriver et al. (2008), in that ingroup/outgroup categorisation exerted an effect on 
own-race but not other-race faces. Specifically, own-race faces were remembered better when 
they were categorised as ingroup rather than outgroup members. This suggests that changes in 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation are sufficient to alter the strength of face memory, even for 
own-race faces with which we have considerable perceptual experience (Bernstein et al., 
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2007), and fits with the idea that category-level processing of own-race faces can be dominant 
under intentional memory conditions. In contrast, I found no effects for ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation with other-race faces; this may be because other-race targets are typically 
processed categorically as outgroup members (Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008), particularly in 
inter-racial contexts (Cassidy et al., 2011). It remained unclear, however, whether the 
observed ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects were a function of memory-directed 
encoding.; in Experiment 4, I investigated whether the effects would generalise to a situation 
in which memory was incidental rather than intentional, where initial processing was directed 
toward deeper encoding.  
3. Experiment 4  
Experiment 4 examined participants’ incidental memory for own-race and other-race 
faces as a function of ingroup/outgroup categorisation. More specifically, participants judged 
faces for likeability an arguably “deep” encoding task, which has previously been 
demonstrated to have consequences for recognition memory, and the engagement of 
configural/ individuated face processing (e.g., Marzi & Viggiano, 2010; McKelvie, 1985, 
1995, 1996), prior to completing a surprise recognition test. I predicted that participants 
would exhibit better recognition memory for own-race versus other-race faces (i.e., the typical 
other-race effect). I also predicted that ingroup/outgroup categorisation and racial category 
membership would interact, but that the specific pattern would differ from that found in 
Experiment 3. Specifically, I predicted that in the absence of intentional memory goal that 
may be sensitive to category-level processes (and thus reduced reliance on configural 
processing) for own-race faces, ingroup/outgroup categorisation would have a greater (rather 
than a lesser) impact for other- than own-race faces. That is, ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
was expected to influence memory for other-race faces, because ingroup categorisation would 
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motivate participants to process other-race faces more deeply (Brewer et al., 1995), enabling 
ingroup/outgroup effects to emerge. Ingroup/outgroup categorisation was not expected to 
influence memory for own-race faces, however. Although it should be the case that ingroup 
categorisation should be as  motivating in relation to own- than other-race faces, I reasoned 
that this ingroup motivational advantage would be offset by extensive experience in 
processing own-race faces configurally and the bias to categorise own-race faces as ingroup 
members (both of which could offset contextual cues to outgroup membership). . 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants and design. Twenty-six White female students from the University 
of Birmingham (Mage = 18.5 years) completed the study for course credit; all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was based on the same 2 (target race: own-
race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) within-participants 
design, as Experiment 3. 
3.1.2 Materials. The materials were as in Experiment 3. 
3.1.3 Procedure. Participants first completed the same identification-enhancing task 
described in Experiment 1. Participants then completed a likeability judgement task; all 
instructions and stimuli were presented via a personal computer running MediaLab and 
DirectRT research software (Empirisoft Corporation, 2006). Participants learned that during 
the task they would see faces of students from either the University of Birmingham or the 
University of Nottingham. They learned further than on each trial, they would see one face 
and that their task was to indicate how likeable they judged each face to be. Trials comprised 
of a fixation cross for 500 ms, an ingroup/outgroup prime that appeared centred at the top of 
the screen for 1500 ms, and a target face that appeared centred on the screen below the prime. 
The ingroup/outgroup prime and target face remained onscreen until participants produced a 
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likeability judgement between 1 (not at all likeable) to 7 (very likeable). The intertrial interval 
was 1000 ms. A total of 80 faces were presented (20 for each own-/other-race × own-/other-
university category).  
Following a brief filler task, participants completed a surprise old/new recognition 
test, which followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1. On task completion, participants 
completed the Voci and Hewstone (2003) inter-racial contact questionnaire.  
3.2 Results 
Data were treated as in Experiment 3.  
3.2.1 Likeability judgements. Participants’ likeability ratings and rating times were 
submitted to 2 (target race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-
university) repeated-measures ANOVAs 
3.2.1.1 Ratings. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented in 
Appendix M. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target race, F(1, 25) = 49.65, 
p < .001, ηp
2 
= .66, such that own-race faces were judged more likeable than other-race faces 
(Ms = 4.31 and 3.29, respectively). The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of 
target university, F(1,25) = 4.57, p = .043, ηp
2 
= .15, such that own-university faces were 
judged as more likeable than other-university faces (Ms = 3.89 and 3.71, respectively).  
The Target Race × Target University interaction, however, was not significant, F(1, 
25) = 2.94, p = .099. Although there is evidence for a relationship between liking and memory 
(Vokey & Read, 1992), this lack of interaction suggests that likeability cannot account for the 
pattern of recognition memory reported subsequently.  
3.2.1.2 Rating times. Due to the presence of outlying responses in the data set, 
response times over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were excluded (1.25 % of the 
data). Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented in Appendix N. The 
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analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > .32, suggesting that the 
differences that emerged in recognition memory as a function of these factors could not be 
attributed to differential viewing times. 
3.2.2 Recognition memory. Participants’ d’ and C scores were submitted to 2 (target 
race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) repeated-
measures ANOVAs.  
3.2.2.1 Recognition sensitivity. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are 
presented in Appendix O. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target race, F(1, 
25) = 33.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 57, demonstrating recognition sensitivity was higher for own-race 
than other-race faces (Ms = 1.71 and 0.67, respectively). There was also a significant main 
effect of target university, F(1, 25) = 7.41, p = .012, ηp
2 
= .23, demonstrating recognition 
sensitivity was higher for own-university than other-university targets (Ms = 1.40 and 0.97, 
respectively). Paralleling the effects on target likeability ratings, this pattern suggests that 
likeable targets are better recognised. 
Importantly, these two factors were subsumed within a significant Target Race × 
Target University interaction, F(1, 25) = 4.56, p = .043, ηp
2
 = 15 (see Figure 6). Although 
recognition sensitivity for own-race faces was equivalent for own-university and other-
university targets (Ms = 1.77 and 1.65, respectively; t(25) = 0.65, p = .52); for other-race 
faces, recognition sensitivity was greater for own-university than other-university targets (Ms 
= 1.03 and 0.28, respectively; t(25) = 2.88, p = .008).  
3.2.2.2 Criterion/bias. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented 
in Appendix P. The analysis again demonstrated a significant effect of target race, F(1, 25) = 
27.54, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .52, revealing that participants adopted a more liberal criterion for 
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other-race faces, but a more conservative criterion for own-race faces (Ms = -0.59 and -0.27, 
respectively).  
 
Figure 6. Recognition sensitivity (d’) as a function of target race and university, 
Experiment 4 (incidental memory). Note. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
The analysis also revealed a significant Target Race × Target University interaction, 
F(1, 25) = 14.33, p = .001, ηp
2
 = 36 (see Figure 7). For own-race faces, participants adopted a 
more conservative threshold for other-university than own-university targets (Ms = 0.36, and 
0.19, respectively; t(25) = 2.18, p = .039). For other-race faces, participants adopted a liberal 
criterion for both other-university and own-university targets, however, participants adopted a 
significantly more liberal criterion for other-university than own-university targets (Ms = -
0.86 and -0.33, respectively; t(25) = 3.07, p = .005).  
3.2.3 Inter-racial contact. Separate scores for quantity and quality of inter-racial 
contact were calculated by averaging across the items separately for each subscale of the 
contact questionnaire (Cronbach’s alphas = .70 and .82 respectively). 
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Recognition sensitivity and criterion bias scores for other-race faces, as a function of 
university affiliation, were submitted to a correlational analysis (Spearman’s rho) with 
participants’ self-reported quantity and quality of inter-racial contact. The analysis revealed 
no significant correlations (all ps > .26; see Appendix Q). Again, any results are therefore 
unlikely to be explained by differences in inter-racial experience.  
 
Figure 7. Criterion/bias (C) as a function of target race and university, Experiment 4. 
Note. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
3.2.4 Post hoc analyses. Because likeability has sometimes been linked with greater 
recognition (e.g., Vokey & Read, 1992), Spearman’s rho correlations between likeability 
ratings and recognition were calculated. The analysis revealed no significant correlations 
between likeability and recognition sensitivity (all ps > .16; see Appendix R). 
Because the time spent judging likeability at encoding could have influenced 
recognition, Spearman’s rho correlations between rating time at encoding and recognition 
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between rating time and subsequent recognition (all ps > .11; see Appendix S). In summary, 
the recognition results cannot be explained in terms of likeability ratings or viewing time at 
encoding. 
3.3 Discussion  
Experiment 4 investigated the effect of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on memory 
for own-race and other-race faces among participants who judged faces for likeability, rather 
than encoding faces for later recognition.  As in Experiment 3, recognition memory was better 
for own-race than other-race faces; that is, I replicated the typical other-race effect. In contrast 
to Experiment 3 (and past research; e.g., Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008), however, 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation exerted an effect on other-race but not own-race recognition. 
Specifically, other-race faces categorised as ingroup members were remembered better than 
those categorised as outgroup members, but there was no evidence that ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation modulated own-race face recognition.  
The failure to observe ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects for own-race faces 
following trait-directed incidental, as opposed to memory-directed, encoding suggests that 
performance here was affected by a default process for own-race faces irrespective of the 
assignment of the non-racial group. I suggest that this default reflects configural coding; this 
will be tested in Experiment 6. Ingroup categorisation did have an effect on the recognition of 
other-race faces, so it cannot be argued that the ingroup/outgroup categorisation was simply 
not applied during trait-directed encoding. Moreover, participants also gave higher likeability 
ratings for ingroup than outgroup faces, regardless of race, again corroborating the 
effectiveness of the ingroup/outgroup manipulation. Rather than ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation failing to exert any motivational influence, the results suggest that in the 
absence of memory-directed encoding to remember faces, all own-race faces are treated 
79 
similarly—perhaps by all being categorised as ingroup members at some level. This reasoning 
is in line with the hypothesis that racial categorisation is a default process that is engaged 
even when a task does not explicitly require categorisation (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; 
Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; but see Cassidy et al., 2011; Hehman et al., 2010). 
That ingroup categorisation exerted a greater influence on other-race faces suggests that this 
default processing strategy was carried over to other-race faces assigned to the participant’s 
social group, at least under deep encoding conditions.  
3.3.1 Incidental versus intentional memory. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 
together thus suggest that different encoding goals can yield very different memorial 
outcomes. Given that the participants in Experiments 3 and 4 came from the same population 
(university, cohort) and were demographically similar (in race, sex, age), I conducted an 
exploratory analysis in which I combined the data from the two experiments. I conducted a 
Target Race (own-race/other-race) × Target University (own-university/other-university) × 
Memory Type (intentional/incidental) mixed-model ANOVA with memory type as a 
between-participants factor. This analysis yielded a significant Target Race × Target 
University × Memory Type interaction, F(1, 54) = 11.23, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .17. For own-race 
targets, the Target University × Memory Type interaction (F(1, 54) = 8.51, p = .005, ηp
2
 = 
.14) was explained by the fact that ingroup categorisation improved recognition among 
participants with an intentional memory goal, t(54) = 2.52, p = .013. This may reflect 
processes recruited over and above the default encoding applied to own-race faces. For other-
race targets, the Target University × Memory Type interaction was also significant (F(1, 54) = 
4.65, p = .036, ηp
2
 = .080). In this case, ingroup categorisation of other-race faces improved 
recognition among participants , t(54) = 3.05, p = .004. This is consistent with extra processes 
being recruited for the other-race, ingroup-categorised faces than would normally be the case. 
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Interestingly, for other-race targets, there was also a strong effect of encoding goal, F(1, 54) = 
4.93, p = .047, ηp
2
 = .071, such that recognition was better following intentional than 
incidental learning (Ms = 1.08 and 0.66, respectively). This pattern is in line with the assertion 
that individuation motives are constrained by individuation experience with other-race faces 
(Hugenberg et al., 2010; see also Rossion & Michel, 2011). Presumably deeper encoding 
(more akin to own-race processing) resulted in participants applying own-race face processing 
strategies to other-race faces, but with the result of extracting “faulty” or inappropriate cues 
for other-race recognition (Davies, Ellis, & Shepherd, 1977; Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 
1975; Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002; Sergent, 1984; Valentine & Endo, 1992), especially 
for ingroup-categorised other-race targets.  
4 Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, I set out to test whether the effects observed in Experiment 3, under 
memory-directed encoding, were the result of differential reliance on configural processing 
for own- and other-race faces. I introduced inverted faces, as well as upright faces, in an 
intentional memory task, and used inversion costs (i.e., poorer recognition of inverted than 
upright faces) as a marker of configural processing (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Maurer et al., 
2002; Thompson, 1980; Yin, 1969). In line with Experiment 3, I predicted that racial and non-
racial categorisation would interact, such that ingroup/outgroup categorisation would have a 
greater impact on recognition memory for own-race than other-race faces due to the impact of 
category-level processes on own-race outgroup faces.  
In terms of processing, I reasoned that if intentional memory goals are more akin to 
category-level, feature-based coding (cf. Mason & Macrae, 2004), and therefore rely less 
upon “normal” configural processing, than inversion effects are likely be relatively weak. 
Although there is overwhelming evidence that inversion is detrimental to face processing 
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(e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 1980; Yin, 1969), there is some prior evidence for 
weak effects of configural coding when category-level processing of faces is emphasised, 
even for own-race faces. Hugenberg and Corneille (2009) tested for configural processes 
using the face-composite effect (Young et al., 1987). Hugenberg and Corneille failed to find a 
face-composite effect for own-race faces when those faces were categorized as outgroup 
members, and speculated that the lack of face-composite effect in their study arose from 
participants’ decreased motivation to attend to outgroup members. It is also possible, 
however, that the null effect was driven by less reliance on configural information in the 
outgroup faces.   Face-composite effects reflect “holistic” rather than configural encoding but, 
importantly, for both inversion and face-composite paradigms, a lack of effect suggests 
relatively less reliance on configural processing. I therefore predicted that there would be a 
lack of reliance on configural processing across all conditions in Experiment 5.   
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants and design. Thirty-nine White students from the University of 
Birmingham (35 female; Mage = 19.6 years) completed the study for course credit; all 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was based on a 2 
(target race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) × 2 
(target orientation: upright/inverted) within-participants design.  
4.1.2 Materials. The materials were the same face as in Experiment 3 and 4, with the 
exception that half of the faces were inverted (i.e., rotated 180°). Across participants, each 
face appeared upright for some participants and inverted for others. Faces were always 
presented in the same orientation at encoding and test. 
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4.1.3 Procedure. The procedure was as in Experiment 3, with the exception that 
participants did not rate their confidence in their memory responses and completed the inter-
racial contact questionnaire described in Experiment 1 (Voci & Hewstone, 2003).  
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Recognition memory. The data were treated as Experiment 3. Hit and false 
alarm rates were calculated separately for each of the Target Race × Target University 
conditions, and these rates were then used to calculate discrimination sensitivity (d’) and 
criterion/bias (C). Participants d’ and C scores were submitted to 2 (target race: own-
race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) × 2 (target 
orientation: upright/inverted) repeated-measures ANOVAs.  
4.2.1.1 Recognition sensitivity. Condition means and the ANOVA summary tables are 
presented in Appendix T. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target race, F(1, 
38) =16.07, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29, with greater recognition sensitivity for own-race than other-
race faces (Ms = 1.35 and 0.89, respectively). The analysis also revealed a significant Target 
Race × Target University interaction, F(1, 38) = 23.75, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .38 which was 
subsumed within a Target Race × Target University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 38) 
= 5.43, p = .025, ηp
2
 = .12 (see Figure 8).  
This interaction was analysed further by conducting separate Target University × 
Target Orientation ANOVAs for each target race. For own-race targets, there was a main 
effect of target university only, F(1, 38) = 5.08, p = .030, ηp
2 
= .12, with stronger recognition 
sensitivity for own-university than other-university targets (Ms = 1.50 and 1.20, respectively). 
Of particular note, there was no effect of inversion, F(1, 38) = 0.24, p = .62, ηp
2 
= .01.  
For other-race targets, there was a main effect of target university, F(1, 38) = 8.52, p = 
.006, ηp
2 
= .18, with paradoxically stronger recognition sensitivity for other-university than  
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Figure 8. Recognition sensitivity (d’) as a function of target race, university, and 
orientation, Experiment 5. Note. Error bars represent standard error. 
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own-university targets (Ms = 1.09 and 0.70, respectively). This effect was subsumed within a 
Target University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 38) = 9.07, p = .005, ηp
2 
= .19. For 
own-university targets, recognition sensitivity was equivalent for inverted and upright targets, 
t(38) = 1.50, p = .14; that is, there was no inversion effect. For other-university targets, 
however, the standard inversion effect was reversed; recognition sensitivity was stronger for 
inverted than upright targets, t(38) = 2.62, p = .013. 
 For exploratory purposes, I also conducted t-tests to examine whether the results for 
the upright targets replicated the findings of Experiment 3 (and those of Shriver et al., 2008). 
Indeed, I again found that for own-race targets, participants demonstrated better recognition 
sensitivity for own-university than other-university targets, t(38) = 1.68, p = .05, but that for 
other-race targets, university status exerted no impact, t(38) = 1.68, p = .39. 
4.2.1.1 Criterion/bias. Condition means and the ANOVA summary table are presented 
in Appendix U. The analysis demonstrated a number of significant main effects: There was a 
main effect of target race, F(1, 38) = 15.14, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29, indicating that participants 
adopted a more liberal criterion for other-race targets but a more conservative criterion for 
own-race targets (Ms = -0.16 and 0.16, respectively); and a main effect of target university, 
F(1, 38) = 6.54, p = .015, ηp
2
 = .15, indicating that participants adopted a more liberal 
criterion for own-university but a more conservative criterion for other-university targets (Ms 
= -0.07 and 0.07, respectively). These main effects were subsumed within a significant Target 
Race × Target University interaction, F(1, 38) = 8.23, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .18 (see Figure 9). 
Inspection of the means demonstrated that for other-race faces, participants adopted a more 
liberal criterion for own-university targets relative to other-university targets (Ms = -0.32 and 
0.01, respectively; t(39) = 3.61, p = .002) but no response bias for other-university targets, 
t(38) = 0.12, p = .90. In contrast, for own-race faces, participants demonstrated a conservative 
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criterion irrespective of own-university or other-university status (Ms = 0.17 and 0.14, 
respectively, t(38) = 0.36, p = .72).  
The analysis also revealed several effects involving target orientation. These effects 
were theoretically uninterpretable, because they do not relate clearly to how one might be 
motivated to protect ingroup identity. Therefore, these results were not analysed further.  
4.2.2 Inter-racial contact. Separate scores for quantity and quality of inter-racial 
contact were calculated by averaging across the items separately for each subscale of the 
contact questionnaire (Cronbach’s alphas = .85 and .80, respectively). Correlational analysis 
(Spearman’s rho) revealed no significant correlations between either the quantity or quality of 
contact (all ps > .39) and inversion costs for either own- or other-university other-race faces 
(see Appendix V). The aforementioned recognition sensitivity results are therefore not 
explained by simple differences in racial experience. 
 
 
Figure 9. Criterion/bias (C) as a function of target race and university, Experiment 5. 
Note. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Own Race Other Race
C
ri
te
ri
o
n
/b
ia
s
 (
C
)
Own university
Other university
86 
4.3 Discussion 
The current experiment yielded several results of interest. First, own-race faces were 
generally remembered better than other-race faces (i.e., the other-race effect). Second, 
replicating the effects of Experiment 3 (see also Bernstein et al., 2007, Shriver et al., 2008), 
ingroup categorisation, relative to outgroup categorisation, benefitted recognition memory for 
own-race faces. Third, there were minimal effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation for 
other-race faces when the faces were presented upright (see also Experiment 3). Fourth, the 
effects of inversion were generally weak, with only non-significant trends for an upright 
memory advantage (for own-race faces and ingroup-categorised other-race faces). Finally, 
there was a reversal of the standard face inversion effect when other-race faces were 
categorised as outgroup members, such that inverted other-race faces were better recognised 
than upright other-race faces when categorised as outgroup members. 
The weak inversion effects observed for own-race faces and ingroup-categorised 
other-race faces is consistent with participants engaging in category-level as well as 
individuated coding of faces, with category-level encoding less sensitive to inversion than 
individuated (configurally encoded) representations.  
The most surprising finding was that inversion benefitted the recognition of outgroup-
categorised other-race faces. This result is noteworthy given the overwhelming evidence for 
the detrimental effects of inversion on face processing (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 
1980; Yin, 1969). It is not, however, the first demonstration of this reversed effect of 
inversion. Young, Hellawell, and Hay (1987, Experiment 2) found a reversal in one of their 
initial demonstrations of the face-composite effect. They demonstrated not only that this 
illusion disappeared when face composites were inverted but rather that the illusion 
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reversed—that is, that participants were faster to recognise identical top halves of faces as 
identical when the faces were inverted rather than upright.  
Because good performance on the face-composite task requires not attending to 
configural information, Young et al. concluded that configurations are perceived correctly 
only in upright faces. The link between attention to configural information and good 
performance on the face-composite task, however, assumes that the correct configurations are 
attended in upright faces. There is evidence that White participants encode own-race faces 
using configural representations of the eyes in relation to the nose and mouth (e.g., Schyns, 
Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002; Sergent, 1984), but other evidence suggests that information about 
the mouth and jaw line might be the most useful for discrimination of Black faces (e.g., 
Davies, Ellis, & Shepherd, 1977; Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975). Thus, for our White 
participants, the extraction of the kinds of configural information typically derived from own-
race faces might not support the recognition of other-race faces and might actually be 
detrimental to their recognition. Indeed, when White participants are trained to attend to 
lower-face features (diagnostic of Black identity) rather than upper-face features (diagnostic 
of White identity), even when the training is with own-race faces, they show improved other-
race recognition (Hills & Lewis, 2006). In the current experiment, however, when other-race 
faces were categorised as outgroup members, presented in inverted orientation, or encoded 
with a memory-directed encoding goal—all of which should decrease reliance on configural 
processing (and perhaps reliance on non-identity-diagnostic configurations)—participants 
appeared to process the faces more effectively (and especially when all factors are combined).  
Elsewhere, there is data reporting an advantage for inverted faces in prosopagnosic 
patients (de Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995). 
In such cases, the benefit from face inversion has been attributed to patients extracting 
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“noisy” (i.e., inefficient) configural representations from upright faces, which disrupts rather 
than facilitates recognition when faces are upright; when faces are inverted, patients extract 
less of this noisy information and show better face recognition. Here I suggest that 
participants were particularly likely to encode other-race, outgroup faces at a category-level 
with minimal configural coding, making configural information less available to recognition 
when faces were inverted.   
5 Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 examined recognition for own- and other-race faces as a function of 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation and face orientation following trait-directed incidental 
encoding. As in Experiment 4, participants judged faces for likeability rather than studying 
faces for later recognition, and then completed a surprise recognition task. In addition, faces 
were presented in either upright or inverted orientation. I predicted that participants would 
exhibit better recognition memory for own-race versus other-race faces (i.e., the typical other-
race effect). I also predicted, in line with our findings from Experiment 4, that 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation and racial category membership would interact. I reasoned 
that in the absence of an intentional memory goal (and any changes in processing that would 
ensure), own-race faces would be recognised equally well, irrespective of how the faces were 
categorised (ingroup/outgroup). In contrast, I reasoned that recognition of other-race faces 
would depend on whether they were categorised as ingroup or outgroup members.  
In terms of processing, I expected more robust inversion effects than in Experiment 5, 
on the assumption that processing in the absence of an explicit memory goal would engage 
more “deep”, individuated (i.e., configural) processing. Ingroup/outgroup categorisation was 
not expected to influence the magnitude of the inversion cost for own-race faces because 
perceptual experience with own-race faces and/or a bias to categorise own-race faces as 
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ingroup members should support normal configural processing in all cases. In contrast, 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation was expected to influence the magnitude of the inversion 
cost for other-race faces, because ingroup categorisation would motivate participants to 
process other-race faces more deeply (Brewer et al., 1995). Specifically, I expected inversion 
costs (i.e., configural processing) to emerge for other-race faces when they were categorised 
as ingroup but not outgroup members.  
5.1 Method 
5.1.2 Participants and design. Thirty-nine White students from the University of 
Birmingham (31 female; Mage = 20.3 years) completed the study for course credit; all had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was based on a 2 (target race: own-
race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-university) × 2 (target 
orientation: upright/inverted) within-participants design. 
5.1.3 Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were as in Experiment 
3. Participants followed the same procedure as in Experiment 4.  
5.2 Results 
Data were treated as in Experiment 4.  
5.2.1 Likeability judgements. Participants’ likeability ratings and rating times were 
submitted to 2 (target race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university/other-
university) × 2 (target orientation: upright/inverted) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
5.2.1.1 Ratings. Conditions means and the ANOVA summary table are presented in 
Appendix W. The analysis revealed a main effect of target race, F(1, 38) = 40.19 p < .001, ηp
2 
= .51, such that own-race faces were judged more likeable than other-race faces (Ms = 4.27 
and 3.41, respectively). The analysis also revealed a main effect of target university, F(1, 38) 
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= 11.54, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .23, such that own-university faces were judged more likeable than 
other-university faces (Ms = 3.93 and 3.75, respectively).  
These main effects were subsumed within a significant Target University × Target 
Orientation interaction, F(1, 38) = 5.78, p = .021, ηp
2 
=.13. For own-university faces, 
participants rated upright faces as marginally more likeable than inverted targets, t(38) = 1.94, 
p = .06 (Ms = 4.00 and 3.86, respectively). For other-university faces, however, likeability 
was equivalent for upright and inverted targets, t(38) = 0.73, p = .47 (Ms = 3.71 and 3.78, 
respectively). Again, however, there were no higher-order Target Race × Target University 
interactions, both F < 0.38, both p > .84, suggesting that likeability could not account for the 
recognition memory results reported below. 
5.2.1.2 Rating times. Mean judgement latencies served as the dependent measure of 
interest. Due to the presence of outlying responses in the data set, response times over 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean were excluded (2.56 % of the data). Condition means are 
the ANOVA summary table are presented in Appendix X.  
The analysis revealed only a significant main effect of target orientation, F(1, 38) = 
4.18, p = .048, ηp
2
 = .099, such that participants were slower to make likeability judgements 
for inverted than upright targets (Ms = 2254 and 2154 ms, respectively). There were no main 
or interaction effects for target race or university, all ps > .21, suggesting that any differences 
that emerged in recognition memory as a function of these factors could not be attributed to 
differential viewing times.  
5.2.2 Recognition memory. Participants’ recognition sensitivity (d’) and 
criterion/bias (C) scores were submitted to 2 (target race: own-race/other-race) × 2 (target 
university: own-university/other-university) × 2 (target orientation: upright/inverted) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs.  
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5.2.2.1 Recognition sensitivity. Condition means and the ANOVA summary tables are 
presented in Appendix Y. The analysis revealed a main effect for target race, F(1, 38) = 
65.66, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .63, with recognition sensitivity higher for own-race than other-race 
faces (Ms = 1.59 and 0.90, respectively). This main effect was subsumed by a significant 
Target Race × Target University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 38) = 4.27, p = .046, 
ηp
2 
= .10 (see Figure 10), which was analysed further by conducting separate Target 
University × Target Orientation ANOVAs for each target race.  
For own-race faces, there was only a significant main effect of target orientation, F(1, 
38) = 4.16, p = .048, ηp
2 
= .09, such that participants demonstrated better recognition 
sensitivity for upright than inverted targets (Ms = 1.77 and 1.40, respectively). For other-race 
faces, there were significant main effects of target university, F(1, 38) = 9.34, p = .004, ηp
2 
= 
.19, and target orientation, F(1, 38) = 6.49, p = .015, ηp
2
 = .15. These effects were qualified by 
a Target University × Target Orientation interaction, F(1, 38) = 5.05, p = .031, ηp
2
 = .12. The 
inversion cost (i.e., poorer recognition sensitivity for inverted than upright faces) was reliable 
for own-university targets, t(38) = 3.86, p < .001, but not for other-university targets, t(38) = 
0.19, p = .85.  
5.2.2.2 Criterion/bias Condition means and the ANOVA summary tables are 
presented in Appendix Z. The analysis demonstrated main effects of target race, F(1, 38) = 
38.24, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .50, indicating that participants adopted a more conservative criterion 
for own-race than other-race faces (Ms = 0.54 and 0.02, respectively); and a main effect target 
university, F(1, 38) = 4.14, p = .049, ηp
2
 = .10, indicating that participants adopted a more 
conservative criterion for other-university than own-university targets (Ms = 0.32 and .24, 
respectively). The analysis also revealed several effects involving target orientation. These 
effects were theoretically uninterpretable, and so were not analysed further.  
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5.2.2 Inter-racial contact. Separate scores for quantity and quality of inter-racial 
contact were calculated by averaging across the items separately for each subscale of the 
contact questionnaire (Cronbach’s alphas = .69 and .86, respectively). 
Correlational analysis (Spearman’s rho) revealed no significant correlations between 
either the quantity (all ps > .60), or quality of contact (all ps > .73) and inversion costs for 
either own- or other-university other-race faces (see Appendix AA). The recognition results 
are therefore not explained by simple differences in racial experience. 
5.2.3 Post hoc analyses. Exploratory post hoc analyses were used to investigate other 
possible contributions to the recognition findings. 
5.2.3.1. Likeability and recognition. Because likeability has sometimes been linked 
with greater recognition (e.g., Vokey & Read, 1992), correlations (Spearman’s rho) between 
likeability ratings and recognition sensitivity were calculated (see Table 4). The analysis 
revealed significant positive correlations between participants’ likeability ratings and 
recognition sensitivity for inverted own-race, own-university faces, and upright other-race, 
own-university faces. No other significant correlations were observed.  
5.2.3.2. Encoding time and recognition. Because the time spent judging likeability 
may have influenced recognition memory outcomes, correlations (Spearman’s rho) between 
rating times and recognition sensitivity for each condition (d’) were calculated. The analysis 
demonstrated several significant positive correlations between response time and recognition 
sensitivity (see Table 5), such that increased response time tended to be related to greater 
recognition sensitivity. For own-race faces, the analysis revealed significant positive 
relationships between encoding time and recognition for upright own-university targets and 
upright other-university targets. For other-race faces, the analysis revealed significant positive 
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relationships between encoding time and recognition for upright own-university targets, 
upright other-university targets, and inverted other-university targets. 
 
 
Figure 10. Recognition sensitivity (d’) as a function of target race, university and 
orientation, Experiment 6. Note. Error bars denote standard error. 
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Table 4 
Spearman’s rho coefficients between likeability ratings and recognition sensitivity (d') 
as a function of target race, university, and orientation, Experiment 4 
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
 rs p rs p rs p rs p 
Own Race (White) .17 .29 .32 .05 .21 .21 -.03 .85 
Other Race (Black) .37 .02 .15 .36 -.08 .64 -.02 .93 
Note. Two-tailed correlations. 
 
Table 5 
Spearman’s rho coefficients between encoding time and recognition sensitivity (d') as 
a function of target race, university, and orientation, Experiment 4 
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
 r p r p r p r p 
Own Race (White) .42 .008 -.12 .48 .36 .02 .30 .07 
Other Race (Black) .61 .001 .24 .14 .34 .04 .33 .03 
Note. Two-tailed correlations. 
  
It is worth noting that most of the relationships (except in the case of inverted own-
university targets) were significant or approaching significance. In combination with the fact 
that the pattern does not mirror the recognition sensitivity results (i.e., that “good” memory 
was evident even in cases where encoding time and recognition were not correlated), this 
suggests that these correlations reflect a more general relationship between increased viewing 
time at encoding and subsequent memory. They do not account for the pattern of recognition 
sensitivity. 
5.3 Discussion 
The current experiment investigated the effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on 
the processing of own-race and other-race faces by participants who encoded faces for 
likeability in an incidental memory task. There were several findings of interest. First, and as 
in Experiments 3–5, participants demonstrated better recognition memory for own-race than 
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other-race faces (i.e., the typical other-race effect). Second, for own-race faces, participants 
demonstrated equivalent recognition sensitivity and inversion costs for ingroup (own-
university) and outgroup (other-university) faces, suggesting configural processing of both. 
Finally, for other-race faces, participants demonstrated better recognition for outgroup (other-
university) than ingroup (own-university) faces, but more configural processing for ingroup 
(own-university) than outgroup (other-university) faces. 
The emergence of reliable face inversion effects for own-race faces in Experiment 6 
but not in Experiment 4 is consistent with my reasoning that intentional memory encoding 
prompts reliance on category-based surface coding (in Experiment 3), which is less sensitive 
to inversion than individuated face encoding.  That non-racial ingroup/outgroup status had no 
impact on processing or memory for own-race faces is inconsistent with the Categorisation–
Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010), which would predict that motivational 
differences vis-à-vis ingroup and outgroup targets would lead to differences in processing. 
Instead, this pattern is consistent with my assertion that as long as encoding recruits ‘deeper’ 
individuated (i.e., configural) face encoding, then experience with own-race faces ensures that 
motivational effects have little scope for influence.  
For other-race faces, outgroup categorisation resulted in better recognition sensitivity 
than ingroup categorisation, but this effect was driven by particularly poor recognition of 
inverted ingroup faces. This poor recognition may stem from configural processing applied to 
ingroup faces from another race. Other-race faces tend not to be subject to the “normal” 
configural processing that is believed to underlie accurate face recognition (e.g., Greenberg & 
MacGregor, 2010; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 2006; Michel et 
al., 2006; Rhodes et al, 1989; Rhodes et al., 2009; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Stahl et 
al., 2008; Tanaka et al., 2004), and so any configural representation extracted for these faces 
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in the deep, incidental memory conditions may be less well specified than the configural 
representation of own-race faces. Other-race ingroup faces may therefore suffer under 
conditions of inversion. Perhaps the configurations extracted by participants were 
inappropriate for other-race faces (Davies et al., 1977; Ellis et al., 1975). Consistent with the 
Categorisation–Individuation Model, the motivation to individuate ingroup faces appears to 
have been constrained by a lack of experience in individuating other-race faces. 
6 General Discussion 
The current research investigated how ingroup/outgroup categorisation influences 
processing of and memory for unambiguous own-race and other-race faces. In addition to the 
typical other-race effect, there were several findings of interest: First, ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation exerted different effects on own-race versus other-race face processing, 
suggesting that the impact of social-categorisation-related motives are constrained by 
perceptual experience. Second, the effects of race and university categorisation varied 
according to whether faces were encoded intentionally or incidentally.  
6.1 Memory Directed Encoding of Own-Race versus Other-Race Faces 
In Experiments 3 and 5, as is typical of many investigations of the other-race effect, 
participants studied ingroup- and outgroup-categorised own-race and other-race faces for later 
recognition. Under these intentional memory-directed encoding conditions, I replicated past 
research (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008): For own-race faces, outgroup 
categorisation impaired recognition relative to ingroup categorisation. This pattern can be 
accounted for Hugenberg et al.’s (2010) Categorisation–Individuation Model: Own-race faces 
are assumed to elicit attention to identity-diagnostic information, but situational cues can 
temporarily direct attention to the category level, which can reduce subsequent recognition 
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accuracy.  The results suggest that category-level information can modulate even own-race 
face processing under these intentional conditions.  
Because category-level encoding is the default for other-race faces, however, the 
processing of these faces is less affected by category-level (feature-based coding).  I also 
propose that category-level information is relatively less sensitive to effects of face inversion 
than individuated configural codes. The net result is that performance generally showed only 
small effects of inversion. The main exception to this result was for other-race, outgroup 
faces, which were recognised best when inverted. This is a surprising result. However, other-
race, outgroup faces should be least subject to configural processing, while in the other 
conditions (e.g., for other-race, ingroup coding) configural coding should be weak. Weak 
configural codes, when inverted may be disruptive to recognition–an argument made in the 
literature on prosopagnosia (de Gelder et al., 1998; de Gelder & Rouw, 2000). In such cases, 
the benefit from face inversion has been attributed to patients extracting “noisy” (i.e., 
inefficient) configural representations from upright faces, which disrupts rather than 
facilitates recognition when faces are upright. Inverting the faces reduces configural coding, 
enabling the patients to improve. It may be, therefore, that other-race, outgroup faces are 
particularly robust to the effects of inversion. 
 6.2 Trait-Directed Encoding of Own-Race versus Other-Race Faces 
In Experiments 4 and 6, participants’ recognition memory was tested after incidental 
learning, when their encoding task was to judge faces for likeability—a task more reminiscent 
of deep everyday face encoding. The results demonstrated that for own-race targets, 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation did not influence performance but it did affect recognition 
memory for other-race faces. This finding was replicated across the experiments. These data 
suggest that the default strategy of individuated processing held for all own-race faces, and 
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that generalised to the processing of other-race faces assigned to the participant’s own 
university. There was converging evidence for the default strategy being configural encoding, 
since all the faces showed strong inversion effects with the exception of the other-race 
outgroup stimuli. It may be that likeability judgements in particular emphasise configural 
processing for ingroup members regardless of whether they are categorised through visual 
(i.e., race) or non-visual dimensions (i.e., university group).   
These findings are in stark contrast to the research on which the Categorisation–
Individuation Model was based, where outgroup categorisation disrupted own-race processing 
(Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009) and recognition (Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008). 
Hugenberg et al. (2010) explained these previous findings by arguing that individuation 
experience is only fully exploited to the extent that the motivation to individuate the target is 
engaged. In contrast, outgroup categorisation signals category rather than identity processing. 
In the current research, however, for own-race faces, either outgroup categorisation did not 
signal identity irrelevance or individuation experience was sufficiently strong that 
individuation motivation was irrelevant. 
For other-race faces, interestingly, recognition sensitivity was no better for ingroup- 
than outgroup-categorised other-race faces, suggesting that a shift to greater configural 
processing does not support better representations of other-race faces. This, in line with the 
Categorisation–Individuation Model, the motivation to individuate is constrained by 
perceptual experience. Importantly, however, it is not the case that the motivation to 
individuate cannot induce a processing shift toward identity-diagnostic information but, 
rather, that this motivation is not sufficient, in the absence of perceptual experience, to result 
in strong recognition (in the case of other-race faces).  
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6.3 Recognition Memory Following Shallow Memory-Directed versus Deep Trait-
Directed Encoding 
These results demonstrate that incidental trait-directed encoding generated several 
shifts in performance relative to memory-directed intentional encoding. First, the detrimental 
effects of face inversion were stronger in Experiment 6 than in Experiment 5. I suggest that 
this is because intentional memory can be influenced by category-level coding of faces, which 
is less sensitive to inversion than configural coding (Experiment 5); in contrast deep, 
incidental encoding relies primarily on configural processing (Experiment 6). Second, the 
effects of ingroup categorisation were diminished for incidental memory for own-race faces. 
This suggests that de-fault face processing, is tuned to own-race faces. This form of 
processing also appeared to apply to other-race, own-university faces, suggesting that both 
social grouping and perceptual learning were effective in this circumstance. Third, there was 
stronger inversion effects in Experiment 6 than in Experiment 5 for all ingroup categorised 
faces, consistent with these faces being processed configurally.  To examine the role of 
intentional versus incidental learning more directly, I conducted an exploratory analysis using 
the combined data from Experiments 3 and 4. The analysis indicated that for own-race 
targets, outgroup categorisation impaired recognition among participants with an intentional 
memory goal; for other-race targets, in contrast, outgroup categorisation impaired recognition 
among participants without an intentional memory goal. This pattern seems to suggest that 
when perceivers actively attempt to remember faces, the motivation to individuate faces 
constrains individuation experience, but that, when perceivers process faces without memory-
directed encoding, the direction of constraint is reversed—at least in the current experiments, 
where own-race and other-race faces were presented in an intermixed (i.e., inter-racial) 
context. 
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6.4 Criterion Bias and the Ingroup Overexclusion Effect 
Although most investigations of the own-race effect do not report analyses of 
criterion/bias, these analyses were revealing of participants’ behaviour because of 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation. In particular, I observed broad support for the “ingroup 
overexclusion effect” (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995), at least 
in for racial ingroup/outgroup status. Across four experiments, participants adopted a more 
conservative criterion for own-race faces but a more liberal criterion for other-race faces, 
suggesting that participants were motivated to protect their racial identity.  
There were also effects of non-racial (i.e., university) ingroup/outgroup status in 
Experiment 6, and Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated an interaction between racial and non-
racial ingroup/outgroup status. The pattern of these effects, however, was not consistent 
across experiments. Although it is not entirely clear from the extant literature why or how 
different cues to ingroup/outgroup status would interact, it is not surprising that university 
ingroup/outgroup status would exert influence less consistently than racial ingroup/outgroup 
status, simply because university status is a non-visual and thus less salient cue than race. It 
may be that participants have to work harder to process beyond racially salient cues to 
ingroup/outgroup membership. This suggests that cues to racial ingroup/outgroup status are 
more easily extracted than non-visually-salient university-based status. Whether non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup status would be more consistently influential in the absence of visually 
salient race cues is an empirical question for future research.  
The distinction between incidental and intentional memory made in this chapter is not 
meant to imply that trait-directed encoding will always lead to processing that supports 
individuation or that memory-directed encoding will always lead to processing that supports 
categorisation. Indeed, there are cases in the literature of intentional memory instructions that 
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effectively eliminate the other-race effect. Hugenberg, Miller, and Claypool (2007; see also 
Rhodes et al., 2009), for example, warned participants about the other-race effect and asked 
them to “do [their] best to try to pay close attention to what differentiates one particular face 
from another face of the same race, especially when that face is not of the same-race as you” 
(p. 337). Under these conditions, the other-race effect did not emerge.  
Although Hugenberg et al. provided no data that speaks to the processing that was 
induced by their instructions; it is possible that the instructions led participants to rely more 
than usual on configural information in other-race faces. That is, intentional encoding may not 
always lead to greater reliance on featural than configural information; equally, incidental 
encoding may not always lead to greater reliance on configural than featural information. The 
important distinction is the relative reliance on configural versus featural information, not 
incidental versus intentional memory.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The current research demonstrates that ingroup/outgroup categorisation has different 
implications for own-race versus other-race face processing, and that these implications 
depend on the goal adopted by perceivers at encoding. When perceivers explicitly attempt to 
process faces to support later recognition, ingroup (versus outgroup) categorisation enhances 
subsequent recognition of own-race faces, but has no impact on recognition of other-race 
faces. In contrast, when perceivers’ process faces to make deeper, non-memory directed trait 
judgements, ingroup categorisation affects other-but not own-race recognition memory on a 
subsequent surprise test.   
The current research demonstrates that ingroup/outgroup categorisation has different 
implications for own-race versus other-race face processing, and that these implications 
depend upon the goals at encoding (with own-race and ingroup faces prompting greater 
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reliance on configural processing, relative to other-race and outgroup faces) and encoding 
goal (whether faces are coded intentionally for later memory [when category-level 
information can impact], or incidentally but at a deep level [when individuation based on 
configural coding is emphasised]).  The findings provide evidence for a complex interaction 
of experience and motivation in own-race and other-race face processing, and underscore the 
importance of perceivers’ encoding goals in shaping their processing strategies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF OWN- AND OTHER-
RACE FACE PROCESSING AS A FUNCTION OF 
INGROUP/OUTGROUP CATEGORISATION 
12
 
 
The current chapter examined the electrophysiological correlates of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation and own- and other-race face processing. In Experiment 7, White participants 
performed a sequential matching task on pairs of upright and inverted faces that were either 
of their own race (White) or another race (Black) and labelled as being affiliated with the 
their own university or another university. Analysis of the behavioural data demonstrated a 
trend whereby for own-race faces, inversion costs were equivalent for own- and other-
university targets; but for other-race faces, inversion costs were larger for own- than other-
university targets, replicating previous results (Chapter 2, Experiment 1). Analysis of the 
face-specific N170 component of the ERP waveform demonstrated that for own-race faces, 
inverted-face processing was delayed relative to upright-face processing regardless of 
university ingroup/outgroup membership. For other-race faces, however, the inversion effect 
on the N170 was reliable only for own-university faces. Effects for race and university status 
did not emerge on the earlier P100 component, however, and effects for university status were 
no longer apparent on the later P200 component. This experiment provides evidence for the 
early interaction between perceptual experience and social categorisation processes in the 
structural encoding of own- and other-race faces, and clarifies recent and past models of face 
perception described in chapter 1.  
                                                             
12
 Experiment 7 is reported in Cassidy, K. D., Boutsen, L.,  Humphreys, G. W., & Quinn, K. A. (in preparation). 
Ingroup categorisation affects the structural encoding of other-race faces: Evidence from the N170 event-related 
potential.  
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1 Introduction 
The Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010) proposes that the 
other-race effect derives from the tendency to attend to identity-diagnostic information in 
own-race faces but to category-diagnostic information in other-race faces. Consistent with 
evidence that own-race faces are processed more configurally than other-race faces (i.e., in 
terms of spatial relationships between features; e.g., Rhodes et al., 1989; or more as a 
perceptual “whole” or gestalt; e.g., Michel et. al., 2006), the model asserts that the other-race 
effect derives from the tendency to attend selectively to identity-diagnostic information in 
own-race faces but to category-diagnostic featural information (e.g., skin tone) in other-race 
faces, and has its roots in both perceptual experience and motivated processing. In support of 
the model, Bernstein et al. (2007) demonstrated that when participants are directed to 
remember faces at encoding, outgroup (versus ingroup) categorisation undermines later 
recognition of own-race faces. Moreover, Hugenberg and Corneille (2009) demonstrated that 
outgroup (versus ingroup) categorisation reduces configural processing of own-race faces.  
My own research (Cassidy et al., 2011; Chapter 2, Experiment 1) has also examined 
the interaction of perceptual experience and social categorisation. I asked White participants 
to perform a simultaneous matching task on upright and inverted faces (i.e., faces rotated by 
180°) that were either own-race (White) or other-race (Black), and from their own university 
or another university. For other-race faces, participants demonstrated greater configural 
processing following own- than other-university labelling, as indexed by larger face-inversion 
costs (i.e., slower or less accurate responding to inverted than upright faces; Yin, 1969). In 
contrast, own-race faces showed strong configural processing irrespective of university 
labelling. I have observed the same pattern on recognition memory when participants were 
directed to make target likeability judgements at encoding, using inversion costs (Chapter 3, 
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Experiment 6). I interpret this pattern of affect as reflecting the mutual constraint of 
experience and motivation: Ingroup categorisation of faces along non-racial dimensions 
motivates perceivers to engage in configural processing, regardless of race. In contrast, 
outgroup categorisation undermines motivation and allows different default strategies (with a 
greater emphasis on configural information for own-race faces and featural information for 
other-race faces) to drive processing (e.g., Cassidy et al., 2011; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; 
Rhodes et al., 1989). 
The above research has relied on purely behavioural measures (response times, error 
rates), which reflect the outcomes of face processing. Such measures may be limited in their 
ability to corroborate theoretical models such as the Categorisation-Individuation Model, 
which assumes the operation of intermediate processing stages that occur on a finer-grained 
time scale. In the current chapter, I turned to event-related potentials (ERPs), which support 
the chronometric assessment and functional characterisation of different stages of face 
perception (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Rugg & Coles, 1995). Indeed, 
ERP studies of face perception have been able to relate distinct stages to ERP components, 
and to assess their sensitivity to perceptual and derived characteristics from faces (for a 
review, see Schweinberger, 2011).  
Examining the electrophysiological correlates of own- and other-race face processing 
provides an opportunity to refine the Categorisation-Individuation Model. In its current form, 
the model is underspecified with regard to when or how non-racial ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation exerts its effects. In proposing that ingroup (versus outgroup) categorisation 
motivates individuals to reallocate selective attention toward identity-diagnostic facial 
characteristics and away from category-diagnostic facial characteristics, the model does not 
specify precisely what these facial “characteristics” are. That is, the model acknowledges the 
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importance of configural information, but also leaves open the potential importance of 
different featural information in own-and other-race faces. Given that identity-diagnostic 
characteristics are not defined by Hugenberg et al., it is worth exploring the 
electrophysiological correlates of featural versus configural analysis in the context of own- 
and other-race face processing.  
Such an approach may also be informative to more general models of face perception. 
The two most influential models of face processing are Bruce and Young’s (1986) functional 
model and Haxby, Hoffman, and Gobbini’s (2000, 2002) distributed neural model. Both 
models assume that face perception begins with perceptual analysis of features and structural 
encoding of the face, but they differ in their assumptions about post-structural encoding 
processes. Bruce and Young’s model posits separate and independent operations to support 
the processing of idiosyncratic versus generic aspects of faces, whereas Haxby et al.’s model 
posits separate but interactive regions for the analysis of changeable versus invariant aspects 
of faces. 
Germane to the current chapter, neither model addresses how extra-facial (i.e., 
perceiver and context) factors influence face processing (Quinn & Macrae, 2011). In our own 
research (Cassidy et al., 2011) and the research of Hugenberg and colleagues (e.g., Bernstein 
et al., 2007; Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009), non-visually-accessible ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation cues at encoding have been shown to shape perceptual differentiation and 
subsequent recognition. Whether these cues influence perceptual analysis, structural 
encoding, or later processing is not clear from the outcome-focused data, but it is also the case 
that neither the Bruce–Young (1986) functional model nor Haxby et al.’s (2000, 2002) 
distributed neural model can be used to generate predictions about the locus of these effects. 
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1.1 Electrophysiological Correlates of Face Processing 
Electrophysiological studies have demonstrated several components that are 
implicated in face processing, ranging in a time window between approximately 90 and 200 
ms after face onset (for a review see Schweinberger, 2011)
13
.  
1.1.1 P100: Face detection and pictorial encoding. The P100 is a positive deflection 
that occurs around 80–100 ms post stimulus onset over medial occipital sites (Woodman, 
2010). The P100 tends to be a domain-general component that is sensitive to low-level visual 
transformations, such as visual changes in luminance and contrast polarity (Halgren, Raji, 
Marinkovi, Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Itier & Taylor, 2002; Rebai, Poiroux, Bernard & 
Lalonde, 2001; Rossion, Joyce, Cottrell, & Tarr, 2003). 
Although the P100 has been demonstrated to be larger for faces than control stimuli, 
such as scrambled faces (Herrmann, Ehlis, Ellgring, & Fallgatter, 2005), other research 
suggests that it is far less consistently modulated by face/object categories (Itier & Taylor, 
2004), with some studies finding no specificity at all (e.g., Boutsen, Humphreys, Praamstra, & 
Warbrick, 2006; Rossion et al., 2003). Elsewhere, the P100 has been found to be modulated 
by top-down attentional processes in face perception (Rutman, Clapp, Chadick, & Gazzaley, 
2009). Therefore, although this component is far from fully understood, it is likely that the 
P100 may reflect may reflect an earlier pictorial encoding stage of face perception (Desjardins 
& Sagalwitz, 2009; Schweinberger, 2011; but see Hahn, Jantzen & Symons, 2012, for 
evidence of early “configural” processing), such that a whole-face “percept” is not available 
to the perceiver at this stage (Rossion & Caharal, 2011).  
                                                             
13
 There are several other components not included in this review: for example the N250, and the N400. The 
N250 is larger for familiar than unfamiliar faces (e.g., Schweinberger et al., 1995, Tanaka & Pierce, 2009).  The 
N400 is not a processing stage per se, but modulates the semantic information about the face (i.e., for example 
names and familiar faces evoke a similar N400; Schweinberger, 1996). As I was interested more in how group 
categorisation informed perceptual processing, and because the faces were all unfamiliar faces (i.e., taken from 
face databases) these components are not reviewed here.  
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1.1.2 N170: Structural encoding of faces. The N170, occurring around 70ms post-
stimulus onset, is a negative deflection that appears bilaterally (though often favouring the 
right hemisphere, over occipito-temporal sites (Bentin et al., 1996; Rossion et al., 1999). The 
N170 has been identified as an integral early marker of face processing (e.g., Bentin et al., 
1996), as it shows face sensitivity in that its peak amplitude is larger in response to face-like 
compared to non-face-like stimuli. The N170 is modulated by photographs of faces and line 
drawings (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Sagiv & Bentin, 2001); Mooney faces (George, Jemel, 
Fiori, Chaby, & Renault, 2005); suggesting that the N170 is associated mainly with face 
processing rather than general visual processing. The N170 is generally thought to reflect the 
later stages of structural encoding (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000a, b, c), and has been 
shown to be sensitive to configural information in faces (e.g., Boutsen et al., 2006; Liu et al., 
2002; Vizioli et al., 2010), using various manipulations of configural processing including the 
Thatcher-illusion (Boutsen et al., 2006; Carbon, Schweinberger, Kaufmann, & Leder, 2005; 
Hahn et al., 2012) as well as face inversion; such that inverted faces yield larger and/or 
delayed N170s relative to upright faces (e.g., Eimer, 2000b; Itier & Taylor, 2002). Given that 
inversion and the Thatcher illusion are known to disrupt face recognition and configural 
processing (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002), the susceptibility of the N170 to 
inversion effects underscores its role in configural face encoding. Its role as a neural marker 
of specific perceptual processes is further underlined by the observation that the N170 is not 
modulated by purportedly higher-order derived information such as face familiarity (Bentin & 
Deouell, 2000; Eimer, 2000b), identity (Gosling & Eimer, 2011), or emotional expression 
valence (Bobes, Martin, Olivares, & Valdes-Sosa, 2000; Eimer & Holmes, 2002, 2007). 
1.1.3 P200 Group Processes. Occurring approximately 30 ms later is the P200, a 
positive deflection that has been demonstrated to index higher-order perceptual processing 
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and to be modulated by attention. It has been demonstrated to be sensitive to face 
categorization and attention-based processes (e.g., Dicketer & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & 
Bartholow, 2009; Kuboto & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006), although the 
component remains far from fully understood (Woodman, 2010). 
1.1.4 ERP components responsive to race. Of critical importance, the P100, N170 
and P200 all show latency and/or magnitude differences for own- versus other-race faces. For 
example, the P100 has been demonstrated to be larger for other-race than own-race faces 
(e.g., Herrmann et al., 2007). However, it has been argued that such differences may be a 
consequence of lower-level visual information differences in stimuli (e.g., Vizioli et al., 2010, 
see also Rossion & Caharel, 2011), perhaps reflecting differences in lower-level visual 
information than race categorisation per se.  
The N170 is also sensitive to race (Caldara et al., 2003; Gajewski, Schlegel, Stoerig, 
2008; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Stahl, Wiese, & Schweinberger, 2008, 2010; Vizioli, et al., 
2010; Weise, Stahl, & Schweinberger, 2009). Ito and Urland (2003), for example, asked 
participants to categorise Black and White target faces on the basis of gender or race while 
recording participants’ ERPs. Ito and Urland found that the N170 amplitude was larger for 
other-race than own-race faces, regardless of whether the participants were explicitly 
attending to race or gender (Experiment 1); this difference was maintained when faces were 
equated for colour information (Experiment 2). Ito and Urland suggest that their data 
constitute evidence that greater amounts of attention are directed to other-race relative to 
own-race faces, and that racial category information is automatically encoded and orientated 
towards (Ito & Urland, 2008; see also Kubota & Ito, 2007; Stahl et al., 2008; Walker, Silvert, 
Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008).  
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More recently, Vizioli et al. (2010) recorded the ERPs of participants whose task was 
to indicate whether upright and inverted Black and White faces were framed by a red or green 
border. Vizioli et al. observed that the race of stimuli modulated the magnitude of the face 
inversion effect at N170, such that inversion was more detrimental for own-race than other-
race faces. This pattern is consistent with behavioural accounts of the face inversion effect 
(e.g., Hancock et al., 2008; Rhodes et al., 1989; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004), and supports 
a link between configural processing and structural encoding of faces. 
The P200 has also been observed to be modulated by race (e.g., Caldara, Rossion, 
Bovet, & Hauret, 2004), such that the P200 is larger and more delayed for other-race faces 
(e.g., Dicketer, & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Kuboto & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-
Jensen & Ito, 2006). Modulation of the P200 by race has been argued to reflect processes 
related to active categorisation of visual stimuli (e.g., Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Latinus & 
Taylor, 2005).  
In summary, although there is some inconsistency across all studies for the P100, 
N170 and P200, with race effects sometimes emerging and sometimes not, the general pattern 
is for delayed and/or enhanced ERP components for other- versus own-race faces. Thus, all of 
these components are candidates for the ingroup/outgroup categorization effects proposed in 
the Categorization–Individuation Model. 
2 Experiment 7 
In Experiment 7, I analysed the ERPs to investigate whether the ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation effects observed in Experiment 1 would also emerge at the electrophysiological 
level. White participants who performed a sequential matching task on White (own-race) and 
Black (other-race) face pairs that were labeled as students from either the same or another 
university. Specifically, they indicated whether the second (test) face was identical to the first 
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(study) face. I analysed EEG activity in response to test faces as a means of investigating the 
neural correlates of ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects. I focused on test faces only, 
because I reasoned that participants would process study faces with the goal of being able to 
remember them. My focus in this chapter, instead, is to investigate non-memory-directed face 
processing. 
Because the N170 is susceptible to inversion effects (e.g., Eimer, 2000b; Itier & 
Taylor, 2002) and is linked to the structural encoding that would show evidence of 
disrupted/delayed configural processing (Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000a, b, c), and given 
that inversion effects have been shown to be larger for own-race than other-race faces (e.g., 
Rhodes et al., 1989), I predicted that the ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects that I have 
observed previously (e.g., Chapter 2;  Cassidy et al., 2011) would be reflected in the N170. 
Based on my previous behavioral data in Experiment 1, I predicted that for own-race faces, 
configural processing should be engaged equally for ingroup and outgroup faces; as a result, 
the N170 component should be delayed for inverted versus upright faces for both ingroup and 
outgroup own-race faces. For other-race faces, however, configural processing should be 
engaged to a greater extent for ingroup than outgroup targets; in this case, there should be a 
delay in the N170 component for inverted versus upright other-race faces only for faces 
categorised as ingroup members.  
Whether the P100 or P200 would show similar effects was less clear, given their less 
consistent relationship to own- and other-race status and inversion effects. Assuming 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation would influence the N170, however, measuring the extent to 
which ingroup/outgroup categorisation would also influence the components chronologically 
preceding (P100) and succeeding (P200) this target component may provide insight into the 
nature of this influence—for example, whether ingroup/outgroup categorisation effects would 
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be tied to face processing per se or would generalize to non-face-specific (but nonetheless 
relevant) processes. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants and design. Sixteen White undergraduate students from the 
University of Birmingham (15 female, Mage = 19.8 years) participated in exchange for partial 
course credit. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was based 
on a 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university, other-
university) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 2 (trial type: same, different match) within-
participants design.  
2.1.2 Materials. Materials were the same as in Experiments 3–5. The face stimuli 
were grouped into 160 unique same-race, same-orientation pairs, with an effort to match 
paired stimuli along a variety of dimensions (e.g., luminance, contrast, head/hair shape). The 
pairs were divided into sets such that each participant received a different set, each face 
appeared as an own-university target for some participants but as an other-university target 
for others, and each face appeared on a “same” trial for some participants but on a “different” 
trial for others. Each face pair appeared twice per set (once upright and once inverted). 
2.1.3 Procedure. Prior to the EEG experiment, participants completed the same group 
identification questionnaire as in previous experiments. Following preparation for the EEG 
recording, each participant was instructed in the sequential face-matching task. Participants 
learned they would see faces of students from the University of Birmingham or the University 
of Nottingham, as indicated by the university’s respective logo and name at the start of each 
trial. Participants learned further that two faces would then be presented sequentially, and that 
their task was to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the second (test) 
face had the same identity as the first (study) face.  
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Stimulus presentation, interfaced with the EEG system, and response collection were 
controlled by purpose-written programs built using E-Prime 2.0 Professional (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2009). Stimuli were viewed from a distance of approximately 80 cm and 
were presented on a 15-in. CRT screen in a 1024 × 768 graphics mode (with a vertical refresh 
rate of 60 Hz) and driven by a Pentium PC running an ATI RAGE PRO 128-MB graphics 
card. Each trial sequence contained the following centrally presented events (see Figure 11): 
fixation cross (300 ms), group prime (1500 ms), study face (500 ms), and test face (500 ms). 
To minimise preparatory activity in the EEG signal, the durations of the blank intervals 
between the group prime and the study face, and between the study and test faces, were 
independently randomised between 900, 1000, and 1100 ms. A valid response was accepted 
as soon as the test face appeared and was followed by an intertrial interval of 1500 ms. The 
320 trials were presented in four blocks of 80 trials without feedback. 
2.1.4 EEG recording, offline processing, and component detection. EEG was 
continuously recorded using 128 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes, arranged according to the 10-5 
electrode system (Oostenveld & Praamstra, 2001) using a nylon cap. Vertical and horizontal 
eye movements were monitored by two unipolar electrodes placed at the infraorbital area 
below each eye and at the outer canthus of the right eye. EEG and electro-oculogram (EOG) 
signals were amplified with a band-pass of 0–128 Hz by BioSemi Active-Two amplifiers 
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) and sampled at 512 Hz. The raw EEG was re-referenced 
to the average activity. 
The EEG data for the individual trials were segmented offline using BrainVision 
Analyzer v1.0 (Brain Products, Munich, Germany). Each segment was 800 ms long, starting 
200 ms before the onset of the test face
 
(which defined the baseline), and lasted for 600 ms 
after onset, respectively. All channels in all segments were manually inspected for 
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oculomotor and noise artifacts. Segments corresponding to incorrect responses, RT outliers, 
or containing oculomotor artifacts (exceeding 100 µV) were excluded from the ERP analysis, 
as were channels with artifacts exceeding 150 µV. Finally, segments were band-pass filtered 
(0.5–30 Hz) and corrected to the 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline before averaging.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Example stimuli sequence, Experiment 7. Participants were presented with (i) 
either an own-university (University of Birmingham) or other-university (University of 
Nottingham) prime, (ii) a study face, and (iii) a test face, and then made same/different 
identity judgements. Faces were either own-race (White) or other-race (Black), and 
presented in either upright or inverted orientation.  
 
For each participant, segments corresponding to each Race × University × Orientation 
condition were averaged; the resulting means were then averaged over participants creating 
grand averaged ERP waveforms for each condition. Topographical current source density 
(CSD) maps of this activity were inspected to identify the scalp electrodes that represented 
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the focus of the N170 component (see Figure 12). The average N170 activity for each 
participant in each condition was then determined by averaging from two pools of 7 
electrodes each, in the left (P7, PO7, P9, PO9, POO9h, PPO9h, TPP9h) and right (P8, PO8, 
P10, PO10, POO10h, PPO10h, TPP10h) hemispheres (See Figure 12, for a spatial layout of 
the electrode pools). For each participant, the average peak amplitude within a 20-ms time 
window (centred on the peak) and the absolute peak latency (ms) from each pool in each 
condition were determined for each component of interest from the electrode pools in each 
condition.   
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Behavioural results. The behavioural data (reaction times and error rates) were 
submitted to a Race × University × Orientation repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix BA. 
2.2.1.1 Reaction time (RT). RTs exceeding 2.5 standard deviations from the mean 
correct individual RT were excluded (3.49% of the data) alongside RTs from trials where 
errors were committed (4.08% of the data). The RT analysis revealed that participants 
responded faster to upright than inverted test faces (Ms = 675 vs. 718 ms, respectively), F(1, 
15) = 31.25, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .68.  
Although the predicted Race × University × Orientation interaction failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 15) = 1.26, p = .28, ηp
2
 = .07, the pattern of means was as predicted 
(replicating Chapter 1, Experiment 1; see Table 6). For own-race faces, inversion was equally 
disruptive for own-university and other-university targets (inversion effect Ms = 50 and 46 
ms, respectively); for other-race faces, inversion was more disruptive for own-university than 
other-university targets (inversion effect Ms = 46 and 31 ms, respectively). 
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2.2.1.2 Error rates. The error rate analysis revealed that participants made fewer 
errors for own-race than other-race faces (Ms = 0.20 vs. 0.27%, respectively), F(1, 15) = 8.77, 
p = .010, ηp
2 
= .37. Participants were also less error-prone for upright than inverted faces (Ms 
= 0.15 vs. 0.32%, respectively), F(1, 15) = 29.86, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .67. No other effects 
approached significance, all ps > .56.  
 
Table 6  
Mean reaction time (ms) to test faces as a function of race, university, and orientation, 
Experiment 7 
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 664 (46.84) 714 (50.54) 668 (46.96) 713 (49.34) 
Other Race (Black) 680 (47.51) 726 (50.87) 689 (47.26) 720 (48.16) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
 
2.2.2 ERP results. Grand-averaged P100, N170, and P200 latencies and peak 
amplitudes per condition from the selected electrode pools were analysed for test faces
14
. The 
data were initially submitted to a Race × University × Orientation × Hemisphere repeated-
measures ANOVA. Grand average waveforms and current source density (CSD) 
topographical maps for the P100, N170, and P200 components are presented in Figure 12.  
2.2.2.1 P100. Condition means and ANOVA summary tables are presented in 
Appendix CA. 
2.2.2.1.1 Latency. The analysis demonstrated no significant main effects or 
interactions (p > .05).  
2.2.2.1.2 Amplitude. The analysis demonstrated a significant main effect of 
hemisphere; revealing that the P100 was larger over the right than the left hemisphere (Ms = 
                                                             
14
 I also analysed ERPs for study faces. Generally the pattern of effect was similar to that demonstrated for 
intentional memory (Chapter 3, Experiment 3 & 5), in that ingroup categorisation delayed the P100 for own- 
relative to other-university faces, and the P100 was larger for own-university than other-university own-race 
faces. This is generally consistent with evidence suggesting that the P100 can be affected by top-down 
influences in visual attention (Rutman, et al., 2010). 
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11.32 vs. 9.50 µV, respectively). Consistent with previous research (e.g., Vizioli et al., 2010), 
there was also a main effect of target orientation, F(1, 15) = 22.28, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .72, 
revealing that the P100 was larger for inverted than upright faces (Ms = 11.13 vs. 9.68, µV, 
respectively). There were no main or interaction effects involving university, all F < 1.93, all 
ps > .18. 
2.2.2.2 N170. Condition means and ANOVA summary tables are presented in 
Appendix DA. 
2.2.2.2.1 Latency. The analysis revealed main effects of race and orientation. 
Consistent with past research (e.g., Stahl, Wiese, & Schweinberger, 2008, 2010; Weise, Stahl, 
& Schweinberger, 2009), the N170 peaked later for other-race than for own-race faces (Ms = 
166 vs. 159 ms, respectively), F(1, 15) = 38.25, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .72. Also consistent with past 
research (e.g., Rossion et al., 1999, Weise et al., 2009; Vizioli et al., 2010), it also peaked 
later for inverted relative to upright faces (Ms = 166 vs. 160 ms, respectively), F(1, 15) = 
18.67, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .55. There was no main effect of university, F(1, 15) = 0.26, p = .61, ηp
2
 
= .02; however, university did interact with orientation, F(1, 15) = 5.02, p = .040, ηp
2
 = .25. 
As predicted, this effect was subsumed within a reliable Race × University × Orientation 
interaction, F(1, 15) = 5.96, p = .028, ηp
2
 = .28 (see Figure 13, Panel B). 
To examine this interaction in more detail, I conducted separate University × 
Orientation ANOVAs for each target race. For own-race faces, the N170 peak latency reliably 
delayed for inverted relative to upright faces, F(1, 15) = 18.96, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .56; no further 
effects were observed (all ps > .58). For other-race faces, orientation interacted with 
university, F(1, 15) = 10.25, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .40. For own-university targets, the N170 
component was delayed for inverted relative to upright faces (Ms = 171 vs. 163 ms, 
respectively; t(15) = 4.16, p = .001, d = .87); there was no inversion cost for other-university 
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targets (Ms = 167 vs. 166 ms, respectively; t(15) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .02  
2.2.2.2.2 Amplitude. The analysis revealed main effects of race and hemisphere. 
Consistent with past research (e.g., Stahl et al., 2008; Vizioli et al., 2010), the N170 amplitude 
was larger for own-race than for other-race faces (Ms = -6.40 vs. -4.80 µV, respectively), F(1, 
15) = 7.58, p = .015, np
2
 = .34. It was also larger over the right than the left hemisphere (Ms = 
-6.49 vs. -4.70 µV, respectively), F(1, 15) = 5.20, p = .038, ηp
2
 = .26. A Race × Hemisphere 
interaction, F(1,15) = 6.77, p = .020, ηp
2
 = .30, indicated that the amplitude difference 
between own- and other-race faces was larger over the right than the left hemisphere (right, 
t(15) = 3.15, p = .007, d =.39; left, t(15) = 1.97, p = .068, d = .13). 
There was no main effect of university, F(1, 15) = 0.48, p = .49, ηp
2
 = .03; however, 
university did interact with race, F(1, 15) = 6.63, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .31 (see Figure 14). Own-
race faces elicited a larger N170 amplitude when preceded by other-university rather than 
own-university primes (Ms = -7.34 and -5.44 µV, respectively), t(15) = 2.35, p = .033, d = .35 
whereas other-race faces showed a marginally larger amplitude after own-university than 
other-university primes (Ms = -5.47 vs. -4.11 µV, respectively), t(15) = 2.00, p = .064, d = 
.32. 
2.2.2.3 P200. Condition means and ANOVA summary tables are presented in 
Appendix EA. 
2.2.2.3.1 Latency. The analysis demonstrated a significant main effect of hemisphere, 
F (1, 15) = 5.87, p = .028, ηp
2 
= .28, revealing that the P200 peaked later over the right than 
the left hemisphere (Ms = 219 vs. 216 ms, respectively). There was also a main effect of 
target race, F(1, 15) = 7.07, p = .018, ηp
2 
= .18, revealing that the P200 was delayed for other-
race relative to own-race faces (Ms = 220 vs. 215 ms, respectively).  
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2.2.2.3.2 Amplitude. The analysis demonstrated a significant main effect of 
hemisphere, F(1, 15) = 6.88, p = .019, ηp
2 
= .32, revealing that the P200 was larger over the 
right than the left hemisphere (Ms = 6.46 vs. 4.82 µV, respectively). There was also a main 
effect of target orientation, F(1, 15) = 5.45, p = .034, ηp
2 
= .27, revealing that the P200 was 
larger for upright than inverted targets (Ms = 6.55 and 4.73 µV, respectively). Finally, there 
was a marginally significant main effect of target race, F(1, 15) = 4.04, p = .063 , ηp
2 
= 21, 
revealing the P200 was larger for own-race than other-race faces (Ms = 6.19 and 5.08, 
respectively)
15
. 
2.3 Discussion  
Experiment 7 examined the electrophysiological correlates of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation in the context of own- and other-race face processing. I observed no reliable 
main or interaction effects involving target university for the P100 or P200; instead the results 
suggested that non-racial categorisation exerts its effect specifically within the N170 time 
window. In particular, the analysis uncovered a Race × University × Orientation interaction 
on the latency of the N170 component of the ERP waveform, a negative deflection that has 
been assumed to reflect face-specific processing (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000b). For 
own-race faces, the processing of inverted faces was delayed relative to the processing of 
upright faces, regardless of non-racial ingroup/outgroup status. For other-race faces, inversion 
also delayed processing—but only in the case of own-university faces. 
 
                                                             
15
 I also analysed responses to the N250 component of the ERP. Although there is some evidence that familiarity 
and race can modulate the N250 (e.g., Tanaka & Peirce, 2009, Hermann et al., 2007), I observed no such effects, 
only finding a main effect of orientation for the N250 amplitude, and no effects for latency.  
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Figure 13 .Group average pooled ERP waveforms (Panel A) and N170 peak latencies (Panel B, 
M ± SEM) to test faces as a function of race, university, and orientation. Note. Error bars denote 
standard error. ERP activity was pooled from left and right occipital-temporal electrode 
locations (shown in Panel C, which also illustrates the topographical distribution of N170 
current source density at a typical peak latency window (line spacing: 10 µV/m
2
)). 
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Figure 14. ERP waveforms and N170 amplitude graph (M ± SEM) as a function of race 
and university, Experiment 7. Note. Error bars denote standard error.  
 
This pattern of results, with effects of inversion emerging for other-race faces only 
when they were categorised as ingroup members, is consistent with the previous behavioural 
findings for perceptual discrimination (Cassidy et al., 2011; Chapter 2, Experiment 1) and 
incidental recognition (Chapter 3, Experiment 6). I have interpreted this pattern as reflecting 
the interaction of current motivation and perceptual experience: For own-race faces—a highly 
familiar class of stimuli—any motivation not to process outgroup faces as extensively as 
ingroup faces, induced by university categorisation, was insufficient to override the dominant 
configural processing strategy used; hence, effects of inversion emerged. For other-race faces, 
however, the data indicate that the categorisation-induced motivation to process ingroup faces 
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more extensively than outgroup faces led to ingroup faces being processed configurally, 
whereas there was no evidence for this with outgroup other-race faces (i.e., no effect of 
inversion on behaviour or ERPs). It is striking that the effects of motivation-based 
categorisation arose as early as the N170 component, typically taken to reflect the structural 
encoding of faces (Eimer, 2000b).  
The results for N170 amplitudes differed. As previously noted, the N170 amplitude 
was larger for own- than for other-race faces. However, this effect interacted with how the 
faces were categorised. For own-race faces, outgroup categorisation increased the N170 
amplitude. In contrast, for other-race faces, outgroup categorisation decreased the N170 
amplitude. It may be that the disparity between ingroup status on the racial dimension and 
outgroup status on the university dimension led to more attention to own-race outgroup 
members whereas, for other-race faces, the indication of outgroup status on both racial and 
university dimensions led to reduced attention and lower N170 amplitudes. Critically, 
however, these general effects did not interact with inversion, which affected N170 latencies 
to reflect the interaction between current motivation and default processing strategies (to own- 
and other-race faces). 
2.3.1 Effects earlier/later than structural encoding. Although the focus of 
Experiment 7 was on structural encoding, as indexed by the N170, I also explored earlier and 
later components of face perception known to be sensitive to target race. I found no evidence 
for differential P100 components as a function of target race or university. The lack of finding 
with regard to race is surprising, given that other have reported that the P100 responds to race 
(e.g., Hehman et al., 2011). Importantly, however, and consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Vizioli et al., 2010), there was an effect of target orientation, indicating that the P100 
amplitude was larger for inverted relative to upright targets. This effect is consistent with the 
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literature suggesting that the P100 captures feature-based information (e.g., Liu, Harris, & 
Kanwisher, 2002).  
Following structural encoding indexed by the N170, I found that the P200 was delayed 
and marginally smaller for other-race than own-race faces. This is consistent with results 
presented elsewhere that suggest that the P200 component indexes information related to 
categories such as race (e.g., Caldara et al., 2004). Interestingly, this component failed to be 
modulated by university ingroup/outgroup status. This suggests that visually salient 
information is indexed more efficiently by the P200 than non-visually-salient information, 
such as non-racial group membership. 
2.3.2 Relation to past literature. The separate contributions of categorisation-
induced motivation and default processing strategies are to some extent supported by recent 
evidence from Hehman, Stanley, Gaertner, and Simons (2011). Using a similar Race × 
University design, their behavioural results showed that there was equivalent recognition of 
own- and other-university faces belonging to the same racial group as the participants, but 
better recognition of own- than other-university faces belonging to another racial group. This 
is the same pattern as I observed (see also Chapter 3, Experiment 4). Hehman et al. also 
examined ERPs, reporting data on peak amplitudes of the P100 and N200 components. They 
reported main effects of race and university-group categorisation, not the interaction I 
observed on amplitudes for the N170. Both results indicate that categorisation of individuals 
as belonging to the same university group can affect early components of the ERP response. 
In our case, the increased amplitude for outgroup-categorised own-race faces suggests that 
university categorisation can magnify attentional biases. Over and above this, though, the 
N170 latency data indicate that university categorisation can induce early qualitative 
differences in structural encoding of faces. 
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It is important to note that, in the current experiment, race and university affiliation 
represented different types of ingroup/outgroup information. Race was a visually accessible 
facial cue, whereas university affiliation was a verbal label that was associated only arbitrarily 
with the faces. Interestingly, the Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010) 
is agnostic on the question of whether visually accessible versus non-accessible 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation should be accorded differential status. Although both forms 
of ingroup/outgroup categorisation exerted their effects at the same processing stage in the 
current experiment (i.e., the N170), the visually accessible race dimension demonstrated a 
longer-lived impact, modulating both the N170 and P200; in contrast, the non-visual 
university dimension modulated only the N170. This pattern alludes to the possibility that not 
all forms of ingroup/outgroup status have equal weight in processing. Admittedly, our 
manipulation of non-racial ingroup/outgroup categorisation may have had little emotional 
impact on participants and, in real-world settings, salient or important non-racial identities 
may be less prone to decaying activation. The relative impact of racial and non-racial 
categorisation on face processing thus remains to be clarified. 
By targeting extra-facial factors, our findings also speak to more general models of 
face processing. The Bruce–Young (1986) functional model, at least in its original form, does 
not allow feedback from activated representations in the “cognitive system” to structural 
encoding; instead, the impact of the cognitive system’s contents are restricted to direct visual 
analysis (e.g., of expression, speech). Our N170 findings, however, provide clear evidence 
that at least one extra-facial factor—ingroup/outgroup categorisation—does influence 
structural encoding. The same criticism cannot be made of Haxby and colleagues’ (2000, 
2002) functional model, which does allow for feedback between the core and extended 
systems. Given that both the P100 and N170 have been localized to fusiform gyrus (Hermann 
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et al., 2005; Itier & Taylor, 2004), however, our findings are interesting in that they highlight 
the need to distinguish between the representation of invariant aspects of faces and identity 
recognition, as in Haxby et al.’s model.  
2.3.3 Caveat. The behavioural Race × University × Orientation interaction was not 
statistically reliable. Nonetheless, the pattern of means was as predicted, and replicated 
Experiment 1. Given the small sample size in the current experiment relative to our past 
research, the lack of statistical reliability most likely reflects lower power and thus should 
pose no cause for concern. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The current chapter demonstrates that ingroup/outgroup categorisation has different 
effects on the processing of own- versus other-race faces, and that these effects emerge early 
in visual processing, at the stage of structural encoding. Ingroup (versus outgroup) 
categorisation prompts more configural processing of other-race faces, but has no impact on 
the configural processing of own-race faces. These patterns reflect shifts in processing 
strategy as a function of racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup status (with own-race and 
ingroup faces prompting greater reliance on configural processing, relative to other-race and 
outgroup faces) and highlight the importance of considering both experience and motivation 
in own-race and other-race face processing. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
HOLISTIC PROCESSING OF OWN-AND OTHER-RACE FACES 
AS A FUNCTION OF INGROUP/OUTGROUP 
CATEGORISATION
16
  
 
The experiments reported thus far used face-inversion effects as a marker of configural 
processing, to understand how ingroup/outgroup categorisation affects the processing of 
own- and other-race faces. Whether face inversion actually disrupts configural processing or 
merely delays it, however, is a matter of debate. In the final experiment of this thesis, I 
investigated whether the effects of face inversion on own- and other-race face processing 
would replicate with a manipulation purported to affect a related form of processing, namely, 
holistic processing. White participants performed a same/different matching task with face 
composites that were either own-race or other-race, labelled as being from their own 
university or another university, and where the top and bottom face halves were aligned or 
misaligned; holistic processing was indexed by delayed responding to aligned versus 
misaligned faces. Replicating the perceptual discrimination (Experiments 1, 2, 7) and 
incidental memory (Experiment 6) experiments reported in this thesis, own-race faces showed 
equivalent holistic processing regardless of ingroup/outgroup university labelling, and other-
race faces showed greater holistic processing following own- than other-university labelling. 
The replicability of this pattern with a different but related processing manipulation lends 
further support to the theoretical framework. 
 
                                                             
16
 Experiment 8 is reported in Cassidy, K.D., Humphreys, G. W., Quinn, K. A. (in preparation). Experience and 
motivation mutually constrain the other-race effect: Evidence from the face face-composite paradigm.  
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1 Introduction 
The experiments reported thus far in the thesis indicate that under conditions of 
perceptual discrimination (Experiments 1, 2, and 7) and incidental memory encoding 
(Experiment 6), other-race faces are processed more configurally when categorised as own-
university rather than other-university members. In contrast, ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
has relatively little impact on the configural processing of own-race faces (Experiments 1, 6, 
7) unless under conditions of intentional memory encoding (Experiments 5) or when own-
race faces are presented within a mono-racial context (Experiment 2). Although supporting 
my hypotheses, however, it must be noted that the aforementioned results relied exclusively 
on the face-inversion effect (i.e., impaired responding to inverted versus upright faces) as a 
marker of configural processing. Whether face inversion truly disrupts configural 
processing—that is, what information is lost versus spared when a face is rotated-upside 
down—is a matter of theoretical debate, with potentially limiting implications for my analysis 
(for reviews, see Rossion, 2008, 2009; Rossion & Gauthier, 2002; Tanaka & Gordon, 2011). 
This chapter aims to use a different, but related, manipulation to provide additional evidence 
that ingroup categorisation affects the configural processing of other-race faces. 
1.1 Effects of Face Inversion 
There is general consensus within the literature that upright faces are processed 
configurally (e.g., Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; McKone, Martini, & Nakayama, 
2001; Rossion & Gauthier, 2002). However, there is far less consensus concerning what 
information remains after face inversion. While inversion effects have provided a wealth of 
empirical attention, a limitation of the face inversion paradigm is that the source of inversion 
interference is not directly manipulated, or specified (Michel et al., 2006; Tanaka & Gordon, 
2011). More specifically, the exact cognitive processes that are undermined by rotating a face 
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upside-down are left untested. This has given way to speculation of what exactly underpins 
the disproportionate effect of inversion for faces.  
Classically, face inversion was proposed to selectively disrupt the extraction of 
configural information from the face, while leaving featural processing unimpaired (e.g., 
Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Collishaw & Hole, 2000; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; Leder & 
Bruce, 2000; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Yin, 1969, 1970). In 
support of this proposal, Freire et al. (2000) manipulated faces either by adjusting the spacing 
between the eyes and mouth (a configural change) or by replacing the features (i.e., the eyes, 
nose, and mouth) of an original face with another face (a featural change). In a face 
discrimination task, participants were asked to indicate whether two faces, presented either 
upright or inverted, were the same identity as each other or different from each other; face 
pairs consisted of identical or configurally or featurally manipulated targets (Experiments 1 
and 2, respectively). Freire et al. reasoned that if configural processing is disrupted by face 
inversion, then accuracy for when configurally altered faces should be reduced to chance 
levels when faces are inverted. They also reasoned that if feature-based processing is spared 
after face inversion, then accuracy for featurally altered images should be similar in both 
orientations. Indeed, this is exactly as Freire et al. observed: Inversion affected discrimination 
accuracy for configurally altered faces but not for featurally altered faces, suggesting that 
upright and inverted faces are processed in a qualitatively different manner.  
Elsewhere, however, there is evidence that not all types of configural information are 
susceptible to face inversion. For example, Goffaux and Rossion (2007) had participants 
perform a delayed matching task. Specifically, participants were required to match a face that 
had been manipulated by altering featural information (e.g., eye-shape, surface texture), 
vertical relations between the eyes (i.e., a vertical configural change), or the horizontal 
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relations of the eyes in the face (i.e., a horizontal configural change) to a target face. The 
results demonstrated that inversion significantly impaired the perception of vertical-relational 
changes, but had a much weaker effect on horizontal-relational and feature changes. Goffaux 
and Rossion suggest that whereas inverted and upright faces may indeed be processed in 
qualitatively different manner, access to some configural information remains after face 
inversion. This information might not be useful in aiding recognition or differentiation, 
however, because perceivers might be unable to apply experience-derived holistic 
representations to inverted faces (e.g., Rossion, 2008, 2009).  
In addition, other researchers have argued that face inversion disrupts feature-based 
and configural processing equally, suggesting that there is no qualitative difference in 
processing inverted versus upright faces (e.g., Sekuler, Gasper, Gold, & Bennett, 2004; 
McKone & Robbins, 2011; McKone & Yovel, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2006; Valentine, 1988, 
1991; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004). Yovel and Kanwisher (2004), for example, made spatial 
(i.e., configural) changes or changed feature shapes of houses or faces, and asked participants 
to discriminate between face and house pairs presented in upright and inverted orientations. 
Yovel and Kanwisher found that the inversion effect was equivalent in both the configural 
and feature-change task for face discrimination, but was absent when performing both tasks 
with houses. 
Finally, there is also evidence that access to configural information is not lost at all 
following face inversion. Sekuler Gaspar, Gold, and Bennett (2004), for example, used a 
psychophysics staircase procedure in which external noise was added to face images, and 
examined trial-by-trial variation in participants’ responses (i.e., patterns of correct and 
incorrect responses) to determine how noise in different parts of the stimulus images biased 
participants toward specific responses. Participants were presented with a target face and then 
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two test faces; their task was to indicate which test face matched the target. The results 
demonstrated that participants were sensitive to both linear (i.e., feature-based) and nonlinear 
(i.e., configural) aspects of the stimuli, and for both upright and inverted faces. Sekuler and 
colleagues concluded that access to configural information is not lost when faces are inverted, 
but that inversion simply makes the processing of both configural and featural information 
less efficient—perhaps because of orientation-dependent expertise. 
1.2 The Face-Composite Effect as an Alternative Processing Index 
Resolving these theoretically differing accounts of what is lost or spared after 
inversion is beyond the scope of this chapter and this thesis. Nonetheless, the debate itself 
means there is some interpretational ambiguity vis-à-vis that results of the experiments 
reported thus far in this thesis. In some sense, it makes little difference to my reasoning 
whether configural information is completely lost or merely rendered less efficient by 
inversion, in that both accounts would imply that inversion invokes a shift to more (or 
exclusive) reliance on feature-based processing. Given the controversy regarding whether 
inversion effects are underpinned solely by disruption to configural processes (i.e., without 
affecting feature coding), and whether configural processes may still be used even when faces 
are inverted, I therefore sought an alternative measure of processing for the final experiment. 
In particular, I chose the face-composite paradigm (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). 
In the face-composite paradigm, participants judge whether the top halves of two faces 
are identical or different; these faces are connected with bottom halves that are also either 
identical or different. A reliable outcome is that participants perceive identical top halves of 
faces as different (or are slower to recognise them as identical) when they are joined with the 
bottom halves of two different faces (Young et al., 1987). The reasoning is that participants 
form a “gestalt” or holistic representation of the entire face, such that the top and bottom 
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halves are “fused” into a coherent whole rather than being represented as independent 
features—interfering with participants’ ability to detect that the top halves of the face depict 
the same identity. Interestingly, this effect disappears when faces are turned upside down or 
laterally offset (Young et al., 1987). This “face-composite effect” (i.e., the recognition 
advantage for misaligned over aligned faces) is typically described as a measure of “holistic” 
processing but, because it divides the face into two halves and thus “breaks” the connection 
between features (e.g., the eyes and mouth), it can equally be said to measure configural 
processing. Moreover, because the face-composite paradigm induces a change in the 
perception of configural information within the same faces, it is subject to less interpretational 
ambiguity than is face inversion, and may therefore be considered a more direct measure of 
configural processing (e.g., McKone & Robbins, 2011). 
2 Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 investigated whether the effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation 
observed in Experiment 1 would also emerge on a different measure of configural/holistic 
processing—specifically, the face-composite effect. Participants performed a perceptual 
discrimination task with pairs of own-race or other-race, aligned or misaligned composite 
faces. Faces were categorised as being own-university or other-university members. In line 
with Experiment 1, I predicted that participants would engage in greater holistic processing of 
ingroup (own-university) than outgroup (other-university) faces. However, given participants’ 
likely greater fluency in the configural processing of own- than other-race races, however, I 
expected that race salience would mitigate the influence of the non-racial (i.e., university) 
group membership for the processing of own-race faces. Therefore, I anticipated that evidence 
for greater holistic processing of own- than other-university faces would emerge more 
strongly for other-race than own-race faces.  
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2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants and design. Sixty-eight White participants from the University of 
Birmingham completed the study for course credit; all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The data from four participants were removed from the analysis because of an error 
rate in excess of 20%, leaving 64 participants (49 female; Mage = 19.7 years). The experiment 
was based on a 2 (target race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university, 
other-university) × 2 (target alignment: aligned, misaligned) within-participants design.  
2.1.2 Materials. Face-composites were created from the same materials as in 
Experiments 1–7. Face stimuli were firstly equated for luminance and contrast and sized to 
240 pixels vertically. Face-composites were created by dividing each target face into a top 
and bottom segment by slicing them in the middle of the nose; thus, the top segment showed 
the forehead, eyes, and bridge of the nose, and the bottom segment showed the nostrils, 
mouth, and chin. For each original target face, four composite faces were created: (i) same-
aligned, (ii) same-misaligned, (iii) different-aligned, and (iv) different-misaligned. 
The “same” composites comprised the top segment of the original face and the bottom 
segment of another face of the same race. The “different” composites comprised top and 
bottom segments of other faces of the same race, where the bottom segment was the same as 
the one used as in the “same” composite for the original target. A gap of 3 pixels was inserted 
between the top and bottom segments of the composites, which were either aligned so that the 
top segment was presented directly above the bottom segment or misaligned so that the top 
segment was offset laterally with the bottom segment 
For each target face, there were two “same” response trials (one aligned, one 
misaligned) and one “different” response trial (across trials, half aligned and half misaligned), 
resulting in 320 “same” trials and 240 “different” trials. This bias, which was present for both 
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levels of target race and target university, was introduced because only the “same” trials were 
of interest (e.g., Le Grand et al., 2004; Michel et al., 2006). Each study face appeared as an 
own-university target for some participants but as an other-university target for others. Each 
stimulus set contained 560 trials, presented in random order. Figure 15 presents example 
stimuli.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. Example stimuli, Experiment 8.  
 
2.1.2 Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the exceptions that 
target faces were presented sequentially rather than simultaneously. After completing the 
identity-strengthening task, participants learned that they would see an original photo of a 
student (the study face) from either the University of Birmingham or the University of 
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Nottingham, followed by a manipulated photo (the test face). Participants learned that their 
task was to ignore the lower parts of the face and decide as quickly and as accurately as 
possible whether the upper half of the test face was the same as, or different from, the upper 
half of the study face. Each trial sequence contained the following centrally presented events 
(see Figure 16): a fixation cross (300 ms), a group prime (1500 ms), a target face (600 ms), 
and a test/composite face that was displayed until participants made a response. The intertrial 
interval was 1000 ms. 
Participants also completed an adapted version of the Hancock and Rhodes (2008) 
inter-racial contact questionnaire.  
 
 
Figure 16. Example trial sequence, Experiment 8.  
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2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Discrimination latency. Mean discrimination latencies served as the dependent 
measure of interest
17
. Due to the presence of outlying responses in the data set, response times 
over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were excluded (2.36% of the data), along with 
trials where errors were committed (8.68% of the data). The data were submitted to a 2 (target 
race: own-race, other-race) × 2 (target university: own-university, other-university) × 2 (target 
alignment: aligned, misaligned) repeated measures ANOVA. Condition means and the 
ANOVA summary table are presented in Appendix FA. 
 The analysis revealed a significant main effect of target alignment, F(1, 63) = 128.40, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .67, demonstrating that participants responded more slowly to aligned the 
misaligned targets (Ms = 599 and 566 ms, respectively)—the classic face-composite effect. 
There was also a significant Target University × Target Alignment interaction, F(1, 63) = 
7.38, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .11, demonstrating that participants responded more slowly to aligned 
than misaligned faces for both own-university, t(63) = 10.37, p < .001, and other-university 
targets, t(63) = 7.39, p < .001; however, face alignment was significantly more disruptive for 
own-university than other university targets, t(63) = 2.72, p = .008.  
This interaction was subsumed within the predicted Target Race × Target University × 
Target Alignment interaction, F(1, 63) = 4.31, p = .042, ηp
2
 = .06 (see Figure 17). I analysed 
this interaction further by conducting separate Target University × Target Alignment 
ANOVAs for each target race. For own-race faces, there was a main effect of target alignment 
only, F(1, 63) = 69.86, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .53; demonstrating participants were disrupted more 
when targets were aligned than misaligned (Ms = 599 and 563 ms, respectively). 
                                                             
17
 Error data were also analysed. Errors were generally low (overall average 8.68 %) and were theoretically 
uninteresting. For the reader’s interest, however, error analyses are presented in Appendix GA. 
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Figure 17. Discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of target race, group, and 
alignment, Experiment 8. Note. Error bars denote standard error. 
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For other-race faces, the analysis demonstrated a main effect of target alignment, F(1, 
63) = 73.49, p = .54, which was subsumed with a significant Target University × Target 
Alignment interaction, F(1, 63) = 10.99, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .15. Participants responded more 
slowly to aligned than misaligned targets for both own-university, t(63) = 8.90, p < .001, and 
other-university targets, t(63) = 8.88, p = .001; however, as predicted, face-alignment was 
significantly more disruptive for own-university than other university targets, t(63) = 3.35, p 
= .001. 
2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 8 exploited the face-composite effect to investigate the influence of 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the processing of own-race and other-race faces. There 
were several findings of interest. First, participants were disrupted when targets were aligned 
relative to when targets were misaligned—the conventional face-composite effect. Second, 
participants were affected more by target alignment for own-university than other-university 
targets. Finally, the effect was modulated by target race: For own-race faces, participants were 
disrupted for aligned versus misaligned targets to an equal extent regardless of own- or other-
university status. In contrast, for other-race faces, participants were disrupted for aligned 
versus misaligned targets more for own-university targets than other-university targets. 
The results of Experiment 8 replicate the findings from the perceptual discrimination 
(Experiments 1, 2, 7; Chapters 2 and 4) and incidental memory (Experiment 6; Chapter 3) 
experiments reported in this thesis: Own-race faces showed equivalent holistic processing 
regardless of ingroup/outgroup university labelling, and other-race faces showed greater 
holistic processing following own- than other-university labelling. This pattern is consistent 
with the Categorisation–Individuation Model’s general hypothesis that experience and 
motivation interact to determine processing: As a result of immeasurable experience with 
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own-race faces, the “default” configural/holistic processing of own-race faces is sufficiently 
fluent as to proceed unencumbered by the motivational effects of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation. The relative lack of experience with other-race faces, however, means that 
configural/holistic processing is less likely to occur—unless some factor (e.g., ingroup 
categorisation) prompts the motivation to individuate these faces. 
Given that the face-composite paradigm is considered a more direct manipulation of 
configural processing than face-inversion (e.g., McKone & Robbins, 2011), the replication of 
the inversion effects with the face-composite paradigm indicates that the results reported 
earlier in this thesis cannot be explained exclusively in terms of delayed rather than disrupted 
configural processing (e.g., McKone et al., 2009, 2011; Sekuler et al., 2004). This replication 
supports the argument that ingroup categorisation—on the basis of race or other salient group 
memberships—prompts configural/holistic (although the effects of this strategy choice are 
constrained by experience).  
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The current chapter summarises the studies reported within this thesis. The current thesis 
aimed to understand the impact of non-racial ingroup/outgroup categorisation on the other-
race effect and to examine factors that might modulate this impact. . Several studies indicated 
that own- versus other-university categorisation affected the processing of other-race faces 
more than own-race faces (Experiments 1, 6, 7, 8), indicating that ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation can shift reliance on configural versus feature-based processes, but that this 
impact might be limited by experience (such that more experience with own-race faces offsets 
the effect of non-racial categorisation on the processing of own-race faces). These effects can 
also be seen in recognition of own- and other-race faces (Experiment 4, 6). Importantly, 
however, these effects are modulated by context (Experiments 1–2) and encoding conditions 
(Experiments 3–6). The implications of these findings for the recent Categorisation–
Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010), and the wider theoretical and practical 
implications for our understanding of the other-race effect are discussed.  
 
1 Background and Aims of the Thesis 
The Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010) argues the other-
race effect is underpinned by an absence of motivation to individuate other-race individuals. 
As such, the Categorisation–Individuation Model argues that if sufficient motivation or cues 
to individuation are provided to the perceiver, then the other-race effect should disappear, or 
at least should be reduced (e.g., Hugenberg et al., 2010). It assumes further that without 
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sufficient experience in discriminating other-race faces, successful individuation is likely to 
be limited.  
The model successfully integrates several diverse accounts of the other-race effect, but 
what remains missing is a clear account of when and how individuation experience constrains 
the motivation to individuate own- and other-race members. The overarching aim of this 
thesis was to investigate the additional signalling cues that affect own- and other-race face 
processing. More specifically, the thesis aimed to (1) understand the role of racial context in 
determining the effects of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on own-race and other-race face 
processing; (2) explore the role of perceiver goals and ongoing task demands in determining 
the processing of ingroup/outgroup own-and other-race faces; and finally, (3) investigate the 
time course of racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup status effects.  
2 Summary of Findings 
2.1 Perceptual Discrimination and Recognition of Own- and Other-Race Faces 
In Chapter 2, I aimed to investigate the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorisation as a 
function of inter-versus intra-racial context on the perceptual processing of own- and other-
race faces. In the research reported in this chapter, participants performed simple 
same/different judgements on pairs of own- versus other-race faces, which were categorised 
as own-university or other-university members. Experiment 1 demonstrated that in an inter-
racial context, cues to own-university categorisation resulted in other-race faces being 
processed more configurally than other-university faces. Own-race faces were processed 
configurally irrespective of cues to group membership. Experiment 2, in contrast, indicated 
that in a mono-racial context, own-university faces were processed more configurally than 
other-university faces, irrespective of race. Taken together, these results provide broad 
support for the Categorisation–Individuation Model (Hugenberg et al., 2010), in that 
 142 
 
situational cues influenced the processing of other-race and own-race faces (in this case via 
inter- versus intra-racial context). However, these results add to the model and current body of 
the literature, by suggesting the processing of other-race faces is more flexible (e.g., McKone 
et al., 2007) and that sensitivity to ingroup/outgroup status does not depend on extensive 
other-race experience (i.e., the findings were not moderated by other-race contact).  
Mindful that situational cues influence the likelihood of either categorisation or 
individuation (as indicated in Chapter 2), Chapter 3 aimed to expand on these findings, by 
investigating how encoding goals influence the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on 
own-race and other-race face processing and memory. Participants judged faces for likeability 
(in an incidental memory task, Experiments 4, 6) or encoded them for later recognition (a 
memory-directed task, Experiments 3, 5). The memory and processing data again 
demonstrated clear evidence that situational cues (in this case, encoding goals) modulate the 
impact of ingroup/outgroup categorisation. With a memory-related goal, other-university 
categorisation, relative to own-university categorisation, resulted in poorer memory for own-
race faces, but had no effect on memory for other-race faces (Experiment 3); this effect of 
outgroup categorisation on memory for own-race faces was underpinned by less reliance on 
default configural processing (Experiment 5). In contrast, when participants evaluated faces 
for likeability (a trait-directed encoding goal), the memory data indicated that own- versus 
other-university categorisation had no effect on own-race recognition, but that other-
university categorisation resulted in poorer recognition for other-race faces. In this case, the 
processing data (Experiment 6) clearly indicated strong reliance on configural processing for 
own-race faces irrespective of university affiliation, and for own-university other-race own-
university. These data clearly support the assertion that recognition is affected by encoding-
related cues, but also extend the Categorisation–Individuation Model by suggesting such cues 
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operate by encouraging either more or less reliance on configural processing. Again, these 
results were not explained by participants’ interracial experience.  
If the motivation attributable to ingroup/outgroup categorisation can indeed change the 
way other-race and own-race faces are processed, it seemed liked that this would be reflected 
at the electrophysiological level, perhaps even at early stages of structural encoding. Chapter 
4 investigated the electrophysiological correlates of ingroup/outgroup categorisation on own- 
and other-race face processing using a similar same/different perceptual matching task as in 
Experiment 1. The behavioural data pattern replicated Experiment 1, whereby own-university 
categorisation affected the processing of other-race faces more than own-race faces. More 
interesting was the electrophysiological data. The P100 demonstrated effects of face 
orientation, but neither racial nor non-racial ingroup/outgroup status influenced this early 
stage of feature analysis. In contrast, there was clear evidence of both racial and non-racial 
group effects on the N170, which is presumed to reflect structural encoding and configural 
processing (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Liu et al., 2002). The pattern of N170 latencies, in 
particular, matched the behavioural pattern: For other-race faces, the N170 was delayed for 
inverted relative to upright faces, but only for own-university targets. In contrast, for own-
race faces, the N170 was delayed for inverted relative to upright faces irrespective of 
university affiliation. The later P200 component demonstrated no such interactions. These 
results indicate that ingroup/outgroup categorisation influences the way in which other-race 
faces are structurally encoded. 
Finally, Chapter 5 acknowledged the limitation in the foregoing studies of relying 
solely on inversion effects as a marker of configural processing (McKone & Robbins, 2011; 
McKone & Yovel, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2006; Valentine, 1988, 1991; Yovel & Kanwisher, 
2004). The final experiment investigated the impact of own-university versus other-university 
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categorisation on the holistic processing of own- and other-race faces using face composites 
rather than inverted faces. The results demonstrated that, irrespective of target group, own-
race faces were processed holistically. In contrast, other-race faces were processed more 
holistically when they were categorised as own-university rather than other-university 
members. This pattern was consistent with the other incidental memory experiments reported 
in this thesis (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 6, 7), thereby strengthening the argument that 
ingroup/outgroup categorisation has implications for the relative reliance on configural versus 
featural facial information.  
3 Theoretical Implications: The Categorisation–Individuation Model 
In Chapter 1, I identified three limitations in the Categorisation–Individuation Model. 
First, the model is relatively vague about factors that might heighten or diminish the 
signalling function of ingroup-/outgroup-specifying information. This is not a limitation per 
se, but it does leave room for theoretical refinement. In Chapter 2, I identified racial context 
as a variable that possesses a signalling function. For example, when own-race and other-race 
faces are presented intermixed (effectively creating an interracial context), ingroup 
categorisation affected the processing of other-race faces more than own-race faces 
(Experiment 1). In contrast, when faces were presented in an intra-racial context (i.e., blocked 
by race), ingroup categorisation moderated processing irrespective of racial status (replicating 
the effect of ingroup categorisation on White faces observed by Hugenberg & Corneille, 
2009). This suggests that when processing own-race faces, perceivers are sensitive to racial-
contextual cues, and that this directly undermines the effects of categorisation on processing; 
that is, when race is highlighted, perceivers see own-race faces as ingroup faces, regardless of 
other ingroup/outgroup cues. In contrast, other-race faces are sensitive to cues of ingroup 
versus outgroup categorisation irrespective of the racial context. These results cannot be 
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accounted for by participants’ interracial experience (as there was no evidence for a link 
between contact and performance) and, as I employed a perceptual matching task, the effects 
are not constrained by differences in participants’ memory performance. Instead, these results 
suggest a potential extension to the Categorisation–Individuation Model, namely, that during 
perceptual encoding, other-race faces are more sensitive to cues of ingroup/outgroup 
categorisation, resulting in the greater motivated allocation of configural processing following 
ingroup categorisation. This is supportive of evidence suggesting that the processing of other-
race faces is generally rather flexible (McKone et al., 2007).  
Second, the model links ingroup categorisation with the motivation to individuate, and 
individuation with configural processing, but presents little direct evidence for a link between 
ingroup categorisation and configural processing. One exception is the recent evidence from 
Hugenberg and Corneille (2009) that for own-race faces, ingroup categorisation prompts more 
holistic processing than does outgroup categorisation. Nonetheless, this is only one 
demonstration, and to date there is no evidence of whether the same link would emerge with 
other-race faces, which tend to be processed less configurally (e.g., Michel et al., 2006, 2007, 
2009; Tanaka et al., 2004). Over several studies, I demonstrated that ingroup categorisation 
results in greater configural processing (i.e., larger inversion effects) of other-race faces. For 
example, in Chapter 2, ingroup other-race faces were processed more configurally than 
outgroup other-race faces, irrespective of inter- or interracial context (Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively). Further, this pattern was not restricted to perception: In Experiment 6, 
participants judged faces for likeability, and demonstrated greater configural processing of 
own-university than other-university targets at subsequent recognition. Finally, this pattern 
was not explained by reliance on face-inversion effects: I replicated the effects in Experiment 
7 with a measure of holistic processing (i.e., face-composite effects). Across all experiments, 
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these effects were not moderated by participants’ inter-racial contact, suggesting that given 
sufficient motivation one can configurally process other-race faces even in the absence of 
experience.  
Finally, the model also assumes that only ingroup-/outgroup-specifying information is 
relevant in determining perceivers’ motivation to individuate faces—or, at least, ingroup-
/outgroup-specifying information is the only factor that is discussed in the model’s 
presentation. It is possible, however, that other factors (e.g., encoding goals, task 
requirements) can prompt more or less configural processing, and thus more or less of the 
“types” of processing that support individuation. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that encoding 
goals can interact with racial and non-racial ingroup/outgroup categorisation to promote or 
impede configural processing. For example, when faces were coded intentionally for later 
recognition (Experiments 3, 5), ingroup (versus outgroup) categorisation resulted in a greater 
recognition of own-race faces but had no effect on other-race recognition. In contrast, when 
participants coded faces for likeability (an incidental non-memory-related judgement; 
Experiment 4), ingroup (versus outgroup) categorisation results in greater recognition of 
other-race faces, but had no effect on recognition of own-race faces. These results were 
explained by a reduced reliance on configural information when coding faces for memory (as 
indicated by null or reversed inversion effects; Experiment 5) and a more “normal” reliance 
on configural information when making non-memory-related judgements (Experiment 6). 
This suggests that different types of task modulate the successful implementation of 
configural processing. For example, it seems that intentional memory—at least as 
operationalised in my experiments—is optimal for the categorisation of faces, both by racial 
and non-racial group, whereas incidental encoding is optimal for individuation (and is more 
 147 
 
likely to be recruited for ingroup than outgroup targets), and these processes prompt different 
degrees of configural processing.  
4 Caveats and Limitations 
In addition to the criticism that the research reported in Chapter 2–4 relied solely on 
inversion effects as evidence of configural processing—which I addressed in Chapter 5—
there are a few additional limitations that must be noted. 
4.1 Null Effects for Inter-Racial Contact 
In none of the experiments reported in this thesis did I find evidence that inter-racial 
contact modulated other-race face processing. Although it makes intuitive sense that the 
quantity and/or quality of contact should have implications for other-race face processing—
and indeed there is evidence to support this hypothesis (Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & 
Spaulding, 1982; Carroo, 1986, 1987)—similar null effects have been reported elsewhere in 
the literature (e.g., Luce, 1974; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Ng & Lindsay, 1994). 
Understanding when and how contact relates to other-race face processing remains to be 
determined. 
4.2 Sampling Limitations  
There are two sampling limitations that characterise the research reported in this 
thesis. First, all of our participants were White. A complete investigation of the other-race 
effect would require examining the performance of non-White participants. This would be 
critical, first, in establishing whether the current results would generalise to members of other 
racial groups. Importantly, however, crossover interactions in own-race and other-race face 
processing as a function of participant race are not always observed (e.g., Lindsay, Jack, & 
Christian, 1999; Tanaka et al., 2004; Walker & Hewstone, 2006). This has been attributed to 
the fact that non-White participants are typically familiar with White faces (and more familiar 
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with White faces than White participants are with non-White faces). Any attempt to replicate 
the findings of this thesis with non-White participants would need to take into account this 
confounding factor. 
Replicating the current findings with other racial categories would also be useful for 
ruling out confounds arising from stimulus characteristics. That is, the use of non-White 
participants would allow me to independently verify that the two sets of faces (White and 
Black) are equivalent in factors such as discriminability. However, this should pose no 
concern to the reader for several reasons. First, all of the face stimuli used in the current 
research were taken from previous research (e.g., Shriver et al., 2008, 2010), or from face 
databases (Eberhardt et al., 2006; Minear & Park, 2004). Indeed, these faces have been used 
in many studies of face processing (e.g., Brebner et al., 2011; Eberhardt, 2005; Eberhardt et 
al., 2006; Hehman et al., 2011; Stahl et al., 2008; Vizioli et al., 2010; Weise et al., 2009; 
Weise, Schweinberger, & Hansen, 2008) and studies using own- and other-race participants 
(e.g., Eberhardt, 2005; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Stahl et al., 2008; Vizioli et al., 2010 ). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the results within this thesis are explained by simple differences 
in discriminability as a function of target race. Further, it is worth noting that studies 
supporting the Categorisation–Individuation Model have also used some of the same stimuli, 
and did not employ other-race participants (Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008; 2010; 
Young et al., 2009; 2010; 2011). Therefore, any criticism of the sample and stimuli would be 
equally applicable to these studies.  
The second sampling limitation is that the vast majority of my participants were 
female. Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, and Sidanius (2010) recently proposed that different 
psychological systems underpin intergroup bias for women and men, with women motivated 
by sexual coercion fears and men motivated by aggression and dominance motives. Whether 
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these differing motives would have different outcomes for face processing is unclear. Indeed, 
just as fearful and angry expressions capture attention (Vuilleumier, 2002), it would seem 
plausible that both fear and dominance motivation should motivate attention, particularly to 
outgroup faces. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence for gender 
differences in same- versus other-race face processing in general, nor is there evidence in the 
available literature to suggest that perceiver sex moderates the finding that face inversion is 
more disruptive to the processing of same-race than other-race faces. Together, these factors 
suggest my findings are unlikely to be subject to gender differences. Nonetheless, this 
remains an empirical question that should be subjected to future scrutiny. 
5 Future Directions 
5.1 Configural/Featural or Global/Local? 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that intentional versus incidental memory encoding has 
consequences not only for the way in which individuals process own-race and other-race 
faces, but also for the effectiveness of motives to individuate targets, as determined by group 
categorisation. I have interpreted these findings as providing evidence that memory-directed 
and non-memory-directed encoding goals recruit different processes (emphasising feature-
based and configural information, respectively), or at least reduce the reliance on configural 
processing. An alternative explanation could be that evaluating faces for likeability (as in 
Experiments 4 and 6) recruits more “global” processing (McKelvie 1991, 1995, 1996), and 
this results in other-race faces being remembered better, particularly when cues to non-racial 
ingroup status are present (as the experiments reported within this thesis). Equally as likely, 
when faces are encoded specifically for later recognition, this could result in a more local-
based processing strategy. For example, there is evidence that when participants respond to 
the local aspects of Navon letters (i.e., a large letter made up of smaller letters), face 
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recognition is impaired (e.g., Macrae & Lewis, 2002). Whether such local versus global task 
switching underpins the effects reported in Experiment 3 remains an area for empirical 
research.  
5.2 The Nature of Recognition 
Throughout this thesis, I have assumed that recognition performance implies identity 
recognition; this may not be the case. For example, recent studies have demonstrated that 
perceivers are remarkably poor at matching unfamiliar targets to different photos of the same 
target (e.g., Bruce et al., 1999; 2001; for a review, see Burton & Jenkins, 2011). That is, 
unless a face is relatively familiar, perceivers are actually rather poor at identifying 
individuals across multiple images. In this thesis, as in much previous research (e.g., Shriver 
et al., 2007), I relied exclusively on the same images at study and test to investigate 
perceptual discrimination and subsequent recognition. It thus remains unclear whether I was 
testing participants’ ability to individuate on the basis of identity or on the basis of perceptual 
image; indeed, both are possible. This raises interesting questions for future research: Does 
categorisation-derived motivation increases the likelihood of individuation on the basis of 
identity or percept? Is it possible that it depends whether the target is an own-race or other-
race face? Perhaps ingroup categorisation of own-race faces induces “true” individuation (i.e., 
in terms of identity), whereas ingroup categorisation of other-race faces induces attempts to 
individuate at the more superficially image level. Understanding the link between 
categorisation-driven motivation and individuation would be a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  
6 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate non-racial ingroup/outgroup categorisation, 
inter-/intra-racial context, and encoding conditions as signalling cues that affect own- and 
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other-race face processing. Across eight experiments using both behavioural and 
neuroimaging methods, I have demonstrated (1) that the context in which own- and other-race 
faces are encountered can determine the salience of racial category membership, with 
implications for how (and how much) non-racial ingroup/outgroup status influences own- and 
other-race face perception, (2) that encoding goals can lead perceivers toward more or less 
configural processing regardless of target ingroup/outgroup status, with implications for the 
influence of non-racial ingroup/outgroup status, and (3) that both racial and non-racial 
ingroup/outgroup status have the potential to influence early stages of face perception. These 
findings both support and extend the Categorisation–Individuation Model, yielding a more 
comprehensive insight into the other-race effect. 
 
 
 152 
 
REFERENCES 
Ackerman, J. M., Shapiro, J. R., Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., Becker, D. V. Griskevicius, 
V., Maner, J. K., & Schaller, M. (2006). They all look the same to me (unless they’re 
angry). From out-group homogeneity to out-group heterogeneity. Psychological 
Science, 17, 836–840. doi: 10.111/j.1467-9280.2006.01790.x  
Anzures, G., Quinn, P. C., Pascalis, O., Slater, A. M., Lee, K. (2010). Categorization, 
categorical perception, and asymmetry in infants representation of face race. 
Developmental Science, 13, 553-564. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00900.x 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Anthony, T., Copper, C., & Mullen, B. (1992). Cross-racial facial identification: A social 
cognitive integration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 296–301. doi: 
10.1177/0146167292183005 
Ayuk, R. E. (1990). Cross-racial identification of transformed, untransformed, and mixed-race 
faces. International Journal of Psychology, 25, 509–527. doi: 
10.1080/00207599008247880 
Bar-Haim, Y., Saidel, T., & Yovel, G. (2009). The role of skin colour in face recognition. 
Perception, 38, 145–148. doi: 10.1068/p6307 
Bar-Haim, Y., Ziv, T., Lamy, D., & Hodes, R. M. (2006). Nature and nurture in own-race 
face processing. Psychological Science, 17, 159–163. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9289.2006.01679.x 
Barkowitz, P., & Brigham, J. C. (1982). Recognition of faces: Own-race bias, incentive, and 
time delay. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12, 255-268. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-
1816.1982.tb00863.x 
Bartlett, J. C., & Searcy, J. H. (1993). Inversion and configuration of faces. Cognitive 
Psychology, 25, 281–316. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1993.1007 
Bartlett, J. C., & Searcy, J. H., & Abdi, H. (2003). What are the routes to face recognition? In 
M. Peterson, & G. Rhodes (Eds.), Perception of faces, objects, and scenes (pp. 21-52). 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Becker, D. V., Anderson, U. S., Neuberg, S. L., Maner, J. K., Shapiro, J. R., Ackerman, J. M., 
Schaller, M., & Kenrick, D. T. (2010). More memory bang for the attentional buck: 
Self-protection goals enhance encoding efficiency for potentially threatening males. 
Social Psychology and Personality Science, 1, 182–189. 
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2007). The cross-category effect: Mere 
social categorization is sufficient to elicit an own-group bias in face recognition. 
Psychological Science, 18, 706–712. doi : 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01964.x 
 153 
 
Bentin, S., Allison, T., Puce, A., Perez, E., & McCarthy, G. (1996). Electrophysiological 
studies of face perception in humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8, 551–565. 
doi: 10.1162/jocn.1996.8.6.551  
Bentin, S., & Deouell, L. Y. (2000). Structural encoding and identification in face processing: 
ERP evidence for separate mechanisms. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17, 35–54. doi: 
10.1080/026432900380472 
Berman, G. L., & Cutler, B. L. (1998). The influence of processing instructions at encoding 
and retrieval on face recognition accuracy. Psychology, Crime and Law, 42, 89-106. 
doi: 10.1080/10683169808401751.  
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2007). The cross-category effect: Mere 
social categorization is sufficient to elicit an own-group bias in face recognition. 
Psychological Science, 18, 706–712. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01964 
Biber, C., Butters, N., Rosen, J., Gerstman, L., & Mattis, S. (1981). Encoding strategies and 
recognition of faces by alcoholic Korsakoff and other brain-damged patients. Journal 
of Clinical Neuropsychology, 3, 315–330. doi: 10.1080/01688638108403135 
Blair, I. V., Judd, C. M., & Chapleau, K. M. (2004). The influence of afrocentric facial 
features in criminal sentencing. Psychological Science, 15, 674-679. doi: 
10.111/j.0956-7976.2004.00739.x 
Blair, I. V., Chapleau, K. M., & Judd, C. M. (2005). The use of afrocentric features as cues 
for judgment in the presence of diagnostic information. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 35, 59-68. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.232 
Blair, I. V., Judd, C. M., & Fallman, J. L. (2004). The automaticity of face and afrocentric 
facial features in social judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 
763-778. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.763 
Blair, I. V., Judd, C. M., Sadler, M. S., Jenkins, C. (2002). The role of Afrocentric features in 
person perception: judeging features and categories. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 83, 5-25. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.5 
Bothwell, R. K., Brigham, J. C., & Malpass, R. S. (1989). Cross-Racial Identification. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 19–25. doi: 
10.1177/0146167289151002 
 
Boutsen, L., Humphreys, G. W., Praamstra, P., & Warbrick, T. (2006). Comparing neural 
correlates of configural processing in faces and objects: An ERP study of the Thatcher 
illusion. NeuroImage, 32, 352-367. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.03.023 
 
Bobes, M. A., Martín, M., Olivares, E., Valdés-Sosa, M. (2000). Different scalp topography 
of brain potentials related to expression and identity matching of faces. Cognitive 
Brain Research, 9, 249-60. doi:10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00003-3 
 
 154 
 
Bower, G. H., & Karlin, M. B. (1974). Depth of processing pictures of faces and recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 103, 751–757. doi: 10.1037/h0037190 
Brebner, J. L., Krigolson, O., Handy, T. C., Quadflieg, S., & Turk, D. J. (2011). The 
importance of skin color and facial structure in perceiving and remembering other: An 
electrophysiological study. Brain Research, 1388, 123–133. doi: 
10.1016/j.brainres.2011.02.090 
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual-process model of impression formation. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. 
K. Srull (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Brewer, M. B., Weber, J. G., & Carini, B. (1995). Person memory in intergroup contexts: 
Categorization versus individuation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
69, 29–40. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.1.29 
Brigham, J. C. (2008). The role of face and racial prejudice in recognizing other people. In C. 
Willis-Esqueda (Ed.), Motivational aspects of prejudice and racism (pp. 68–110). 
NewYork: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-73233-6_4 
Brigham, J. C. (1986). The influence of race on face recognition. In H. D. Ellis, M. A. Jeeves, 
F. Newcombe, & A. W. Young, (Eds.), Aspects of face processing (pp. 170–177). 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
Brigham, J. C., & Barkowitz, P. (1978). Do “they all look alike” The effect of race, sex, 
experience, and attitudes on the ability to recognize faces. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 8, 306–318. doi. 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1978.tb00786.x 
Brigham, J. C., & Malpass, R. S. (1985). The role of experience and contact in the recognition 
of faces of own-and other-race persons. Journal of Social Issues, 41, 139–155. doi: 
10.1111/j.1540-4560.1985.tb01133.x 
Brigham, J. C., Maass, A., Snyder, L. D., & Spaulding, K. (1982). Accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications in a field setting. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 42, 673–
681.  
Brigham, J. C., Bennett, L. B., Meissner, C. A., & Mitchell, T. L. (2007). The influence of 
race on eyewitness memory. In R. Lindsay, D. Ross, J. Read, & M. Toglia (Eds.), 
Handbook of eyewitness psychology: Memory for people (pp. 257–281). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Buckhout, R., & Regan, S. G. (1988). Explorations in research on the other-race effect in face 
recognition. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical 
aspects of memory: Current research and issues: Memory in everyday life (Vol.1; 
pp.40–46). New York: Wiley.  
Burton, A. M., & Jenkins, R. (2011). Unfamiliar face perception. ? In A. Calder, G. Rhodes, 
M. Johnson, & J. Haxby (Eds.), The handbook of face perception (pp. 287-306). New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 155 
 
Brown, E., & Perrett, D. I. (1993).What gives a face its gender? Perception, 22, 829-840. doi: 
10.1068/p220829 
Bruce, V., Henderson, X., Greenwood, K., Hancock, P., Burton, A. M., & Miller, P. (1999). 
Verification of face identities from images captured on video. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 5, 339-360. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.5.4.339 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Newman, C., & Burton, A. M. (2001). Matching identities of 
familiar and unfamiliar faces caught on CCTV images. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 7, 207–218. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.7.3.207 
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology, 77, 305-327. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1986.tb02199.x 
Bruyer, R. (2011). Configural face processing: A meta-analytic survey. Perception, 40, 1478-
1490. doi: 10.1068/p6928 
Byatt, G., & Rhodes, G. (1998). Recognition of own-race and other-race caricatures: 
Implications for models of face recognition. Vision Research, 38, 2455-2468. doi: 
10.1016/s0042-6989(97)00469-0 
Byatt, G., & Rhodes, G. (2004). Identification of own-race and other-race faces: Implications 
for the representation of race in face space. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 735–
741. doi: 10.3758/BF03196628 
Carey, S. (1992). Becoming a face expert.Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London, B, 335, 95-103. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1992.0012 
Carey, S., & Diamond, R. (1977). From piecemeal to configurational representation of faces. 
Science, 195, 312-314. doi: 10.1126/science.831281 
Carey, S., Diamond, R., & Woods, B. (1980). Development of face recognition: a 
maturational component? Developmental Psychology, 16, 257-269. doi: 
10.1037/0012-1649.16.4.257 
Carroo, A. W. (1986). Other race recognition: A comparison of Black American and African 
Subjects. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 62, 135–138. doi: 10.2466/pms.1986.62.1.135 
Carroo, A. W. (1987). Recognition of faces as a function of race, attitudes, and reported 
cross-racial friendships. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 64, 319–325. doi: 
10.2466/pms.1987.64.1.319 
Cassidy, K. D., Boutsen, L., Humhreys, G.W., & Quinn, K. A. (in preparation). Ingroup 
categorization affects the structural encoding of other-race faces: Evidence from the 
N170 Event-related potential.  
Cassidy, K. D., Humphreys, G. W., & Quinn, K. A. (in preparation). The influence of 
ingroup/outgroup categorization on own-and other-race face processing: the 
moderating role of encoding goals.  
 156 
 
Cassidy, K. D., Humphreys, G. W., & Quinn, K. A. (in preparation). Experience and 
motivation mutually constrain the other-race effect: Evidence from the face-composite 
paradigm.  
Cassidy, K. D., Quinn, K. A., & Humphreys, G. W. (2011). The influence of 
ingroup/outgroup categorization on same-and other-race face processing: The 
moderating role of inter-versus intra-racial context. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 47, 811-817. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.02.017 
Caldara, R., & Abdi, H. (2006). Simulating the ‘other-race’ effect with autoassociative neural 
networks: Further evidence in favour of the face-space model. Perception, 35, 659-
670. doi: 10.1068/05360 
Caldara, R., Rossion, B., Bovet, P., & Hauert, C. (2004). Event-related potentials and time 
course if the ‘other-race’ face classification advantage. NeuroReport, 15, 905–910. 
doi : 10.1097/00001756-200404090-00034 
Caldara, R., Thut, G., Servoir, T. P., Michel, C. M., Bovet, P., & Renault, B. (2003). Face 
versus non-face object perception and the ‘other-race’ effect: a spatio-temporal event-
related potential study. Cognitive Neurophysiology, 114, 515–528. doi: 
10.1016/S1388-2457(02)00407-8 
Carbon, C. C., Schweinberger, S. R., Kaufmann, J. M., & Leder, H. (2005). The thatcher 
illusion seen by the brain: An event-related potentials study. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 24, 544-555. doi: 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.03.008 
Chance, J. E., & Goldstein, A. G. (1981). Depth of processing in response to own- and other-
race faces. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7, 475–480. doi: 
10.1177/014616728173017 
Chance, J. E., & Goldstein, A. G. (1996). The other-race effect and eyewitness identification. 
In S. L. Sporer, R. S. Malpass, & G. Koehnken (Eds.), Psychological Issues in 
Eyewitness Identification (pp. 153–176). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Chance, J. E., Goldstein, A. G., & McBride, L. (1975). Differential experience and 
recognition for faces. Journal of Social Psychology, 97, 243–253. doi: 
10.1080/00224545.1975.9923344 
Chance, J. E, Turner, A. L., & Goldstein, A. G. (1982). Development of face recognition for 
own-and other-race faces, Journal of Social Psychology, 112, 29–37.  
Chiroro, P., & Valentine, T. (1995). An investigation of the contact hypothesis of the own-
race bias in face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48, 879–
894. doi: 10.1080/14640749508401421 
Clifford, B. R., & Prior, D. (1980). Levels of processing and capacity allocation. Perceptual 
and Motor Skills, 50, 829-830. doi: 10.2466/pms.1980.50.3.829 
 157 
 
Cloutier, J., & Macrae, C. N. (2007). Who or what are you? Facial orientation and person 
construal. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1298–1309. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.885 
Cloutier, J., Mason, M. F., & Macrae, C. N. (2005). The perceptual determinants of person 
construal: Reopening the social-cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 88, 885–894. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.885 
Coin, C., & Tiberghien, G. (1997). Encoding activity and face recognition. Memory, 5, 545–
568. doi: 10.1080/741941479 
Collishaw, S. M., & Hole, G. J. (2000). Featural and configurational processes in the 
recognition of faces of different familiarity. Perception, 29, 893–909. doi: 
10.1068/p2949 
Corenblum, B., & Meissner, C. (2006). Recognition of faces of ingroup and outgroup children 
and adults. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 93, 187–206. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2005.09.001 
Courtois, M. R., & Mueller, J. H. (1979). Processing multiple physical features in facial 
recognition. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 14, 74-76.  
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory 
research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671–684. doi: 
10.1016/S0022-5371(72)80001-X 
 
Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the retention of words in 
episodic memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 268–294. doi: 
10.1037/0096-3445.104.3.268 
 
Cross, J., Cross, J., & Daly, J. (1971). Sex, race, age, and beauty as factors in the recognition 
of faces., Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 10, 393–396. doi: 
10.3758/BF03210319 
de Gelder, B., Bachoud-Levi, A.C., & Degos, J. D. (1998). Inversion superiority in visual 
agnosia may be common to a variety of orientation polarized objects besides faces. 
Vision Research, 38, 2855–2961. doi: 10.1016/S0042-6989(97)00458-6 
de Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. (2000). Paradoxical configural effects for faces and objects in 
prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1271–1279. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(00)00039-7 
de Heering, A., De Liedekerke, C., Deboni, M., & Rossion, B. (2010). The role of experience 
during childhood in shaping the other-race effect. Developmental Science, 13, 181–
187. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00876 
Desjardins, J., & Segalowitz, S. J. (2009). Deconstructing the P1 and the N170 face-effect 
using independent component analysis. Psychophysiology, 46, S24.  
 158 
 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.56.1.5 
Davies, G., Ellis, H., & Shepherd, J. (1977). Cue saliency in face as assessed by the ‘photofit’ 
technique. Perception, 6, 263–269. doi: 10.1068/p060263 
Diamond, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are not so special: An effect of expertise. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 107–117. doi: 1037/0096-
3445.115.2.107 
Dickter, C. L., & Bartholow, B. D. (2007). Event-related brain potential evidence of ingroup 
and outgroup attention biases. SCAN, 2, 189–198. PMid: 18985140 
Donnelly, D., & Davidoff, J. (1999). The mental representation of faces and houses:issues 
concerning parts and wholes. Visual Cognition, 6, 319-343. doi: 
10.1080/135062899395000 
Eberhardt, J. L. (2005). Imaging race. American Psychologist, 60, 181–190. doi: 1037/0003-
066X.66.2.181 
Eberhardt, J. L., Davies, P. G., Purdie-Vaughns, V. J., & Johnson, S. L. (2006). Looking 
deathworthy: Perceived stereotypicality of Black defendants predicts capital-
sentencing outcomes. Psychological Science, 17, 383–386. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2006.01716.x 
Eimer, M. (2000a). Effects of face inversion on the structural encoding and recognition of 
faces: Evidence from event-related brain potentials. Cognitive Brain Research, 10, 
145–158. doi: 10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00038-0 
Eimer, M. (2000b). The face-specific N170 component reflects late stages in the structural 
encoding of faces. NeuroReport, 11, 2319–2324. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200007140-
00050 
Eimer, M. (2000c). Event-related brain potentials distinguish processing stages involved in 
face perception and recognition. Clinical Neurophysiology, 111, 694-705. 
doi:10.1016/S1388-2457(99)00285-0 
 
Eimer, M., & Holmes, A. (2002). An ERP study on the time course of emotional face 
processing. NeuroReport, 13, 427-31. doi:10.1097/00001756-200203250-00013 
 
Eimer, M., & Holmes, A. (2007). Event-related brain potential correlates of emotional face 
processing. Neuropsychologia, 45, 15-31. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.04.022 
 
Ellis, H. D., & Deregowski, J. B. (1981). Within-race and between-race recognition of 
transformed and untransformed faces. The American Journal of Psychology, 94, 27–
35. doi: 10.2307/1422341 
 159 
 
Ellis, H. D., Deregowski, J. B., & Shepherd, J. W. (1975). Descriptions of White and Black 
faces by White and Black subjects. International Journal of Psychology, 10, 119–123. 
doi: 10.1080/002075975808247325  
Farah, M. J., Tanaka, J. W., & Drain, H. M. (1995). What causes the face inversion effect? 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 628-
634. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.21.3.628 
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, H. M., & Tanaka, J. R. (1995). The inverted face inversion 
effect in prosopagnosia: Evidence for mandatory, face-specific perceptual 
mechanisms. Vision Research, 35, 2089–2093. doi: 10.1016/0042-6989(94)00273-O 
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, H. M., & Tanaka, J. R. (1998). What is “special” about 
face perception? Psychological Review, 105, 482-498. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.105.3.482 
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic 
activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013–1027. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.69.6.1013 
Feingold, G. A. (1914). The influence of environment on persons and things. Journal of 
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 5, 39–51. URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1133283.  
Ferguson, K., Kulkofsky, S., Cashon, C., & Casasola, M. (2009). The development of 
specialized processing of own-race faces in infancy. Infancy, 14, 3. doi: 
10.1080/15250000902839369 
Ferguson, D. P., Rhodes, G., Lee, K., & Sriram, N. (2001). ‘They all look alike to me’: 
Prejudice and cross-race face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 92, 567–577. 
doi: 10.1348/000712601162347 
Fink, G. R., Halligan, P. W., Marshall, J. C., Frith, C. D., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Dolan, R. J. 
(1996). Where in the brain does visual attention select the forest and the tress? Nature, 
382, 626-628. doi: 10.1038/38262a0 
Freire, A. Lee, K., Symons, L. A. (2000). The face–inversion effect as a deficit in the 
encoding of configural information: Direct evidence. Perception, 29, 159–170. doi: 
10.1068/p3012 
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum model of impression formation from 
category-based to individuated processes: Influences of information and motivation on 
attention and interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1–74). New York: Academic Press. 
Furl, N., & Phillips, P. J., & O’Toole, A. J. (2002). Face recognition algorithms and the other-
race effect: computational mechanisms for a developmental contact hypothesis. 
Cognitive Science, 26, 797–815. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2606_4 
 160 
 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup 
identity model. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.  
Gajewski, P., Schlegel, K., & Stoerig, P. (2008). Effects of human race and face inversion on 
the N170: A cross race study. Journal of Psychophysiology, 22, 157–165. doi: 
10.1027/0269-8803.22.4.157 
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Orientation priming of novel shapes in the context of 
viewpoint-dependent recognition. Perception, 26, 51-73. doi: 10.1068/p260051 
Ge, L. Z., Zhang, H. C., Wang, Z., Quinn, P. C., Pascalis, O., Kelly, D., Slater, A., Tian, J., & 
Lee, K. (2009). Two faces of the other-race effect: Recognition and categorisation of 
Caucasian and Chinese faces. Perception, 38, 1199–1210. doi: 10.1068/p6136.  
George, N., Jemel, B., Fiori N., Chaby, L., & Renault, B. (2005). Electrophysiological 
correlates of facial decision: Insights from upright and upside-down mooney-face 
perception. Cognitive Brain Research, 24, 663-673. doi: 
10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.03.017.  
Goffaux, V., & Rossion, B. (2007). Face inversion disproportionately impairs the perception 
of vertical but not horizontal relations between features. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33, 995-1002. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.33.4.995 
Goldstein, A. G., & Chance, J. E. (1976). Measuring psychological similarity of faces. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 7, 407-408.  
Goldstein, A. G., & Chance, J. E. (1978). Judging face similarity in own and other races. 
Journal of Psychology, 98, 185–193. doi: 10.1080/00223980.1978.9915960 
Goldstein, A. G. (1979a). Race-related variation of facial features: Aanthropometric data. I. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 13, 187–190.  
Goldstein, A. G. (1979b). Facial feature variation: Anthropometric data. II. Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society, 13, 191–193.  
Goldstein, A. G., & Chance, J. E. (1979c). Do “foreign” faces really look alike? Bulletin of 
the Psychonomic Society, 13, 111–113.  
Goldstein, A. G., & Chance, J. E. (1980). Memory for faces and schema theory. Journal of 
Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 105, 47–59. doi: 
10.1080/00223980.1980.9915131 
Goldstein, A. G., & Chance, J. E. (1985). Effects of training on Japanese face recognition: 
Reduction of the other-race effect. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23, 211–214. 
Goodman, G. S., Sayfan, L., Lee, J. S., Sandhei, M., Walle-Olsen, A., Magnussen, S., Pezdek, 
K., & Arredondo, P. (2007). The development of memory for own- and other-race 
faces. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 98, 233–242. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2007.08.004 
 161 
 
Gosling, A., & Eimer, M. (2011). An event-related brain potential study of explicit face 
recognition. Neuropsychologia, 49, 2736-2745. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.05.025 
 
Green, D. M., Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics, New York 
Wiley.  
Greenberg, S., & MacGregor, H. M. (2010). Disruptive effect of holistic bias on processing of 
other-race faces following face categorization. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 110, 567–
579. doi: 10.2466/pms.110.2.567-579 
Gross, T. F. (2009). Own-ethnicity bias in the recognition of Black, East Asian, Hispanic and 
White faces. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31, 128-135. doi: 
10.1080/01973530902880381 
Hahn, A. C., Jantzen, K. J., & Symons, L. A. (2012). Thatcherization impacts the processing 
of own-race faces more so than other-race faces: An ERP study. Social Neuroscience, 
7, 113-125. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2011.583080 
Halgren, E., Raji, T., Marinkovi, K., Jousmaki, V., & Hari, R. (2000). Cognitive response 
profile of human fusiform face area as determined by MEG. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 69-
81. doi: 10.1093/cercor/10.1.69 
Hancock, K. J., & Rhodes, G. (2008). Contact, configural encoding and the other-race effect 
in face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 99, 45–56. doi: 
10.1348/000712607X199981 
Haslam, A. S., Oakes, P. J., Reynolds, K. J., & Turner, J. C. (1999). Social identity salience 
and the emergence of stereotype consensus. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 25, 809–818. doi:10.1177/0146167299025007004 
 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed neural system for face 
perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 223–233. doi:10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01482-0 
 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2002).Human neural systems for face 
recognition and social communication. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 59–67. 
doi:10.1016/S0006-3223(01)01330-0 
 
Hayden, A., Bhatt, R., Joseph, J., & Tanaka, J. (2007). The other-race effect in infancy: 
Evidence using a morphing technique. Infancy, 12, 95–104. doi: 10.1111/j.1532-
7078.2007.tb00235.x 
Hayward, W. G., Rhodes, G., & Schwaninger, A. (2008). An own-race advantage for 
components as well as configurations in face recognition. Cognition, 106, 1017–1027. 
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.04.002 
 162 
 
Hehman, E., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Where the division lies: Common 
ingroup identity moderates the cross-racial recognition effect. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 46, 445−448. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.11.008 
Hehman, E., Stanley, E. M., Gaertner, S. L., & Simons, R. F. (2011). Multiple group 
membership influences face-recognition: Recall and neurological evidence. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1262-1268. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.014 
Herrmann, M. J., Ehlis, A. C., Ellgring, H., & Fallgatter, A. J. (2005). Early stages (P100) of 
face perception in humans as measured with event-related potentials. Journal of 
Neural Transmission, 112, 1073–1081. doi: 10.1007/s00702-007-0624-9 
Herrmann, M. J., Schreppel, T., Jager, D., Koehler, S., Ehlis, A. C., & Fallgatter, A. J. (2007). 
The other-race effect for face perception: An event-related potential study. Journal of 
Neural Transmission, 114, 951–957. doi: 10.1007/s00702-007-0624-9 
Hills, P. J., & Lewis, M. B. (2006). Reducing the own-race bias in face recognition by 
shifting attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59, 996–1002. doi: 
10.1080/17470210600654750 
Hugenberg, K., & Corneille, O. (2009). Holistic processing is tuned for in-group faces. 
Cognitive Science, 33, 1173–1181. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01048.x 
Hugenberg, K., Miller, J., & Claypool, H. M. (2007). Categorization and individuation in the 
cross-race recognition defect: Toward a solution to an insidious problem. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 334–340. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.02.010 
Hugenberg, K., & Sacco, D. F. (2008). Social categorization and stereotyping: How social 
categorization biases person and perception in face memory. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 2, 1052–1072. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00090.x 
Hugenberg, K., Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., & Sacco, D. F. (2010). The Categorization–
Individuation Model: An integrative account of the other-race recognition deficit. 
Psychological Review, 117, 1168–1187. doi: 10.1037/a0020463 
Itier, R. J., & Taylor, M. J. (2002). Inversion and contrast polarity reversal affect both 
encoding and recognition processes of unfamiliar faces: a contrast repetition study 
using ERPs. NeuroImage, 15, 353-372. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0982 
Itier, R. J., & Taylor, M. J. (2004). Effects of repetition learning on upright and inverted 
contrast-reversed face processing using ERPs. NeuroImage, 21, 1518–1532. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.12.016 
 
Ito, T. A., & Bartholow, B. D. (2009). The neural correlates of race. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 13, 524–531. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.10.002 
Ito, T. A., & Urland, G. R. (2003). Race and gender on the brain: Electrocortical measures of 
attention to race and gender of multiply categorizable individuals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 616–626.  doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.616 
 163 
 
Ito, T. A., & Urland, G. R. (2005). The influence of processing objectives on the perception of 
faces: An ERP study of race and gender perception. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 21–36. doi: 10.3758/CABN.5.1.21 
Jaquet, E., Rhodes, G., Hayward, W. G. (2008). Race-contingent aftereffects suggest distinct 
perceptual norms for different race faces. Visual Cognition, 16, 734-753. doi: 
19.1080/1350628701350647 
Johnston, R. A., Kanazawa, M., Takashi, K., & Oda, M. (1997a). Exploring the structure of 
multidimensional face-space: effects of age and gender. Visual Cognition, 4, 39-57. 
doi: 10.1080/713756750.  
Johnston, R. A., Milne, A. B., Williams, C., & Hosie, J. (1997b). Do distinctive faces come 
from outer space? An investigation of the status of a multidimensional face-space. 
Visual Cognition, 4, 59-67. doi: 10.1080/713756748 
Kelly, D. J., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., Gibson, A., Smith, M., Ge, L., & Pascalis, 
O. (2005). Three-month-olds, but not newborns, prefer own-race faces. Developmental 
Science, 8, F31–F36. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.0434a.x 
Kelly, D. J., Liu, S. Y., Lee, K., Quinn, P. C., Pascalis, O., Slater, A. M., & Ge, L. Z. (2009). 
Development of the other-race effect during infancy: Evidence toward universality? 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 104, 105–114. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2009.01.006 
Kelly, Liu, S., Ge, L., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., Liu, Q., & Pascalis, O. (2007b). 
Cross-race preferences for same-race faces extend beyond the African versus 
Caucasian contrast in 3-month-old infants. Infancy, 11, 87-95. doi: 
10.1207/s15327078in1101_4 
Kelly, D. J., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., Ge, L., & Pascalis, O. (2007a). The other-
race effect develops during infancy: Evidence of perceptual narrowing. Psychological 
Science, 18, 1084–1089. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02029.x 
Kosslyn, S. (1987). Seeing and imaging in the cerebral hemispheres: A computational 
approach. Psychological Review, 94, 148-175. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.94.2.148 
Kubota, J. T., & Ito, T. A. (2007) Multiple cues in social perception: the time course of 
processing race and facial expression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 
738–752. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.10.023 
Kunda, Z., & Spencer, S. J. (2003). When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they 
color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and 
application. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 522-544. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.522 
Latinus, M., & Taylor, M. J. (2005). Holistic processing of faces: Learning effects with 
Mooney faces. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17, 1316–1327. doi: 
10.1162/0898929055002490 
 164 
 
Lavarkas, P. J., Buri, J. R., & Mayzner, M. S. (1976). A perspective on the recognition of 
other-race faces. Perception & Psychophysics, 20, 475–481. doi: 
10.3758/BF03208285 
Leder, H., & Bruce, V. (2000). When inverted faces are recognized: The role of configural 
information in face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53, 
513–536. doi: 10.1080/027249800390583 
Leder, H., Candrian, G., Huber, O., & Bruce, V. (2001). Configural features in the context of 
upright and inverted faces. Perception, 30, 73-83. doi: 10.1068/p2911 
Lee, K., Byatt, G., & Rhodes, G. (2000). Caricature effects, distinctiveness, and 
identification: Testing the face-space framework. Psychological Science, 11, 379-385. 
doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00274 
Leehey, S., Carey, S., Diamond, R., & Cahn, A. (1978). Upright and inverted faces: the right 
hemisphere knows the difference. Cortex, 14, 411-419.  
Leopold, D. A., O’Toole, A. J., Vetter, T., & Blanz, V. (2001). Prototype-references shap 
encoding revealed by high-level aftereffects. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 89-94. doi: 
10.1038/82947 
Levin, D. T. (1996). Classifying faces by race: The structure of face categories. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 22, 1364–1382. doi: 
10.1037/0278-7393.22.6.1364 
Levin, D. T. (2000). Race as a visual feature: Using visual search and perceptual 
discrimination tasks to understand face categories and the cross-race recognition 
deficit. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 559–574. doi: 
10.1037/0096-3443.129.4.559 
Levin, D. T., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Distortions in the perceived lightness of faces: The role 
of race categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 501–512. doi: 
10.1037/0096-3445.135.4.501 
Leyens, J.-P., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (1992). The ingroup overexclusion effect: Impact of valence 
and confirmation on stereotypical information search. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 22, 549–569. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420220604 
Lindsay, D. S., Jack, P. C., & Christian, M. A. (1991). Other-race face perception. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 76, 587–589. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.76.4.587 
Linville, P. W., & Jones, E. E. (1980). Polarized appraisals of out-group members. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 689–703. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.38.5.689 
Linville, P. W., Fischer, G. W., & Salovey, (1989). Perceived distributions of the 
characteristics of in-group and out-group members: Empirical evidence and a 
computer simulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 165–188. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.165  
 165 
 
Liu, J., Harris, A., & Kanwisher, N. (2002). Stages of face processing in face perception: An 
MEG study. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 910–916. doi: 10.1038/nn909 
Luce, T. S. (1974). The role of experience in inter-racial recognition. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 1, 39–41. doi: 10.1177/014616727400100114 
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically about 
others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 93-120. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.93 
Macrae, C. N., & Martin, D. (2006). A boy primed sue: feature-based processing and person 
construal. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 793-805. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.406 
Macrae, C. N., & Lewis, H. L. (2002). Do I know you? Processing orientation and face 
recognition. Psychological Science, 13, 194–196. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00436  
Macron, J. L., Susa, K. J., & Meissner, C. A. (2009). Assessing the influence of recollection 
and familiarity in memory for own-versus other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 16, 99–103. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.1.99 
MacLin, O. H., & Malpass, R. S. (2001). Racial categorization of faces: The ambiguous race 
face effect. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 98–118. doi: 1037/1076-
8971.7.1.98 
MacLin, O. H., & Malpass, R. S. (2003). The ambiguous-race face illusion. Perception, 32, 
249–252. doi: 10.1068/p5046 
MacLin, O. H., MacLin, M., & Malpass, R. S. (2001). Race, arousal, attention, exposure, and 
delay: An examination of factors moderating face recognition. Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, 7, 134–152. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.7.1.134 
MacLin, O. H., Van Sickler, B. R., MacLin, M. K., & Li, A. (2004). A re-examination of the 
cross-race effect: The role of race, inversion and basketball trivia. North American 
Journal of Psychology, 6, 189–204.  
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (1991). Detection theory: A user’s guide. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Malpass, R. S. (1990). An excursion into utilitarian analysis. Behavior Science Research, 24, 
1–15.  
Malpass, R. S., & Kravitz, J. (1969). Recognition for faces of own and other races. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 330–334. doi: 10.1037/h0028434 
Malpass, R. S., Laviguer, H., & Weldon, D. E. (1973). Verbal and visual training in face 
recognition. Perception & Psychophysics, 14, 285–292. doi : 10.3758 /BF03212392 
Martin, D., & Macrae, C. N. (2007). A face with a cue: Exploring the inevitability of person 
categorization. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 806-816. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.445 
 166 
 
Marzi, T., & Viggiano, M. P. (2010). Deep and shallow encoding effects on face recognition: 
An ERP study. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 78, 239-250. doi: 
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2010.08.005 
Mason, M. F., & Macrae, C. N. (2004). Categorizing and individuating others: The nueral 
substrates of person perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 1785-1795. 
doi: 10.1162/0898929042947801 
Maurer, D., Le Grand, R., & Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many faces of configural 
processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 255–260. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(02)01903-4 
McKelvie, S. J. (1985). Effect of depth of processing on recognition memory for normal and 
inverted photographs of faces. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 60, 503–508. doi: 
10.2466/pms.1985.60.2.503 
McKelvie, S. J. (1991). Effects of processing strategy and transformation on recognition 
memory for photographs of faces. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 29, 98–100.  
McKelvie, S. J. (1995). Encoding operations and recognition memory for faces. Canadian 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49, 437–459. doi: 10.1037/1196-1961.49.4.437 
McKelvie, S. J. (1996). Effects of encoding operations on recognition memory for upright and 
inverted faces. Australian Journal of Psychology, 48, 75–85. doi: 
10.1080/00049539608259509 
McKone, E., Brewer, J. L., MacPherson, S., Rhodes, G., & Hayward, W. G. (2007). Familiar 
other-race faces show normal holistic processing and are robust to perceptual stress. 
Perception, 36, 224–248. doi: 10.1068/p5499 
McKone, E., Martini, P., & Nakayama, K. (2001). Categorical perception of face identity in 
noise isolates configural processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 27, 573–599. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.27.3.573 
McKone, E., & Robbins, R. (2011). Are faces special? In A. Calder, G. Rhodes, M. Johnson, 
& J. Haxby (Eds.), The handbook of face perception (pp. 149-176). New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
McKone, E., & Yovel, G. (2009). Why do picture–place inversion effects sometimes 
dissociate perception of features and spacing in faces, and sometimes not? 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 778-797. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.5.778 
MediaLab and DirectRT [Computer software]. New York: Empirisoft Corporation. 
Megreya, A. M., White, D., & Burton, A. M. (2011). The other-race effect does not rely on 
memory: Evidence from a matching task. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 64, 1473–1483. doi: 10.1080/17470218.575228 
 167 
 
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (1985). The role of experience and contact in the 
recognition of faces of own- and other-race persons. Journal of Social Issues, 41, 139–
155. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1985.tb01133.x 
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001a). Thirty years of investigating the own-race bias in 
memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 3–
35. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.7.1.3 
Meissner, C. A., Brigham, J. C., & Butz, D. A. (2005). Memory for own- and other-race 
faces: A dual-process approach. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 545–567. doi: 
10.1002/acp.1097 
Michel, C., Caldara, R., & Rossion, B. (2006). Same-race faces are perceived more 
holistically than other-race faces. Visual Cognition, 14, 55–73. doi: 
10.1080/13506280500158761 
Michel, C., Corneille, O., & Rossion, B. (2007). Race categorization modulates holistic face 
encoding. Cognitive Science, 31, 911–924. doi: 10.1080/03640210701530805 
Michel, M., Corneille, O., & Rossion, B. (2010). Holistic face encoding is modulated by 
perceived face race: Evidence form perceptual adaptation. Visual Cognition, 18, 434–
455. doi: 10.1080/13506280902819697 
Michel, M., Rossion, B., Han, J., Chung, C., & Caldara, R. (2006). Holistic processing is 
finely tuned for faces of one’s own race. Psychological Science, 17, 608–615. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01752.x 
Minear, M., & Park, D. C. (2004). A lifespan database of adult facial stimuli. Behavior 
Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 630–633. doi: 
10.3758/BF03206543 
Murray, J. E., Rhodes, G., & Schuchinsky, M. (2003). When is a face not a face? The effects 
of misorientation on mechanisms of face perception. In M. Peterson, & G. Rhodes 
(Eds.), Perception of faces, objects, and scenes (pp. 53–74). New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Navarrete, C. D., McDonald, M. M., Molina, L. E., & Sidanius, J. (2010). Prejudice at the 
nexus of race and gender: An outgroup male target hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 98, 933–945. doi: 10.1037/a0017931 
Nelson, C. A. (2001). The development and neural bases of face recognition. Infant and Child 
Development, 10, 3-18. doi:10.1002/icd.239 
Ng, W. J., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (1994). Cross-race facial recognition: Failure of the contact 
hypothesis. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 25, 217–232. doi: 
10.1177/0022022194252004 
Oostenveld, R., & Praamstra, P. (2001). The five percent electrode system for high resolution 
EEG and ERP measurements. Clinical Neurophysiology, 112, 713–719. doi: 
10.1016/S1388-2457(00)00527-7 
 168 
 
O’ Toole, A., Deffenbacher, K., Valentin, D., Abdi, H. (1994). Structural aspects of face 
recognition and the other-race effect. Memory and Cognition, 22, 208-224. doi: 
10.3758/BF03208892 
Papesh, M. H., & Goldinger, S. D. (2010). A multidimensional scaling analysis of own- and 
cross-race face spaces. Cognition, 116, 283-288. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.05.001 
Pauker, K., Weisbuch, M., Ambady, N., Sommers, S. R., Adams, R. B., Jr., & Ivcevic, Z. 
(2009). Not so Black and White: Memory for ambiguous group members. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 795–810. doi: 10.1037/a0013265 
Petterson, K. E., & Baddeley, A. D. (1977). When face recognition fails. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 3, 406-417. doi: 
10.1037/0278-7393.3.4.406 
Pezdek, K., Blandon-Gitlin, I., Moore, C. (2003). Children’s face memory: More evidence for 
the cross-race effect. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 760-763. doi: 10.1037/0021-
9010.88.4.760 
Philiastides, M. G., & Sajda, P. (2006). Temporal characterization of the neural correlates of 
perceptual decision making in the human brain. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 509-518. doi: 
10.1093/cercor/bhi130 
Platz, S., & Hosch, H. (1988). Cross-racial/ethnic eyewitness identification: A field study. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18, 972–984. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-
1816.1988.tb01197.x 
Psychology Software Tools (2009). E-Prime (version 2.0). [Computer Software]. Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA.  
Quattrone, G. A., & Jones, E. E. (1980). The perception of variability within in-groups and 
out-groups: Implications for the law of small numbers. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 38, 141–152. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.38.1.141 
Quinn, K. A., & Macrae, C. N. (2011). The face and person perception: Insights from social 
cognition. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 849–867. (Special issue: “Person 
perception 25 years after Bruce and Young (1986)”.) doi:10.1111/j.2044-
8295.2011.02030.x 
 
Quinn, K. A., Mason, M. F., & Macrae, C. N. (2010). When Arnold is “The Terminator,” we 
no longer see him as a man: The temporal determinants of person perception. 
Experimental Psychology, 57, 27–35. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000004 
Quinn, P. C., Uttley, L., Lee, K., Gibson, A., Smith, M., Slater, A. M., & Pascalis, O. (2008). 
Infant preference for female faces occurs for same-but not other-race faces. Journal of 
Neuropsychology, 2, 15-26. doi: 10.1348/174877407x231029 
Rebai, M., Poiroux, S., Bernard, C., & Lalonde, R. (2001). Event-related potentials for 
category-specific information during the passive viewing of faces and objects. 
International Journal of Neuroscience, 106, 209-226.  
 169 
 
Rhodes, G. (1985). Lateralized processes in face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 
76, 249-271. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1985.tb01949.x 
Rhodes, G. (1988). Looking at faces: First-order and second-order features as determinates of 
face appearance. Perception, 17, 43-63. doi: 10.1068/p170043 
Rhodes, G. (1993). Configural coding, expertise, and the right hemisphere advantage for face 
recognition. Brain and Cognition, 22, 19-41. doi: 10.1006/brcg.1993.1022 
Rhodes, G., Brake, S., & Atkinson, A. (1993). Whats lost in inverted faces? Cognition, 47, 
25–57. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(93)90061-Y 
Rhodes, G., Carey, S., Byatt, G., & Proffitt, F. (1998). Coding spatial variations in faces and 
simple shapes: a test of two models. Vision Research, 38, 2307-2321. doi: 
10.1016/s0042-6989(97)00470-7.  
Rhodes, G., Brake, S., Taylor, K., & Tan, S. (1989). Expertise and configural encoding in 
face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 80, 313–331. 
Rhodes, G., Ewing, L., Hayward, W., Maurer, D., Mondloch, C., & Tanaka, J. (2009). 
Contact and other-race effects in configural and component processing of faces. 
British Journal of Psychology, 100, 717–728.  
Rhodes, G., Hayward, W. G., & Winkler, C. (2006). Expert face coding: Configural and 
component coding of own-race and other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 13, 499–505.  
Rhodes, G., Lie, H. C., Ewing, L., Evangelista, E., & Tanaka, J. W. (2010). Does perceived 
race affect discrimination and recognition of ambiguous-race faces? A test of the 
sociocognitive hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning, & 
Memory, and Cognition, 36, 217–223.  
Rhodes, G., Locke, V., Ewing, L., & Evangelista, E. (2009). Race coding and the other-race 
effect in face recognition. Perception, 38, 232–241. doi: 10.1068/p6110 
Robertson, L. C., & lamb, M. R. (1991). Neuropsychological contributions to theories of 
part/whole organizarion. Cognitive Psychology, 23, 299-230.  
Rodin, M. J. (1987). Who is memorable to whom? A study of cognitive disregard. Social 
Cognition, 5, 144–165. doi: 10.1521/soco.1987.5.2.144 
Rossion, B. (2008). Picture-plance inversion leads to qualitative changes of face perception. 
Acta Psychologica, 128, 274-289.  
Rossion, B. (2009). Distinguishing the cause and consequence of face inversion: The 
perceptual field hypothesis. Acta Psychologia, 132, 300–312.  
Rossion, B., & Caharel (2011). ERP evidence for the speed of face categorization in the 
human brain: disentangling the contribution of low-level visual cues from face 
perception. Vision Research, 51, 1297–1311. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2011.04.003 
 170 
 
Rossion, B., Delvenne, J. F., Debatisse, D., Goffaux, V., Bruyer, R., Crommelinck, M., & 
Guerit, J. M. (1999). Spatio-temporal localization of the face inversion effect: An 
event-related potentials study. Biological Psychology, 50, 173–189.  
Rossion, B., Delvenne, J. F., Debatisse, D., Goffaux, V., Bruyer, R., Crommelinck, M., & 
Guerit, J. M. (1999). Spatio-temporal localization of the face inversion effect: An 
event-related potentials study. Biological Psychology, 50, 173–189. 
Rossion, B., & Gauthier, I. (2002). How does the brain process upright and inverted faces? 
Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 1, 63-75.  
Rossion, B., Joyce, C. A., Cottrell, G. W., & Tarr, M. J. (2003). Early lateralization and 
orientation tuning for face, word and object processing in the visual cortex. 
NeuroImage, 20, 1609-1624.  
Rossion, B., & Michel, C. (2011). An experience-based holistic account of the other-race 
effect. In A. Calder, G. Rhodes, M. Johnson, & J. Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford handbook 
of face perception (pp.215-243). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Rugg, M. D., & Coles, M. G. H. (1995). Electrophysiology of mind: Event-related brain 
potentials and cognition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rutman, A., M., Clapp, W. C., Chadick, J. Z., & Gazzaley, A. (2009). Early-top down control 
of visual processing predicts working memory performance. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22, 1224-1234. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21257 
Sangiv, N., & Bentin, S. (2001). Structural encdoing of human and schematic faces : holistic 
and part-based processes. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 937-951.  
Sangrigoli, S., Pallier, C., Argenti, A. M., Ventureyra, V. A. G., & de Schonen, S. (2005). 
Reversibility of the other-race effect in face recognition during childhood. 
Psychological Science, 16, 401–444.  
Sangrigoli, S., & de Schonen, S. (2004). Effect of visual experience on face processing: A 
developmental study of inversion and non-native effects. Developmental Science, 7, 
74–87. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00324.X  
Schweinberger, S. R. (1996). How Gorbachev primed Yeltsin: analyses of associative priming 
in person recognition by means of reaction times and event-related brain potentials. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 22, 1383-
1407.  
Schweinberger, S. R. (2011). Neurophysiological correlates of face recognition. In A. Calder, 
G. Rhodes, M. Johnson, & J. Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of face perception 
(pp.345-466). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Schweinberger, S. R., Pfutze, E. M., & Sommer, W. (1995). Repetition priming of face 
recognition: Evidence from event-related potentials. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 21, 722-736.  
 171 
 
Schyns, P. G., Bonnar, L., & Gosselin, F. (2002). Show me the features! Understanding 
recognition from the use of visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 402–409. 
doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00472 
Searcy, J. H., & Bartlett, J. C. (1996). Inversion and processing of component and spatial-
relational information in faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 22, 904-915. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.22.4.904 
Sekuler, A. B., Gaspar, C. M., Gold, J. M. & Bennett, P. J. (2004). Inversion leads to 
quantitative, not qualitative, changes in face processing. Current Biology, 14, 391–
396. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2004.02.028 
Sergent, J. (1984). An investigation into component and configural processes underlying face 
perception. British Journal of Psychology, 75, 221–242. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8295.1984.tb01895.x 
Shepherd, J. W. (1981). Social factors in face recognition. In G. Davies, H. Ellis, & J. 
Shepherd, J. W. (Eds.), Perceiving and remembering faces (pp. 55–79). London: 
Academic Press.  
Shepherd, J. W., & Deregowski, J. B. (1981). Races and faces: A comparison of the responses 
of Africans and Whites to faces of the same and different races. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 20, 125–133. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1981.tb00485.x 
Shriver, E. R., Young, S. G., Hugenberg, K., Bernstein, M. J., & Lanter, J. R. (2008). Class, 
race, and the face: Social context modulates the cross-race effect in face recognition. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 260–274. doi: 
10.1177/0146167207310455 
Shriver, E. R., & Hugenberg, K. (2010). Power, individuation, and the cross-race recognition 
deficit. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 767–774. doi: 
10.1016/j.jesp.2010.03.014 
Stroessner, S. J. (1996). Social categorization by race or sex: Effects of perceived non-
normalcy on response times. Social Cognition, 14, 247–276. doi: 
10.1521/soco.1996.14.3.247 
Slone, A. E., Brigham, J. C., & Meissner, C. A. (2000). Social and Cognitive factors affecting 
the own-race bias in Whites. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22, 71–84. 
Sporer, S. L. (1991). Deep— deeper — deepest? Encoding strategies and the recognition of 
human faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 
17, 323-333. doi:10.1037/0278-393.17.2.323 
Sporer, S. L. (2001). Recognizing faces of other ethnic groups: An integration of theories. 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 36–97. doi: 10.1037//1076-8971.7.1.36 
 172 
 
Sthal, J., Wiese, H., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2010). Learning task affects the ERP-correlates 
of the own-race bias, but not recognition memory. Neuropsychologia, 48, 2027–2040. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.024 
Stahl, J., Wiese, H., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2008). Expertise and own-race bias in face 
processing: an event-related potential study. NeuroReport, 19, 583–587. doi: 
10.1097/WNR.0B013e3282f97b4d 
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1991). Second-order relational properties and the inversion 
effect: Testing a theory of face perception. Perception and Psychophysics, 50, 367-
372. doi: 10.3758/BF03212229 
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 46A, 225-245.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (2003). The holistic representation of faces. In M. A. Peterson, 
G. Rhodes (Eds.), Perception of faces, objects, and scenes (pp. 53-74). New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Gordon, I. (2011). Features, configuration and holistic face processing. In A. 
Calder, G. Rhodes, M. Johnson, & J. Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of face 
perception (pp.177-–194). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Tanaka, J. W., Kiefer, M., & Bukach, C. M. (2004). A holistic account of the own-race effect 
in face recognition: Evidence from a cross-cultural study. Cognition, 93, B1–B9. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2003.09.011 
Tanaka, J. W., & Pierce, L. J. (2009). The neural plasticity of other-race face recognition. 
Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 122-131.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Sengco, J. (1997). Features and their configuration in face recognition. 
Memory & Cognition, 25, 583-592. doi: 10.3758/BF03211301 
Thompson, P. (1980). Margaret Thatcher: A new illusion. Perception, 9, 483–484. doi: 
10.1068/p090483 
Valentine, T. (1988). Upside-down faces: A review of the effect of inversion upon face 
recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 79, 471–491. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8295.1988.tb02747.X 
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion and race in 
face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43A, 161–204.  
Valentine, T. (2001). Face-space models of face recognition. In M. J. Wenger & J. T. 
Townsend (Eds.), Computational, geometric, and process perspectives on facial 
cognition: Contexts and challenges (pp. 83–113). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Valentine, T., & Bruce, (1986).The effect of distinctiveness in recognizing and classifying 
faces. Perception, 15, 525-535. doi: 10.1068/p150525 
 173 
 
Valentine, T., & Endo, M. (1992). Towards an exemplar model of face processing: The 
effects of race and distinctiveness. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
44A, 671–703.  
Vizioli, L., Foreman, K., Rousselet, G. A., & Caldara, R. (2010). Inverting faces elicits 
sensitivity to race on the N170 component: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Vision, 
10, 1–23. doi: 10.1167/10.1.15 
Voci, A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in 
Italy: The meditational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 6, 37-54. doi: 
10.1177/1368430203006001011 
Vokey, J. R., & Read, J. D. (1992). Familiarity, memorability, and the effect of typicality on 
the recognition of faces. Memory & Cognition, 20, 291–302. doi: 
10.3758/BF03199666 
Vuilleumier, P. (2002). Facial expression and selective attention. Current Opinion in 
Psychiatry, 15, 291–300. 10.1097/00001504-200205000-00011 
Walker, P. M., &Hewstone, M. (2006a). A developmental investigation of other-race contact 
and the own-race face effect. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24, 451–
463. doi: 10.1348/026151005X51239 
Walker, P. M., & Hewstone, M. (2006b). A perceptual discrimination investigation of the 
own-race effect and intergroup experience. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 461–
475. doi: 10.1002/acp.1191 
Walker, P. M., Silvert, L., Hewstone, M., & Nobre, A. C. (2008). Social contact and other-
race face processing in the human brain. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 
3, 16–25. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsm035 
Walker, P. M., & Tanaka, J. M. (2003). A perceptual encoding advantage for own-race versus 
other-race faces. Perception, 32, 1117–1125. doi: 10.1068/p5098 
Weise, H., Stahl, J., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2009). Configural processing of other-race faces 
is delayed but not decreased. Biological Psychology, 81, 103–109. doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2009.03.002 
Wells, G. L., & Turtle, J. W. (1988). What is the best way to encode faces? In M. M. 
Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory: Current 
research and issues: Volume 1. Memory in everyday life (pp.163-168). Chichester, 
UK: Wiley.  
Willadsen-Jensen, E. C., & Ito, T. A. (2006) Ambiguity and the time course of racial 
perception. Social Cognition, 24, 580–606. doi: 10.1521/soco.2006.24.5.580 
Willadsen-Jensen, E. C., & Ito, T.A. (2008) A foot in both worlds: Asian Americans’ 
perceptions of Asian, White, and racially ambiguous faces. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, 11, 182–200. doi: 10.1177/1368430207088037 
 174 
 
Winograd, E. (1978). Encoding operations which faciliatate memory for faces across the life 
span. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of 
memory (pp. 255-262). New York: Academic Press.  
Winograd, E. (1981). Elaboration and disctinctivness in memory for faces. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 181-190. doi: 
10.1037/0278-7393.7.3.181 
Woodman, G. F. (2010). A brief introduction to the use of event-related potentials in the 
studies of perception and attention. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 2031–
2046. doi: 10.3758/APP.72.8.2031 
Wright, D. B., Boyd, C. E., & Tredoux, C. G. (2001). A field study of the own-race bias in 
South Africa and England. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 119–133. doi: 
10.1037/1076-8971.7.1.119 
Wright, D. B., Boyd, C. E., & Tredoux, C. G. (2003). Inter-racial contact and the own-race 
bias for face recognition in South Africa and England. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
17, 365–373. doi: 10.1002/acp.898 
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at faces upside down. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 81, 
141–145. doi: 10.1037/h0027474 
Yin, R. K. (1970). Face recognition by brain injured patients: a dissociable ability? 
Neuropsychologia, 8, 395- 402. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(70)90036-9 
Young, A. W., Hellawell, D., & Hay, D. C. (1987). Configurational information in face 
perception. Perception, 16, 747–759. doi: 10.1068/p160747 
Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., & Hugenberg, K. (2010). When do own-group biases in face 
recognition occur? Encoding versus post-encoding. Social Cognition, 28, 240–250. 
doi: 10.1521/soco.2010.28.2.240 
Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2011). Individuation motivation and face experience can 
operate jointly to produce the own-race bias. Article in press at Social Psychology and 
Personality Science. doi: 10.1177/1948550611409759.  
Young, S. G., Hugenberg, K., Bernstein, M. J., & Sacco, D. F. (2009). Interracial contexts 
debilitate same-race face recognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 
1123–1126. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.009 
Yovel, G., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). Face perception: domain specific, not process specific. 
Neuron, 44, 889-898. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(04)00728-7 
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Leyens, J.-P., & F. Bellour, F. (1995). The ingroup overexclusion effect: 
Identity concerns in decisions about group membership. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 25, 1–16. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420250102 
 175 
 
Appendix A 
Adapted Inter-group Process Questionnaire (Voci & Hewstone; 2003) 
 
Quantity of Contact Stem Statements (five point scales): 
 
How many people from Afro-Caribbean’s do you know? (None-More than 10) 
How frequently do you have contact Afro-Caribbean’s? (Never- very frequently) 
How many Afro-Caribbean students do you know? (None- more than 10)  
How frequently do you have contact with Afro-Caribbean students? (Never- Very frequently) 
 
Quality of contact Stem statements (five points Scales):  
 
When you meet Afro-Caribbean Students, in general do you find the contact pleasant? (Not at 
all—Very) 
When you meet Afro-Caribbean Students, in general do you find the contact cooperative? 
(Not at all — Very) 
When you meet Afro-Caribbean Students, in general do you find the contact superficial? (Not 
at all — Very 
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Appendix B 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 1, Discrimination Latencies (ms) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Trial Type (A)    78394.64  1  1.88   0.179 
Race (B) 3502.79  1  0.20   0.658 
University (C) 2530.84  1  0.250   0.621 
Orientation (D) 793241.936  1  48.23   0.001 
 
A × B 227.59  1 0.045   0.834 
A × C 163253.97  1  35.77   0.001 
A × D 15255.98  1 1.63   0.210 
B × C 12398.17  1 1.39   0.246 
B × D 789.46  1 0.14   0.706 
C × D 9027.90  1 3.17   0.085 
 
A × B × C 28584.19  1  7.65   0.009 
A × B × D 13972.72  1  2.37   0.134 
A × C × D 2625.35  1  0.54   0.465 
B × C × D 31840.48  1  7.57   0.010 
 
A × B × C × D 5796.74  1  1.85   0.183 
 
Error (A/within)   1286794.86 31 
Error (B/within)   544203.77 31 
Error (C/within)   313773.33 31 
Error (D/within)   509802.99 31 
 
Error (A × B/within)   157867.44 31 
Error (A × C/within)   141451.83 31 
Error (A × D/within)   288754.50 31 
Error (B × C/within)   275408.95 31 
Error (B × D/within)   169294.93 31 
Error (C × D/within)   88180.30 31 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   115802.43 31 
Error (A × B × D /within)   13972.72 31 
Error (A × C × D /within)   148799.57 31 
Error (B × C × D /within)   130301.02 31 
 
Error (A × B × C × D /within)   96969.45 31 
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Average discrimination latencies (ms) as a function of Trial Type, Race, Group and 
Orientation, Experiment 1. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 900 (34.50) 949 (37.77) 931 (34.08) 991 (56.05) 
 Different Trial 955 (43.28) 1043 (50.86) 880 (49.45) 987 (57.04) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 876 (31.45) 970 (39.48) 915 (34.50) 983 (40.84) 
 Different Trial 911 (30.64) 1029 (45.69) 932 (42.29) 978 (40.74) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix C 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 1, Average Errors 
Source SS df F p  
 
Trial Type (A)    0.060  1  4.79   0.036 
Race (B) 0.001  1  0.34   0.564 
University (C) 0.017  1  6.65   0.015 
Orientation (D) 0.178  1  27.13   0.001 
 
A × B 2.67  1 1.13   0.295 
A × C 24.93  1  19.57   0.001 
A × D 39.93  1 13.49   0.001 
B × C 46.92  1 25.29   0.001 
B × D 1.87  1 1.11   0.300 
C × D 3.28  1 2.41   0.130 
 
A × B × C 15.47  1  14.88   0.001 
A × B × D 1.87  1  1.23   0.275 
A × C × D 10.98  1  7.45   0.010 
B × C × D 7.26  1  7.40   0.011 
 
A × B × C × D 6.79  1  4.72   0.38 
 
Error (A/within)   0.060 31 
Error (B/within)   0.069 31 
Error (C/within)   0.080 31 
Error (D/within)   0.230 31 
 
Error (A × B/within)   0.127 31 
Error (A × C/within)   0.069 31 
Error (A × D/within)   0.159 31 
Error (B × C/within)   0.100 31 
Error (B × D/within)   0.091 31 
Error (C × D/within)   0.073 31 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   0.003 31 
Error (A × B × D /within)   0.082 31 
Error (A × C × D /within)   0.079 31 
Error (B × C × D /within)   0.053 31 
 
Error (A × B × C × D /within)   0.077 31 
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Average errors committed as a function of Trial Type, Race, Group and Orientation, 
Experiment 1. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 
 Different Trial 0.06 (0.01) 0.16 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 
 Different Trial 0.03 (0.01 0.09 (0.19) 0.04 (0.01) 0.10 (0.16) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix D 
Correlations between self reported quality and quantity of contact reaction time inversion 
costs for own and other-university other-race targets, Experiment 1. 
 
 
Quantity of Contact Quality of Contact 
 r p r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
-0.02 0.90 -0.01 0.93 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
-0.06 0.71 -0.32 0.07 
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Appendix E 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 2, discrimination latency (ms). Note that the ‘condition’ is a 
between-participants factor 
 
Source SS df F p  
 
Trial Type (A)    120346.01  1  6.87   0.012 
Race (B) 24.800  1  0.001   0.978 
University (C) 8970.7  1  3.22   0.080 
Orientation (D) 380605.82  1  52.19   0.001 
Condition (E) 193777.21  1  0.70   0.405 
 
A × B 24127.42  1 4.28   0.045 
A × C 32455.51  1  11.077   0.002 
A × D 22310.93  1 5.85   0.020 
B × C 5048.31  1 1.94   0.170 
B × D 149.67  1 0.03   0.861 
C × D 12359.94  1 12.17   0.001 
 
A × E 2208.19  1 0.126   0.724 
B × E 255309.98  1  7.86   0.008 
C × E 5837.56  1 2.10   0.155 
D × E 11620.07  1 1.59   0.214 
 
 
A × B× E 13751.29  1 2.44   0.125 
A × C× E 446.35  1  0.15   0.698 
A × D× E 142.09  1 0.03   0.848 
B × C × E 23.42  1 0.009   0.925 
B × D× E 8389.70  1 1.74   0.194 
C × D× E 593.22  1 0.58   0.449 
 
A × B × C 3730.19  1  1.93   0.171 
A × B × D 3912.14  1  1.34   0.254 
A × C × D 1026.40  1  0.33   0.564 
B × C × D 79.06  1  0.053   0.819 
 
A × B × C × D 242.10  1  0.78   0.782 
 
A × B × C × E 10552.53  1  5.48   0.024 
A × B × D × E 657.14  1  0.225   0.638 
A × C × D × E 3253.37  1  1.07   0.306 
B × C × D × E 231.41  1  0.155   0.696 
 
A × B × C × D × E 523.87  1  0.168   0.684 
 
Error (A/within)   735356.22 42 
Error (B/within)   24.80 42 
Error (C/within)   116683.78 42 
Error (D/within)   306251.39 42 
 
Error (A × B/within)   236271.29 42 
Error (A × C/within)   123062.92 42 
Error (A × D/within)   160074.34 42 
Error (B × C/within)   108932.60 42 
Error (B × D/within)   202258.89 42 
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Error (C × D/within)   42646.33 42 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   80799.45 42 
Error (A × B × D /within)   122661.25 42 
Error (A × C × D /within)   127297.77 42 
Error (B × C × D /within)   62773.21 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × D /within)   130595.16 42 
 
Error (A× E/between)   735356.22 42 
Error (B× E/between)   24.80 42 
Error (C× E/between)   116683.78 42 
Error (D× E/between)   306251.39 42 
 
Error (A × B × E/between)   236271.29 42 
Error (A × C × E/between)   123062.92 42 
Error (A × D × E/between)   160074.34 42 
Error (B × C × E/between)   108932.60 42 
Error (B × D × E/between)   202258.89 42 
Error (C × D × E/between)   42646.33 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × E /between)   80799.45 42 
Error (A × B × D × E /between)   122661.25 42 
Error (A × C × D × E /between)   127297.77 42 
Error (B × C × D × E/between)   62773.21 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × D × E /between)   130595.16 42 
 
 
 
Average latency (ms) when the white face (own-race) block appeared first, as a function of 
Trial Type, Race, Group and Orientation, Experiment 1. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 790 (29.85) 843 (34.11) 823 (29.05) 857.14 (36.87) 
 Different Trial 850 (26.67) 939 (32.83) 829 (26.5) 895 (33.74) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 776 (29.22) 836 (38.65) 801 (33.47) 831 (41.73) 
 Different Trial 789 (25.93) 847 (31.64) 799 (29.99) 846 (31.67) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Average latency (ms) when the black (other-race) face block appeared first, as a function of 
Trial Type, Race, Group and Orientation, Experiment 1. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 754 (29.85) 768 (34.11) 769 (29.99) 786 (36.87) 
 Different Trial 767 (26.67) 823 (32.83) 777 (26.54 812 (33.74) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 775.57 (29.22) 813 (38.65) 809 (33.47) 845 (41.73) 
 Different Trial 793 (25.93) 865 (31.64) 812 (29.99) 852 (31.67) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix F 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 2, Errors Analysis. Note that the ‘condition’ is a between-
participants factor 
 
Source SS df F p  
 
Trial Type (A)    153.27  1  12.08   0.001 
Race (B) 6.98  1 5.38   0.025 
University (C) 0.45  1  0.263   0.611 
Orientation (D) 101.85  1  42.83   0.001 
Condition (E) 28.92  1  1.47   0.232 
 
A × B 24.84  1 10.79   0.002 
A × C 41.27  1  15.86   0.001 
A × D 66.74  1 14.00   0.001 
B × C 18.12  1 6.60   0.014 
B × D 9.70  1 4.02   0.051 
C × D 3.12  1 2.55   0.118 
 
A × E 3.69  1 0.30   0.581 
B × E 1.17  1 0.90   0.348 
C × E 0.13  1 0.07   0.784 
D × E 1.69  1 0.71   0.403 
 
 
A × B× E 4.07  1 1.77   0.191 
A × C× E 0.83  1  0.32   0.575 
A × D× E 0.32  1 0.06   0.795 
B × C × E 0.26  1 0.095   0.759 
B × D× E 0.213  1 0.08   0.768 
C × D× E 0.33  1 0.27   0.606 
 
A × B × C 0.240  1  0.11   0.735 
A × B × D 7.30  1  6.07   0.018 
A × C × D 0.187  1  0.17   0.680 
B × C × D 6.00  1  4.92   0.032 
 
A × B × C × D 0.32  1  0.30   0.585 
 
A × B × C × E 3.58  1 1.73   0.195 
A × B × D × E 3.12  1  2.59   0.115 
A × C × D × E 1.11  1 1.03   0.316 
B × C × D × E 0.26  1  0.21   0.644 
 
A × B × C × D × E 2.60  1  2.42   0.127 
 
Error (A/within)   490.83 42 
Error (B/within)   53.20 42 
Error (C/within)   71.64 42 
Error (D/within)   97.50 42 
 
Error (A × B/within)   94.35 42 
Error (A × C/within)   106.64 42 
Error (A × D/within)   195.36 42 
Error (B × C/within)   112.50 42 
Error (B × D/within)   98,76 42 
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Error (C × D/within)   50.09 42 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   84.87 42 
Error (A × B × D /within)   49.34 42 
Error (A × C × D /within)   44.42 42 
Error (B × C × D /within)   50.03 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × D /within)   44.11 42 
 
Error (A× E/between)   490.83 42 
Error (B× E/between)   53.20 42 
Error (C× E/between)   71.64 42 
Error (D× E/between)   97.50 42 
 
Error (A × B × E/between)   94.35 42 
Error (A × C × E/between)   106.64 42 
Error (A × D × E/between)   195.36 42 
Error (B × C × E/between)   112.50 42 
Error (B × D × E/between)   98.76 42 
Error (C × D × E/between)   50.09 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × E /between)   84.87 42 
Error (A × B × D × E /between)   49.34 42 
Error (A × C × D × E /between)   44.34 42 
Error (B × C × D × E/between)   50.03 42 
 
Error (A × B × C × D × E /between)   44.11 42 
 
 
 
Average errors when the white face (own-race) block appeared first, as a function of Trial 
Type, Race, Group and Orientation, Experiment 2. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 0.63 (0.28) 1.09 (0.37) 1.22 (0.35) 0.81 (0.37) 
 Different Trial 2.13 (0.46) 4.04 (0.57) 1.13 (0.38) 2.95 (0.52) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 0.86 (0.31) 1.00 (0.31) 1.36 (0.37) 1.54 (0.39) 
 Different Trial 1.45 (0.30) 2.00 (0.53) 1.40 (0.30) 2.13 (0.52) 
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Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
Errors when the black (other-race) face block appeared first, as a function of Trial Type, 
Race, Group and Orientation, Experiment 2. 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 
 Same Trial 1.23 (0.29) 1.76 (0.38) 1.57 (0.34) 1,71 (0.38) 
 Different Trial 1.76 (0.47) 4.19 (0.58) 1.61 (0.39) 2.81 (0.53) 
Other Race (Black) 
 Same Trial 1.14 (0.31) 1.28 (0.32) 2.14 (0.38) 2.14 (0.40) 
 Different Trial 1.90 (0.36) 3.00 (0.54) 1.33 (0.31) 2.76 (0.53) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix G 
Correlations between self reported quality and quantity of contact and reaction time inversion 
costs for own and other-university other-race targets, Experiment 2.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact Quality of Contact 
 r p r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
-0.01 0.90 0.01 .0.95 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
-0.01 0.98 0.12 0.42 
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Appendix H 
 
Interracial Contact Questionnaire (adapted from Hancock & Rhodes, 2008) 
 
In the following questionnaire we would like you to indicate how well the following 
statements represent the type of interactions you have with Black and Caucasian people. 
Please indicate the extent to which each statement represents your interactions by crossing out 
the number which best represents your opinion. 
 
Very 
strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
(1) I know lots of Black people  
(2) I interact with White people during recreational periods 
(3) I live, or have lived in an area where I interact with Black people  
(4) I live, or have lived in an area where I interact with White people  
(5) I interact with Black people during recreational periods 
(6) I interact with White people on a daily basis 
(7) I socialize a lot with White people 
(8) I went to a high school where I interacted with Black students 
(9) I socialize a lot with Black people 
(10) I know lots of White people 
(11) I generally only interact with Black people 
(12) I interact with Black people on a daily basis 
(13) I went to a high school where I interacted with White students 
(14) I generally only interact with White people 
(15) I have lived in a country where the predominant race is Black 
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Appendix I 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 3, Recognition Sensitivity (d’) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    6.66  1  6.20   0.019 
University (B) 5.26  1  8.50   0.007 
 
A × B 5.71  1  6.97   0.013 
 
Error (A/within)   30.99 29 
Error (B/within)   17.94  29 
 
Error (A × B/within)   23.77 29 
 
 
 
Average discrimination sensitivity (d) Scores, as a function of target race and group, 
Experiment 3. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 1.97 (0.10) 1.11 (0.15) 
Other Race (Black) 1.06 (0.23) 1.08 (0.12) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix J 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 3, Criterion Bias (C) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    7.80  1  24.362   0.001 
University (B) 0.01  1  0.076   0.785 
 
A × B 0.00  1  0.002   0.966 
 
Error (A/within)   9.29 29 
Error (B/within)   4.86 29 
 
Error (A × B/within)   3.65 29 
 
 
 
Average criterion bias (C) Scores, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 3. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 0.24 (0.62) 0.26 (0.71) 
Other Race (Black) -0.26 (0.54) -0.24 (0.93) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix K 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 3, Confidence Ratings 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    2.23  1  10.292   0.003 
University (B) 0.29  1  3.431   0.074 
 
A × B 0.00  1  0.047   0.830 
 
Error (A/within)   6.30 29 
Error (B/within)   2.48 29 
 
Error (A × B/within)   2.35 29 
 
 
Average confidence ratings, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 3. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 4.85 (0.11) 4.76 (0.13) 
Other Race (Black) 4.58 (0.13) 4.47 (0.15) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
 
 192 
 
Appendix L 
 
Correlations between self reported quantity of contact and recognition sensitivity (d’) for 
other-race targets, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 3.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact 
 r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
-0.30 0.10 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
-0.09 0.63 
 
 
Correlations between self reported quantity of contact and criterion bias (C) for other-race 
targets, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 3.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact 
 r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
0.21 0.14 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
0.09 0.62 
 
 
Correlations between self reported quantity of contact and confidence ratings for other-race 
targets, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 3.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact 
 r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
0.18 0.32 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
0.23 0.21 
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Appendix M ANOVA Summary: Experiment 4, Likeability Ratings 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    27.32  1  49.648   0.001 
University (B) 0.79  1  3.568   0.043 
 
A × B 0.40  1  2.941   0.099 
 
Error (A/within)   13.76 25 
Error (B/within)   4.36 25 
 
Error (A × B/within)   2.043 25 
 
 
Average likeability ratings, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 4. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 4.45 (0.12) 4.17 (0.13) 
Other Race (Black) 3.32 (0.16) 3.25 (0.16) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix N 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 4, Encoding Response Times 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    2565.44  1  0.076   0.786 
University (B) 8085.24  1  1.021   0.322 
 
A × B 13208.72  1  0.805   0.378 
 
Error (A/within)   847836.98 25 
Error (B/within)   198030.36 25 
 
Error (A × B/within)   410268.62 25 
 
 
Average likeability response times (ms), as a function of target race and group, Experiment 4. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 1633 (104.46) 1628 (97. 91) 
Other Race (Black) 1601 (102.22) 1641 (100.70) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix O 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 4, Recognition Sensitivity (d’) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    29.05  1  33.399   0.001 
University (B) 4.82  1  7.409   0.012 
 
A × B 2.71  1  4.565   0.043 
 
Error (A/within)   21.74 25 
Error (B/within)   16.26 25 
 
Error (A × B/within)   14.86 25 
 
 
 
Average discrimination sensitivity (d’) scores, as a function of target race and group, 
Experiment 4. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 1.76 (0.10) 1.65 (0.12) 
Other Race (Black) 1.03 (0.12) 0.27 (0.24) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix P 
 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 4, Criterion Bias (C) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    19.51  1 27.544   0.001 
University (B) 0.80  1  3.302   0.081 
 
A × B 3.19  1  14.331   0.001 
 
Error (A/within)   17.70 25 
Error (B/within)   6.12 25 
 
Error (A × B/within)   5.57 25 
 
 
 
Average criterion bias (C) scores, as a function of target race and group, Experiment 4. 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
Own Race (White) 0.18 (0.08) 0.36 (0.83) 
Other Race (Black) 0.32 (0.09) -0.85 (0.16) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix Q 
 
Correlations between self reported quality and quantity of contact and discrimination 
sensitivity (d’) scores for own and other-university other-race targets, Experiment 4.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact Quality of Contact 
 r p r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
-0.01 0.94 0.07 0.72 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
0.15 0.48 0.24 0.25 
 
 
Correlations between self reported quality and quantity of contact and criterion bias scores 
(C) scores for own and other-university other-race targets, Experiment 4.  
 
 
Quantity of Contact Quality of Contact 
 r p r p 
Own University 
(Birmingham)  
0.01 0.97 0.18 0.38 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
-0.08 0.70 -0.19 0.37 
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Appendix R 
 
 
Correlation coefficients between likeability ratings and recognition sensitivity (d') as a 
function of target race and university, Experiment 4. 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
r p r p 
Own Race (White) 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.91 
Other Race (Black) -0.04 0.84 -0.19 0.34 
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Appendix S 
 
Correlation coefficients between likeability response times and recognition sensitivity (d') as a 
function of target Race and University, Experiment 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
r p r p 
Own Race (White) 4.85 0.12 4.76 0.13 
Other Race (Black) 4.58 0.13 4.48 0.15 
 200 
 
Appendix T 
 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 5, Recognition Sensitivity (d’) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    16.51  1  16.073   0.001 
University (B) 0.15  1  0.152   0.699 
Orientation (C) 0.06  1  0.059   0.810 
 
A × B 9.49  1 23.759   0.001 
A × C 0.78  1  1.055   0.311 
B × C 3.56  1 3.862   0.058 
 
A × B × C 4.024  1  5.430   0.025 
 
Error (A/within)   39.04 38 
Error (B/within)   38.73 38 
Error (C/within)   38.95 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   9.49 38 
Error (A × C/within)   28.31 38 
Error (B × C/within)   35.37 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   28.16 38 
 
 
Average recognition sensitivity (d’), as a function of target race, group and orientation, 
Experiment 5.  
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 1.53 (0.13) 1.47 (0.15) 1.24 (0.14) 1.15 (0.16) 
Other Race (Black) 0.85 (0.15) 0.54 (0.15) 0.80 (0.15) 1.37 (0.15) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix U 
 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 5, Criterion Bias (C) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    7.47  1  15.142   0.001 
University (B) 1.71  1  6.535   0.015 
Orientation (C) 24.08  1  47.277   0.001 
 
A × B 2.43  1  8.229   0.007 
A × C 0.83  1  3.274   0.078 
B × C 1.96  1  20.647   0.001 
 
A × B × C 0.010  1  0.108   0.745 
 
Error (A/within)   18.77 38 
Error (B/within)   9.96 38 
Error (C/within)   19.36 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   11.21 38 
Error (A × C/within)   9.64 38 
Error (B × C/within)   3.60 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   3.55 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average criterion bias scores as a function of target race, group and orientation, Experiment 
5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own-race (White) 0.47 (0.07) -0.13 (0.08) 0.29 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) 
Other-race (Black) 0.10 (0.08) -0.73 (0.09) 0.25 (0.07) -0.24 (0.09) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses denote standard error. 
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Appendix V 
 
Correlation coefficients between the quality and quantity of other-race contact and 
discrimination sensitivity (d’) inversion costs for other-race faces as a function of target 
university, Experiment 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 r p r p 
Quantity of Contact 0.04 0.82 0.13 0.43 
Quality of Contact -0.13 0.45 0.14  0.39 
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Appendix W 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 6, likeability ratings 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    56.50  1  40.190   0.001 
University (B) 2.65  1  11.554   0.002 
Orientation (C) 0.10  1  0.266   0.609 
 
A × B 0.006  1 0.038   0.847 
A × C 0.132  1  0.829   0.368 
B × C 0.860  1 5.775   0.021 
 
A × B × C 0.011  1  0.060   0.0807 
 
Error (A/within)   53.42 38 
Error (B/within)   8.73 38 
Error (C/within)   15.27 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   6.50 38 
Error (A × C/within)   0.13 38 
Error (B × C/within)   0.86 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   6.70 38 
 
 
Likeability ratings as a function of target race, group and orientation, Experiment 6.  
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 4.39 (0.13) 4.30 (0.15) 4.12 (0.14) 4.22 (0.16) 
Other Race (Black) 3.60 (0.13) 3.41 (0.15) 3.29 (0.13) 3.33 (0.14) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix X 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 6, likeability response latencies 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    124751.60  1  0.883   0.353 
University (B) 121344.00  1  1.573   0.217 
Orientation (C) 791523.29  1  4.181   0.048 
 
A × B 34676.39  1 0.311   0.580 
A × C 29630.84  1  0.372   0.545 
B × C 13706.73  1 0.262   0.621 
 
A × B × C 5493  1  0.086   0.0771 
 
Error (A/within)   5370965.34 38 
Error (B/within)   3172293.59 38 
Error (C/within)   7190998.20 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   4235619.42 38 
Error (A × C/within)   3023164.56 38 
Error (B × C/within)   1991227.92 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   2428994.83 38 
 
 
Average likeability response latencies (ms), as a function of target race, group and orientation, 
Experiment 6.  
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 2082 (125.53) 2223 (107.65) 2165 (127.54) 2264 (125.20) 
Other Race (Black) 2170 (134.73) 2257 (119.53) 2195 (139.430) 2272 (135.86) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix Y 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 6, discrimination sensitivity (d’) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)   37.07  1 65.662   0.001 
University (B) 2.82  1  4.141       0.049      Orientation 
(C) 9.46  1 7.368   0.019 
 
A × B 6.08  1 8.966   0.005 
A × C 0.023  1  0.037   0.848 
B × C 0.72  1 1.403   0.244 
 
A × B × C 2.97  1 4.273   0.046 
 
Error (A/within)   21.45 38 
Error (B/within)   25.91 38 
Error (C/within)   48.84 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   25.77 38 
Error (A × C/within)   23.809 38 
Error (B × C/within)   19.616 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   26.43 38 
 
 
Average discrimination sensitivity (d’), as a function of target race, group and orientation, 
Experiment 6.  
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 1.76 (0.14) 1.50 (0.15) 1.77 (0.13) 1.31 (0.14) 
Other Race (Black) 0.98 (0.13) 0.35 (0.13) 1.15 (0.182) 1.11 (0.17) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix Z 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 6, criterion bias (C) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)   20.68  1 38.239   0.001 
University (B) 0.47  1  4.140   0.049  
Orientation (C) 11.49  1 30.809   0.001 
 
A × B 0.14  1 0.852   0.362 
A × C 1.37  1  5.130   0.029 
B × C 1.99  1 12.68   0.001 
 
A × B × C 0.20  1 1.035   0.315 
 
Error (A/within)   20.55 38 
Error (B/within)   4.33 38 
Error (C/within)   14.17 38 
 
Error (A × B/within)   6.48 38 
Error (A × C/within)   10.15 38 
Error (B × C/within)   5.977 38 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   7.42 38 
 
 
Average criterion bias (C), as a function of target race, group and orientation, Experiment 6.  
 Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
 Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Own Race (White) 0.70 (0.71) 0.34 (0.96) 0.62 (0.82) 0.48 (0.75) 
Other Race (Black) 0.32 (0.96) -400 (0.11) 0.24 (0.93) -0.68 (0.11) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix AA 
Correlation coefficients between the quality and quantity of other-race contact and 
discrimination sensitivity (d’) inversion costs for other-race faces as a function of target 
university, Experiment 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 r p r p 
Quantity of Contact -0.03 0.81 0.08 0.60 
Quality of Contact 0.02 0.89 0.56 0.73 
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Appendix BA 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 7, response latencies (ms) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)   6010.32  1 3.350   0.087 
University (B) 0.202  1  0.001 0.984  
Orientation (C) 59845.45  1 31.25   0.001 
 
A × B 58.01  1 0.76   0.7.87 
A × C 666.35  1  2.165   0.162 
B × C 247.28  1 0.263   0.615 
 
A × B × C 762.20  1 1.255   0.280 
 
Error (A/within)   26913.29 15 
Error (B/within)   7410.82 15 
Error (C/within)   288720.85 15 
Error (A × B/within)   11507.51 15 
Error (A × C/within)   44617.21 15 
Error (B × C/within)   14093.36 15 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   9110.57 15 
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ANOVA Summary: Experiment 7, Error Analysis 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)   5.69  1 8.768   0.010 
University (B) 0.008  1  0.019   0.891  
Orientation (C) 35.07  1 29.86   0.001 
 
A × B 0.28  1 0.351   0.563 
A × C 0.00  1  0.00   1.000 
B × C 0.31  1 0.98 0.759 
 
A × B × C 0.19  1 0.34   0.56 
 
Error (A/within)   9.74 15 
Error (B/within)   6.055 15 
Error (C/within)   17.61 15 
 
Error (A × B/within)   12.03 15 
Error (A × C/within)   7.43 15 
Error (B × C/within)   4.781 15 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   8.61 15 
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Appendix CA 
ANOVA Summary Table for P100 Mean Peak Latency, Experiment 7.  
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)      0.53  1   0.006    0.94 
Race (B)     326.37  1   2.509    0.14 
University (C)     21.51  1   0.262    0.62 
Orientation (D)     214.57  1   0.239    0.24 
 
A × B     2.15  1   0.038    0.85 
A × C     50.13     1   1.361    0.26 
A × D     40.29     1   1.628    0.22 
B × C     200.50  1   3.647    0.08 
B × D     37.26  1   0.430    0.52 
C × D     149.01  1   2.507    0.13 
 
A × B × C     19.31  1   0.609    0.45 
A × B × D     50.13  1   2.084    0.17 
A × C × D     34.34  1   0.614    0.45 
B × C × D     167.43  1   0.829    0.38 
 
A × B × C × D     21.52  1   1.073    0.31 
 
Error (A/within)    1280.24 15 
Error (B/within)    1950.99  15 
Error (C/within)  1233.52  15 
Error (D/Within) 2144.80     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    848.52 15 
Error (A × C/within)    552.61  15 
Error (A × D/within) 373.61  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 824.71     15 
Error (B × D/within)    1300.75  15 
Error (C × D/within)  891.45  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 475.67     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 360.90     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)  838.30     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 3031.21     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 300.82     15 
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ANOVA Summary Table for P100 Mean Peak Amplitude, Experiment 7 
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)      212.85  1   4.827    0.44 
Race (B)     12.49  1   0.580    0.46 
University (C)     1.30  1   0.221    0.65 
Orientation (D)     133.78  1   22.283    0.001 
 
A × B     0.20  1   0.122    0.73 
A × C     0.22     1   0.199    0.66 
A × D     0.23     1   0.255    0.62 
B × C     8.44  1   0.861    0.37 
B × D     50.09  1   3.822    0.07 
C × D     4.92  1   0.521    0.48 
 
A × B × C     0.97  1   0.302    0.59 
A × B × D     1.66  1   0.521    0.48 
A × C × D    3.57  1   1.93    0.19 
B × C × D     7.77  1   0.933    0.35 
 
A × B × C × D     1.00  1   0.322    0.58 
 
Error (A/within)    661.42 15 
Error (B/within)    323.13 15 
Error (C/within)  88.12  15 
Error (D/Within) 90.05     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    24.78 15 
Error (A × C/within)    16.82  15 
Error (A × D/within)  13.60  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 147.12     15 
Error (B × D/within)    196.56  15 
Error (C × D/within) 141.41  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 48.31     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 29.20     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)  27.77     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 124.94     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 46.66     15 
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P100 Mean Peak Latency (ms) and Amplitude (µV) as a Function of Hemisphere, Race, 
University, and Orientation 
  
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Left Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 P100 Latency (ms) 109 (2.57) 111 (4.58) 107 (3.12) 111 (2.53) 
 P100 Amplitude (µV) 8.26 (1.02) 10.93 (1.33) 8.00 (1.24) 9.80 (1.33) 
Other Race (Black) 
 P100 Latency (ms) 108 (3.40) 114 (4.13) 113 (3.08) 112 (3.90) 
 P100 Amplitude (µV) 9.47 (1.26) 9.74 (1.39) 9.24 (1.16) 10.54 (1.45) 
Right Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 P100 Latency (ms) 109 (1.81) 113 (2.98) 107 (2.63) 108 (3.24) 
 P100 Amplitude (µV) 10.22 (1.13) 12.36 (1.41) 9.61 (1.51) 12.33 (1.26) 
Other Race (Black) 
 P100 Latency (ms) 110 (3.14) 113 (2.73) 114 (2.32) 110 (3.81) 
 P100 Amplitude (µV) 11.63 (1.43) 11.24 (1.56) 11.06 (1.36) 12.13 (1.70) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix DA 
ANOVA Summary Table for N170 Mean Peak Latency, Experiment 7.  
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)    7.881  1 0.164    0.692 
Race (B)     2793.84  1   38.25    0.001 
University (C)     27.55  1   0.258    0.619 
Orientation (D)     2140.46  1   18.67    0.001 
 
A × B     5.37  1   0.0340    0.568 
A × C     0.37     1 0.28    0.869 
A × D 1.20     1   0.077    0.785 
B × C 45.07  1 0.028 0.869 
B × D     134.48  1   0.1.017    0.329 
C × D     358.00  1   5.028    0.40 
 
A × B × C     0.134  1   0.010    0.92 
A × B × D 14.32  1   2.007    0.177 
A × C × D 3.35  1 0.472    0.503 
B × C × D     177.03  1   5.955    0.028 
 
A × B × C × D     2.51  1 0.352    0.562 
 
Error (A/within)    722.89 15 
Error (B/within)    1095.52  15 
Error (C/within) 1599.64  15 
Error (D/Within) 1719.35     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    237.09 15 
Error (A × C/within)    198.221  15 
Error (A × D/within) 234.59  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 1790.01     15 
Error (B × D/within)    1983.92  15 
Error (C × D/within) 1068.00  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 194.64     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 107.03     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)  106.55     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 445.92     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 107.38     15 
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ANOVA Summary Table for N170 Mean Peak Amplitude, Experiment 7 
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)      204.93  1   5.200    0.038 
Race (B)     163.77  1   7.588    0.015 
University (C)     4.87  1   0.486    0.496 
Orientation (D)     28.04  1   1.695    0.213 
 
A × B     17.39  1   6.772    0.020 
A × C     0.19     1   0.119    0.734 
A × D 0.015     1   0.009    0.927 
B × C 169.86  1   6.634    0.021 
B × D 6.26  1   0.34    0.561 
C × D 0.80  1   0.047 0.832 
 
A × B × C     0.151  1   0.0630    0.805 
A × B × D      2.40     1    0.232 0.232 
A × C × D    7.94  1   3.72    0.073 
B × C × D     11.03  1   0.743    0.402 
 
A × B × C × D 0.442  1   0.099 0.758 
 
Error (A/within)    591.11 15 
Error (B/within)    323,75 15 
Error (C/within) 150.37 15 
Error (D/Within) 248.20     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    38.53 15 
Error (A × C/within)    25.04  15 
Error (A × D/within)  25.02  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 384.08     15 
Error (B × D/within)    272.95  15 
Error (C × D/within) 258.26  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 35.98     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 23.23     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)  31.97     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 222.79     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 67.19     15 
 
 
 215 
 
N170 Mean Peak Latency (ms) and Amplitude (µV) as a Function of Hemisphere, Race, 
University, and Orientation 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Left Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 N170 Latency (ms) 156 (1.60) 164 (3.09) 156 (1.82) 162 (2.93) 
 N170 Amplitude (µV) -4.69 (1.02) -5.09 (1.23) -3.49 (1.33) -3.37 (0.73) 
Other Race (Black) 
 N170 Latency (ms) 162 (2.08) 171 (3.17) 166 (2.77) 167 (3.61) 
 N170 Amplitude (µV) -4.08 (1.03) -4.50 (1.29) -5.24 (1.58) -7.14 (1.35) 
Right Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 N170 Latency (ms) 157 (1.69) 165 (2.65) 156 (2.04) 163 (2.54) 
 N170 Amplitude (µV) -5.38 (1.42) -6.73 (1.36) -4.93 (1.46) -4.69 (1.09) 
Other Race (Black) 
 N170 Latency (ms) 162 (1.96) 170 (2.58) 167 (2.39) 166 (2.87) 
 N170 Amplitude (µV) -6.13 (1.26) -7.06 (1.67) -8.18 (1.96) -8.84 (1.87) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix EA 
ANOVA Summary Table for P200 Mean Peak Latency, Experiment 7 
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)      493.58  1   5.875    0.02 
Race (B)     1662.37  1   7.069    0.02 
University (C)     1583.63  1   1.931    0.19 
Orientation (D)     275.62  1   0.796    0.39 
 
A × B    110.21  1   2.877    0.11 
A × C     37.26     1   0.638    0.43 
A × D     46.73     1   1.544    0.23 
B × C     1323.25  1   1.237    0.28 
B × D     400.78  1   2.631    0.13 
C × D     2.15  1   0.009    0.93 
 
A × B × C     120.70  1   1.884    0.19 
A × B × D     40.29  1   1.705    0.21 
A × C × D     34.33  1   0.700    0.42 
B × C × D     229.12  1   0.414    0.53 
 
A × B × C × D     0.95  1   0.027    0.87 
 
Error (A/within)    1260.19 15 
Error (B/within)    1662.37  15 
Error (C/within)  12300.93  15 
Error (D/Within) 275.62     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    110.21 15 
Error (A × C/within)    875.39  15 
Error (A × D/within) 453.96  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 16039.35     15 
Error (B × D/within)    2284.83  15 
Error (C × D/within) 3563.64  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 960.76     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 354.54     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)  735.29     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 8304.26     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 538.83     15 
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ANOVA Summary Table for P200 Mean Peak Amplitude, Experiment 7 
 
Source SS df F p  
 
Hemisphere (A)      172.50  1   6.882    0.02 
Race (B)     78.88  1   4.047    0.06 
University (C)     18.78  1   0.836    0.38 
Orientation (D)     212.29  1   5.447    0.03 
 
A × B     3.00  1   2.191    0.16 
A × C     0.34     1   0.260    0.62 
A × D     4.68     1   1.802    0.19 
B × C     6.23  1   0.192    0.67 
B × D     0.10  1   0.004    0.95 
C × D     1.85  1   0.100    0.76 
 
A × B × C     0.93  1   0.680    0.42 
A × B × D     7.14  1   4.323    0.06 
A × C × D    2.11  1   0.864    0.37 
B × C × D     1.73  1   0.214    0.65 
 
A × B × C × D     0.96  1   0.334    0.57 
 
Error (A/within)    375.96 15 
Error (B/within)    292.35 15 
Error (C/within)  336.76  15 
Error (D/Within) 584.65     15 
 
Error (A × B/within)    20.57 15 
Error (A × C/within)    19.39  15 
Error (A × D/within)  38.94  15 
Error (B × C/Within) 487.28     15 
Error (B × D/within)    350.74  15 
Error (C × D/within) 277.99  15 
 
Error (A × B × C/Within) 20.41     15 
Error (A × B × D/Within) 24.78     15 
Error (A × C × D/Within)   36.66     15 
Error (B × C × D/Within) 121.47     15 
 
Error (A × B × C × D/Within) 43.00     15 
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P200 Mean Peak Latency (ms) and Amplitude (µV) as a Function of Hemisphere, Race, 
University, and Orientation, Experiment 1 
 
  Own University (Birmingham) Other University (Nottingham) 
  Upright Inverted Upright Inverted 
Left Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 P200 Latency (ms) 211 (3.46) 217 (5.15) 214 (5.85) 218 (3.02) 
 P200 Amplitude (µV) 6.66 (1.16) 5.12 (1.34) 6.16 (1.34) 4.01 (1.13) 
Other Race (Black) 
 P200 Latency (ms) 225 (9.18) 223 (6.42) 212 (4.74) 215 (4.26) 
 P200 Amplitude (µV) 5.14 (1.64) 3.60 (0.96) 4.44 (1.19) 3.46 (1.18) 
Right Hemisphere 
Own Race (White) 
 P200 Latency (ms) 214 (3.80) 222 (4.43) 214 (5.83) 216 (2.12) 
 P200 Amplitude (µV) 7.16 (1.07) 5.76 (1.19) 8.38 (1.21) 6.35 (1.55) 
Other Race (Black) 
 P200 Latency (ms) 229 (8.62) 226 (6.20) 219 (5.93) 218 (3.64) 
 P200 Amplitude (µV) 7.46 (1.64) 4.60 (1.07) 7.03 (1.24) 4.96 (1.15) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix FA 
 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 8, discrimination latency (ms) 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    1223.20  1  1.064   0.306 
University (B) 771.39  1  0.845   0.361 
Alignment (C) 142164.62  1  128.389   0.001 
 
A × B 1787.18  1 1.375   0.245 
A × C 661.14  1  0.740 3.93 
B × C 5059.041  1 7.382   0.008 
 
A × B × C 4965.25  1  4.312 0.042 
 
Error (A/within)   72394.55 63 
Error (B/within)   57503.89 63 
Error (C/within)   69759.73 63 
 
Error (A × B/within)   81888.56 63 
Error (A × C/within)   56288.868 63 
Error (B × C/within)   43172.88 63 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   7245.33 63 
 
 
Average discrimination latency (ms), as a function of target race, group and orientation, 
Experiment 8.  
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 Aligned Misaligned Aligned Misalgined 
Own Race (White) 596 (13.38) 560 (12.14) 602 (12.82) 566 (11.61) 
Other Race (Black) 607 (13.64) 565 (12.02) 593 (12.33) 574 (12.39) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
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Appendix GA 
ANOVA Summary: Experiment 8, error analysis 
Source SS df F p  
 
Race (A)    169.97  1  23.372   0.001 
University (B) 0.56  1 0.142   0.708 
Alignement (C) 710.17  1 37.270   0.001 
 
A × B 0.096  1 0.026   0.873 
A × C 62.58  1  22.20   0.001 
B × C 2.67  1 1.063   0.306 
 
A × B × C 0.330  1  0.128   0.722 
 
Error (A/within)   458.15 63 
Error (B/within)   250.56 63 
Error (C/within)   1200.45 63 
 
Error (A × B/within)   234.52 63 
Error (A × C/within)   177.54 63 
Error (B × C/within)   158.45 63 
 
Error (A × B × C /within)   162.29 63 
 
 
Average errors, as a function of target race, group and orientation, Experiment 8.  
 
Own University 
(Birmingham) 
Other University 
(Nottingham) 
 Aligned Misaligned Aligned Misaglied 
Own Race (White) 4.35 (0.64) 2.60 (0.63) 4.17 (0.66) 2.60 (0.58) 
Other Race (Black) 6.23 (0.70) 2.98 (0.59) 6.00 (0.69) 3.14 (0.59) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard error 
 
 
 
